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THE FLORIDA EDUCATION FINANCE PROGRA FROM 1981 TO 2009: 
 
A HISTORICAL REVIEW AND EQUITY ANALYSIS 
 
Curtis Todd Bowden 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 In 1973, the state of Florida implemented the Florida Education Finance Program 
(FEFP).  The program was developed to distribute available funds to public school 
districts in a more equitable manner than the Minimum Foundation Plan it replaced.  
Almost immediately, the Florida Education Finance Program came under attack as less 
equitable and unnecessarily complex. 
 The Florida Education Finance Program provides funding to local school districts 
based on the number students and the types of educational programs in which they are 
enrolled.  Through a system of program cost factors and district cost differentials the 
Florida Education Finance Program adjusts for the type of students and the economic 
environment the district serves.  But does it distribute funds equitably? 
This study was designed to answer one central research question:  “Does the 
Florida Education Finance Program equitably distribute available funding to public 
school districts in the state?”  In order to answer this question, a three phase method was 
implemented.  In the first phase a chronological development of Florida‟s school finance 
plan was developed.  The second phase employed research based statistical tools to gauge 
the distributional equity of Florida‟s mechanism for distributing available funds for 
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Florida public school districts.  The final phase used Pearson product-moment 
correlations to gauge the fiscal neutrality of the system.  The study is patterned after a 
similar study completed in 1982 that called into question the distributional equity of the 
Florida Education Finance Program. 
The coefficient of variation, federal range ratio, McLoone index, Verstegen index, 
and Gini coefficient are all research based measures of distributional equity that are 
resistant to inflationary pressure.  Each of these measures of distributional equity yielded 
the same results.   They showed a high level of equity in the distribution of available 
funding to Florida‟s public school districts through the Florida Education Finance 
Program. 
This study left open the questions of adequacy and the role of the state in funding 
public education in the state of Florida to future study. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 For over 30 years, the distribution of educational opportunities and the equality of 
education funding across communities has generated considerable interest among policy 
makers, the public, and the courts (Moser & Rubenstein, 2002).  The majority of states 
have been involved in ongoing judicial and legislative controversies over education 
finance formulas that provide more education resources to students in some school 
districts than others.  Despite scores of court decisions and dozens of legislative 
enactments, the legal and political issues concerning state funding of education remains 
muddled (Imber, 2001).  Consistent with court decisions, states appear to be taking a 
more active role in the design of public school finance programs that recognize the 
difference in the needs of pupils, school and school districts (Verstegen & Jordan, 2009).  
Usually when the state assumes a greater fiscal responsibility for funding its public 
schools, a higher level of fiscal equity is the result (Driscoll & Salmon, 2008). 
The two key questions that currently guide the school funding debate are: 
1. How much money is needed? 
2. What is fair in the distribution of available funding (Ramirez, 2003)?  
These questions revolve around the concepts of adequacy and equity.  Challenges to the 
constitutionality of a state school finance system as inequitable or inadequate have driven 
reform of school finance systems in those states (Hirth & Eiler, 2005). School funding 
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litigation is nothing new to the United States (Murry, 2006).  During the past 40 years, 
questions about the equity and adequacy of school finance have been the subject of 
lawsuits in nearly every state (Glenn, 2006). 
In examining any school funding formula, it is important to understand the 
differences between equity, equality, and adequacy because it leads to profound 
differences in the definition of the problems to be addressed and the remedies available 
for their solution (Hirth & Eiler, 2005).  Theoretically, there should be no relationship 
between wealth and resources (Driscoll & Salmon, 2008).  
Adequacy Defined 
 One would think that a concept so central to the debate of funding of public 
education would have a readily accepted definition.  Yet, a consensus of the experts is 
hard to find.  In general terms, adequacy deals with the amount of money needed by a 
system of education to deliver a specific result.  The key to adequacy is that it revolves 
around a stated outcome.  The adequacy of educational dollars is measured by the degree 
of student achievement in comparison to the stated performance standards of the 
education system (Odden, 2003). 
There is not and probably will never be a single standard that applies across states 
as the absolute cost of an adequate education (Baker, 2005).  If we assume that state-
imposed standards define what an “adequate” education is, we can refer to the amount of 
money necessary to achieve educational adequacy as the “cost” of education (Imazeki & 
Reschovsky, 2003).   To date, no single approach to determining an adequate spending 
level is dominant across the country, and each produces different dollar amounts.  Most 
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require substantial increases in education funding (Odden, 2003).  The Kentucky 
Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better Education in 1989 defined an adequate 
education as one that provides “sufficient knowledge of economic, social and political 
systems to enable the student to make informed choices” and “sufficient understanding of 
governmental process to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her 
community, state, and nation (Roelke, Green, & Zielewski, 2004, p. 122).”  The 
Wyoming Supreme Court in Campbell County School District v. State in 1995 found that 
the state‟s education article obliged the legislature to “provide an education system of a 
character which provides Wyoming students with a uniform opportunity to become 
equipped for their future role as citizens, participants in the political system (Roelke et 
al., 2004, p. 122).”  The New Hampshire Supreme Court held in Claremont School 
District v. Governor in 1993 that an adequate education “includes broad educational 
opportunities needed in today‟s society to prepare citizens for their role as participants 
and as potential competitors in today‟s marketplace (Roelke et al., 2004, p. 122).”  The 
New York Supreme Court found in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State in 2003 that an 
adequate education is one that provides students with greater than minimum preparation 
(Roelke et al, 2004). 
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 The underlying theoretical assumptions for the shape of educational adequacy are:  
1. Basic costs vary by desired outcomes 
2. Marginal Costs of Achieving Outcomes vary by district scale 
3. Marginal Costs of Achieving Outcomes vary by student needs 
4. Marginal Costs of Producing Outcomes vary by prices districts must 
pay for comparable resources 
5. Scale, student needs, and input prices interact to influence costs 
multiplicatively 
6. Marginal costs of achieving desired outcomes increase as performance 
standards increase and decrease as performance standards decrease 
(Baker, 2005). 
 
 Court decisions and legislative struggles have emphasized that adequacy – state 
funding at levels that allow all children to perform at high levels – is replacing equity as 
the school finance issue of our time (Picus, 2001).  Long focused on fiscal equity, school 
finance is now shifting toward fiscal adequacy.  And this shift represents a fundamental 
change: it means that school finance today encompasses not only fiscal inputs but also 
their connection to educational programs, teacher compensation, and student achievement 
(Odden, 2003). Adequacy is challenging equity as the standard to which state school 
revenue distribution plans should be held (Cohen-Vogel & Cohen-Vogel, = 2001).  
Despite the shift to adequacy, those who make school finance policy must remain vigilant 
about fiscal disparities caused by the unequal distribution of available revenues. As 
funding formulas are revised to ensure adequacy, there will also be an improvement in 
fiscal equity (Odden, 2003). 
Equity Defined 
The struggle for equity continues to be at once the most important and the most 
contentious issue in American education (Imber, 2001).  Equity is a long-held and widely 
affirmed ideal of the American system of government (Verstegen & Driscoll, 2008).  In 
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one form or another, equity in school funding has been a major concern in K-12 
education finance discussions since the early 1970s (Toutkoushian & Michael, 2007).  
While perfect equity will probably never be fully defined, much less achieved, education 
policy and practice must be designed to promote the goal of creating the most equitable 
system of education possible (Imber, 2001).   
 Two alternative definitions of equity exist in school funding.  The first is known 
as horizontal equity, meaning that school districts considered to be similar to each other 
along dimensions that relate to the cost of providing basic education, such as wealth, size, 
and socioeconomic status, should have comparable levels of funding.  This is often called 
the equal treatment of equals in school finance literature.  A second equity principle, 
vertical equity, states that for education funding to be equitable, school districts with 
higher costs to educate student populations should receive more funding than their 
counterparts to compensate for this difference; this is called the unequal treatment of 
unequals (Toutkoushian & Michael, 2007). 
From the pupil‟s perspective, equity means sufficient funding to ensure equal 
access to educational opportunity.  From the taxpayers‟ perspective, equity means that 
taxes should be equal regardless of one‟s taxing jurisdiction.   
Fiscal equity in financing public education has been a substantive issue with a 
long history in school finance literature (Maiden & Evans, 2009).  Equity targets need to 
be supplemented, not supplanted, by adequacy targets to determine whether there is 
sufficient funding available to teach all children to high standards (Verstegen, 2002).  In 
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theory, any system designed to provide adequate funding for virtually all students should 
also meet the standards of equity (Picus, 2001). 
  Public education systems are designed to produce equity (fairness) in the 
treatment of their students, but they do not, cannot, and should not aspire to produce 
complete equality.  In the difficult process of allocating resources for education, some 
recipients must necessarily receive advantages over others, while some suffer 
disadvantages.  This is inevitable in a process where there are innate and fundamental 
differences in students‟ ability, interest, and desire to learn (Brimley & Garfield, 2002). 
Adequacy Versus Equity Studies 
As stated previously, state distribution systems can be evaluated from two distinct 
perspectives.   
1. How much money is needed? 
2. What is fair in the distribution of available funding? 
 
Finance systems can be equitable but not adequate if children and youth within a state 
receive insufficient funding to meet state standards, requirements, and laws (Verstegen & 
Driscoll, 2008).  Researchers and policymakers should endeavor to ensure that resources 
supporting instruction as the critical component of the educational enterprise are 
distributed fairly.  Continued studies of state distribution systems are strongly 
recommended (Maiden & Evans, 2009).  Studies designed to determine the amount of 
money needed to operate an adequate system of education are designed and conducted 
differently than studies designed to test the fairness of the distribution of available 
funding.  It is important for researchers to clearly differentiate whether they intend to 
conduct an adequacy or equity study, and tailor their methods accordingly. 
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Over the past 10 years, education policy analysts have established four different 
approaches for determining an adequate per student funding level in a state system of 
education:  
1. Determining the economic cost of various educational functions 
2. Linking spending to performance benchmarks 
3. Asking professional educators 
4. Pricing effective school wide strategies (Picus, 2001) 
 
Each of these methods results in a cost of education for a presumed hypothetical average 
student that can serve as an adequacy target and basis for school finance policy.  This 
cost is further adjusted for special high cost students and district characteristics 
(Verstegen, 2002).  It is important to note that researchers would chose from one of the 
four established approaches.  A justification for using the selected method would be 
required as each method will deliver a different result based on its methodology. 
 Measures of equity are well-established in the school finance literature (Bundt & 
Leland, 2001).  New York University Professors Robert Berne and Leanna Stiefel have 
developed a widely used framework for conceptualizing and measuring equity in 
education finance (Verstegen, 2002).  The framework consists of eight equity measures 
that can be used in conjunction with each other to make judgments about distribution of 
available funding.  The equity measures are: 
1. Range 
2. Restricted Range 
3. Federal Range Ratio 
4. Coefficient of Variation 
5. Gini Coefficient 
6. McLoone Index 
7. Verstegen Index 
8. Fiscal Neutrality 
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The Case of Florida 
In 1982, a doctoral student at the University of Florida proposed to study the 
financing of Florida‟s K-12 public schools.  That student, Dr. Lee Shiver, completed his 
doctoral studies with a dissertation entitled A Historical Review of the Development of 
Florida’s School Finance Plan and the Fiscal Equalization Effects of the Florida 
Education Finance Plan.  Dr. Shiver‟s dissertation, completed in 1982, studied Florida‟s 
system for financing public education from two perspectives.  The first perspective was a 
historical one.  Dr. Shiver chronicled the financing of public schools in Florida from 
statehood through the publication of his dissertation in 1982.  The second perspective 
involved the application of statistical tests to determine if the newly enacted Florida 
Education Finance Program (FEFP) distributed funds more equitably than the Minimum 
Foundation Plan (MFP) it replaced. 
Dr. Shiver‟s study was held out as an equity study.  His findings were surprising 
in that he found the Minimum Foundation Plan was more equitable than the newer 
Florida Education Finance Program.  In the introduction to his study, Dr. Shiver quoted 
from the work of Morphet, Johns and Reller (1982, p. 402).  The quote stated: 
The equalization of educational opportunity within a state is not a 
simple task …The measurement of educational need and the 
computation of variations in the unit costs for equivalent 
educational programs and services is a problem which requires 
continuous study in each state if educational opportunities are 
really equalized. 
 
This statement is as true in 2009 as it was in 1982.  It is this need for continuous study 
that drives the call for new and current study of Florida‟s system for financing public K-
12 education.   
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 It behooves policymakers to carefully and continuously examine state education 
funding systems (Vesely, Crampton, Obiakor, & Sapp, 2008).  Continuing that study, and 
clearly differentiating between equity and equality, is the intent of this study.  Utilizing 
the multiple perspectives of the Shiver study, it is the desire of this study to chronicle the 
evolution of the Florida Education Finance Program from the publication of Dr. Shivers 
work in 1982 through 2009.  The current study will also replicate the statistical 
techniques used by Dr. Shiver.  Newer statistical models are also to be employed so that a 
linear comparison can take place amongst the findings to produce a work, that when 
compiled with the original study, provides data about the equalization effects of the 
Florida Education Finance Program from the 1970-71 through 2008-09 academic years.   
 Over a decade after the A Nation at Risk report and three decades well after the 
ground breaking school finance litigation of the 1970‟s, a review of the political economy 
of education finance in state capitols indicates that public school funding continues to be 
a tortuous undertaking and its path is strewn with technical and political minefields.  The 
pursuit of equal educational opportunity, begun in earnest in the late 1960‟s, is still a 
distant goal for many states (Nakib & Herrington, 1998).  School finance policy for most 
of the 20
th
 century largely concerned fiscal equity.  The key problem was differences in 
revenues per pupil across school district lines, usually but not always, caused by 
differences in property wealth per pupil (Odden, 2000).  In the twentieth century, state 
governments have tried to offset these funding inequities by supplementing local 
revenues with state funds through a variety of equalizing measures.  Although these 
measures mitigate local inequalities, they rarely offset them (Rebell, 1999). 
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 Dr. Shiver wrote in 1982: 
It is important that the status of the FEFP‟s impact on equalization of 
educational opportunity in the state be updated to provide the information 
necessary for developing sound public finance policy in the future.  
Combined with a historical overview of the development of state support 
for public schools in Florida, such an analysis will enable scholars and 
governmental decision-makers to reflect upon and evaluate the pertinent 
background information, the trends established, and the lessons learned in 
the state‟s quest for school finance equity (p. 5). 
 
Many things have changed in regards to financing schools equitably since 1982, yet many 
have not.  The need for current information and a complete history of Florida‟s finance 
system described by Dr. Shiver in 1982 is evident today.  Twenty-seven years later, the 
1982 study‟s historical review has become outdated.  From a statistical perspective, 
statistical tools have been developed and refined over the last twenty-seven years that 
allow us to better gauge the equity of a state‟s school finance distribution system.   It is 
the need for an updated historical review and an updated statistical analysis of the State 
of Florida‟s school finance distribution formula that forms the basis of this study.   
Statement of the Problem 
 The United States has not one system of education finance but 50, each shaped by 
statutes of the particular state.  Therefore, the study of education finance policy is the 
study of state legislative activity (Crampton, 2007).  The means by which states provide 
funding for public education vary greatly across the United States, and there are many 
variations in the details of how these distributions are made.  Although almost every state 
uses a funding formula for distributing revenues for public education, no two are alike in 
their specific details (Toutkoushian & Michael, 2008).  The state of Florida has had in 
place, since the time of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, an education finance system called the 
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Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP), which makes substantial effort to equalize 
per-pupil spending in all of the state's school districts while recognizing the local factors 
that may necessitate changes in that spending (Bauries, 2006).  In 1982, Dr. Shiver called 
into question the equity components of the Florida Education Finance Program.  His 
findings specifically stated that the Minimum Foundation Plan was more equitable than 
the Florida Education Finance Program.  This study challenges those findings by using 
recent, research based statistical tools to conduct a true equity study. 
 A statistical analysis of the equalization of educational funding in Florida from 
1982-83 to 2008-09 was conducted to determine the state aid impact on equalization in 
the state.  Dr. Shiver‟s original statistical method was employed as well as more recent 
statistical tools.  The findings are presented side-by-side for comparative purposes.  The 
coupling of these studies provides data from 1970-71 through 2008-09.  Measures of 
fiscal equality are the focus of the analysis. 
Research Question 
 The central research question of this study is: 
 Does the Florida Education Finance Program equitably distribute available 
funding to public school districts in the state? 
Procedures 
 The study is conducted using procedures outlined in the initial Shiver study as 
well as those contained in the current literature.  The study is conducted in three phases.   
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Phase I 
  The chronological development of Florida‟s school finance plan is traced through 
a review of relevant literature including official state and local agency reports and 
records.  This historical review covers the period from 1982 through 2009.  The historical 
review has been completed and is included as chapter 2 of this study. 
Phase II 
Phase II begins with the identification of the statistical measures and independent 
and dependant variables, which will be used to assess the progress of state school aid, 
toward greater equalization of educational opportunity.  Based on the concept and 
measurement approaches which have been used previously by Dr. Shiver, and those 
established in the current literature, as well as the accessible and centrally recorded data 
pertaining to the state and local funding of Florida's sixty-seven public school districts 
necessary to conduct such analyses, the following measures are the variables for analysis. 
Variables for Analysis 
Total State Revenue per Pupil.  This variable is the sum of all state revenue 
provided to districts and includes the FEFP appropriations, categorical program funding, 
special state revenue sources, special state appropriations, and state lottery funds divided 
by the unweighted FTE student count of the district.  The required local effort is 
prescribed by the state, but raised from local sources (property taxes) and will not be 
included in total state revenue per pupil. 
District Cost Differential (DCD) Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil.  This 
variable is the sum of all state revenue provided to districts and includes the FEFP 
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appropriations, categorical program funding, special revenue sources, special 
appropriations, and lottery funds divided by the unweighted FTE student count of the 
district divided by the district‟s District Cost Differential. 
Comparable Wage Index (CWI) Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil.  This 
variable is the sum of all state revenue provided to districts and includes the FEFP 
appropriations, categorical program funding, special revenue sources, special 
appropriations, and lottery funds divided by the unweighted FTE student count of the 
district divided by the district‟s Comparable Wage Index. 
Geographic Cost of Education Index (GCEI) Adjusted Total State Revenue per 
Pupil.  This variable is the sum of all state revenue provided to districts and includes the 
FEFP appropriations, categorical program funding, special revenue sources, special 
appropriations, and lottery funds divided by the unweighted FTE student count of the 
district divided by the district‟s Geographic Cost of Education Index. 
Total Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable is the revenue derived from the 
required local effort combined with other local revenues provided to the district divided 
by the unweighted FTE student count. 
DCD Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable is the revenue 
derived from the required local effort combined with other local revenues provided to the 
district divided by the unweighted FTE student count divided by the district‟s District 
Cost Differential. 
CWI Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable is the revenue 
derived from the required local effort combined with other local revenues provided to the 
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district divided by the unweighted FTE student count divided by the district‟s 
Comparable Wage Index. 
GCEI Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable is the revenue 
derived from the required local effort combined with other local revenues provided to the 
district divided by the unweighted FTE student count divided by the district‟s Geographic 
Cost of Education Index. 
Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable combines the total state 
revenue and the total local revenue provided to the district divided by the unweighted 
FTE student count. 
DCD Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable combines 
the total state revenue and the total local revenue provided to the district divided by the 
unweighted FTE student count divided by the district‟s District Cost Differential. 
CWI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable combines 
the total state revenue and the total local revenue provided to the district divided by the 
unweighted FTE student count divided by the Comparable Wage Index. 
GCEI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable combines 
the total state revenue and the total local revenue provided to the district divided by the 
unweighted FTE student count divided by the Geographic Cost of Education Index. 
Measures of Dispersion of Variability and Variation 
Seven different measures of dispersions of variability or variation were selected 
by the Shiver study to summarize the FEFP‟s impact on distributional equality among the 
state‟s school districts.  Three additional measures of dispersion or variability have been 
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selected based on their prevalence in the current literature.  These ten different measures 
of dispersions or variability will be utilized in the current study. 
Percentiles.  School districts are ranked according to the variable of interest with 
values listed for the 100
th
 (highest), 95
th
, 75
th
, 50
th
 (median), 25
th
, 5
th
, and 1
st
 (lowest) 
percentiles. 
Range.  The range is the difference between the values of a variable in the highest 
and lowest districts in a distribution. 
Restricted Range.  The restricted range is a measure less sensitive to extreme 
values than the range.  In this study, it is the difference between the values of the selected 
revenue measure at the 95
th
 and the 5
th
 percentiles. 
Federal Range Ratio.  The federal range ratio is the restricted range divided by 
the per-pupil revenue measure at the 5
th
 percentile.  
Mean.  The mean is the sum of the school districts values of a variable divided by 
the number of districts. 
Standard Deviation.  The standard deviation is the square root of the mean of the 
squared differences between the value of the variable in each district and the mean. 
Coefficient of Variation.  The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation 
divided by the mean. 
Gini Coefficient.  After school districts are ranked in ascending order by the 
variable of interest, they will be plotted on a graph with the percentage of the total pupil 
population measured along the horizontal axis and the percentage of revenue received on 
the vertical axis.  A 45-degree diagonal dissects the graph and represents the locus points 
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where the two factors are equal, or a state of total equality.  Inequalities are represented 
by the curve (Lorenz curve) divergent from the diagonal.  The Gini coefficient is a 
statistical summary of distributional equality and is equal to the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the 45-degree diagonal divided by the area of the triangle below the diagonal.  
The closer the Gini coefficient approaches zero, the closer the distribution is to total 
equality. 
McLoone Index.  The McLoone index is the sum of per-pupil revenue measure for 
students at or below the median divided by the sum of per-pupil revenue measure if all 
the students below the median received the median amount. 
Verstegen Index.  The Verstegen index is the sum of per-pupil revenue measure 
for students at or above the median divided by the sum of per-pupil revenue measure if 
all the students above the median received the median amount. 
 Corresponding data appropriate to the aforementioned variables and measures are 
then collected, computed, and analyzed for every other school year beginning with 1982-
83 through 2008-09.   
Phase III 
Assuming the continuance of some degree of variation among the aforementioned 
measures of distributional equality, a separate analysis using Pearson product-moment 
correlations will focus on the relationship between each of the selected per pupil revenue 
measures and a pair of independent variables thought to have varying degrees of 
influence on per pupil revenues.  Variations in distributional equality are then evaluated 
by assessing the changes in the strength of relationship associated with each correlation.  
   
17 
This procedure gauges the fiscal neutrality of the system and is consistent with the 
procedures utilized in the Shiver study and are contained in the current literature. 
Independent Variables 
 The selected independent variables are measured in terms of amount or unit per 
pupil and are as follows: 
District Cost Differential Factor.  District cost differential factors are 
incorporated into the FEFP formula to adjust the districts‟ FEFP allocations for the 
varying cost of providing similar education programs.  The district cost differential is not 
based on student variables, but rather economic data relevant to the cost of doing 
business in a geographic region and is not measured per pupil. 
Assessed Valuation.  The property tax base is the assessed, nonexempt value of 
property against which taxes are levied.  Assessed property values are a net figure for a 
district.  In order for the assessed valuation to be relevant for a school finance study, the 
figure was converted to a per pupil figure.  Each district‟s net assessed valuation is 
divided by the unweighted FTE of that district. The result is an assessed valuation per 
pupil. 
Delimitations 
1.   The historical account of the development of Florida‟s school finance plan is 
delimited to a review of the major changes in the structure of the state‟s public school 
funding systems since the Shiver study was completed in 1982. 
2.   The analysis of equalization of educational opportunity in the state is confined 
to the twelve selected revenue measures. 
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3.   The study is restricted to quantitative measures of distributional equality and 
fiscal neutrality as its criteria of school finance equity. 
4.   Analysis of the state aid program‟s impact on equalization of educational 
opportunity in the state is confined to a study of every other school year from 1982-83 
through 2008-09. 
5.   Given that variations in revenues are more meaningful than variations in 
expenditures when studying the distribution of funding, the study is confined to analysis 
of measures of yearly revenues per pupil. 
6.   The assessed property values to be used in this study will be for the calendar 
year immediately preceding the selected school year.  This is consistent with the method 
employed in the Shiver study and allows for analysis of results across both the current 
and prior study. 
7.   The Comparable Wage Index and Geographic Cost of Education Index are 
cost adjustment indexes that are developed, calculated, and disseminated by outside third 
parties.  Each of these indexes is only available for specific years of the current study.  
When a current index is not available, the index from the most recent previous year was 
employed.  This is consistent with the index‟s application in current literature. 
8.  State revenue in the state of Florida is distributed to schools using the Florida 
Education Finance Program, but this is not the only means for distributing funds to 
Florida‟s public school districts.  Through the annual appropriation process, categorical 
funds are also allocated to public school districts.  These categorical allocations take 
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place outside of the Florida Education Finance Program are not included in any of the 
revenue measures used in this study.   
Limitations 
 This study is very clearly an equity study.  It seeks to answer the question:  "Does 
the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP) equitably distribute available funding to 
public school districts in the state?"  This study does not attempt to define what funding 
level is adequate for the students of Florida, nor does it attempt to make judgments on the 
adequacy of Florida‟s funding of public schools. 
Although the FEFP remains, basically, a foundation program, the complexities 
inherent in its funding process dictate that comparison of the substantive conclusions of 
this study or the prior Shiver study with similar analyses of other states‟ school finance 
reform measures be made with caution.  This study does not propose to, nor did the 
Shiver study, represent a comprehensive application of the myriad school finance equity 
standards and measures to the FEFP and its effect on equalization, but instead, focuses on 
a more compendious design that provides the same type of evaluative information in 
regard to distributional equity and fiscal neutrality.  This study has been constructed 
using the same methodology as the Shiver study to allow for comparison between years 
within the state of Florida.  Any other application of the studies‟ data would be 
inconsistent with their design.  
 The current study employs three cost adjustments in connection with the selected 
revenue measures.  The cost adjustments are the District Cost Differential (DCD), the 
Comparable Wage Index (CWI), and the Geographic Cost of Education Index (GCEI).  
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The DCD is available for all years of the current and previous study.  The DCD is a 
product of the Florida Price Level Index and the method for determining it has varied 
from year to year.  This variation is discussed further in Chapter 2.  The CWI was first 
calculated in 1997 and is available from 1997 through 2003.  To allow for continuous 
evaluation, the CWI for 2003 is used for subsequent years of the study.  The justification 
for this procedure is discussed in Chapter 3.  The GCEI was first calculated for the 1987-
88 school year and is available for the 1987-88, 1990-91, and 1993-94 school years.  In 
years where a current GCEI is not available and to allow for continuous evaluation, the 
GCEI for the most recent preceding year is utilized.  The justification for this procedure 
is discussed in Chapter 3. 
Justification for the Study 
Since establishing educational systems in the 1800s, most states have experienced 
problems in trying to equalize education funding from school to school and district to 
district (Hadderman, 1999).  The pace of reforms of state finance systems still shows no 
sign of slowing after 30 years of efforts.  More than 50 years after the historic Brown v. 
Board of Education decision demanding equality of educational opportunity for all 
students, the role of state education funding systems as a tool to promote social justice 
remains understudied and underutilized (Vesely, Crampton, Obiakor, & Sapp, 2008).  
Ever since the early 1970‟s, when states first made changes to their foundation grants and 
the Serrano v. Priest decision gave reforms a legal push, equalization of school finance 
across school districts has been a prime concern of state policy makers (Chandler, 2002). 
Equity in the financing of education continues to hold the attention of educational 
   
21 
researchers and policymakers.  Questions about whether public education funds are being 
fairly allocated (equity) and are sufficient for their specified purpose (adequacy) are 
being contested and debated by legislative and judicial bodies across the nation in the 
states on a regular and ongoing basis (Parrish, Hikido, & Fowler, 1998).  New attention 
to adequacy issues does not eliminate concerns about inequalities (Verstegen, 2002). 
The justification for this study is much the same as it was when Dr. Shiver first 
proposed to study the issue.  Without a current understanding of the historical 
development of Florida‟s school finance program, legislative and executive decision-
makers concerned with public school funding will be hard pressed to formulate sound 
policies for the future.  The primary focus of school finance equity analysis has rightly 
been on measuring imbalances in students‟ access to educational resources within a state 
(Fastrup, 2002).  Documentation of Florida‟s historical quest for equalization of 
educational opportunity can provide school funding policy-makers with an account of 
what has been accomplished in the past, thus facilitating their understanding of the 
origins and development of present-day problems and serving as a guide for the future.  
One of the most important standards by which we judge our education systems is equity 
(Bundt & Leland, 2001).  The ultimate goal of educational finance and economic 
research is to improve the quantity and quality of educational opportunities provided to 
all children (Rolle, Houck, & McColl, 2008). 
Financial equity among school expenditures is one type of educational input 
whose importance is widely recognized (Oesch & Paquette, 1995).  Although there are a 
few examples in which the target of equity has been the taxpayer, courts have only been 
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concerned with the extent to which the state is providing equal educational opportunity 
for children (Cohen-Vogel & Cohen-Vogel, 2001).  Although difficult to measure, or 
even define, equality of educational opportunity as a central policy objective has 
prompted continuous study (Oesch & Paquette, 1995).  The review of the historical 
development of the state‟s school finance plan contained within this study seeks to 
expand significantly on the Dr. Shiver study.  Current analysis of the FEFP‟s impact on 
equalization of educational opportunity in the state will not only allow legislators and 
others interested in Florida‟s school finance plan to assess the current status of school 
finance equity in Florida, but coupled with a review of the historical development of the 
state‟s support for public schools, provides needed, consequential information for the 
continued improvement of Florida‟s schools.   
When describing the limitations of his 1982 study, Dr. Shiver wrote “this study‟s 
analysis of the equalization trends before and after enactment of the FEFP may differ 
significantly in a future assessment of the long-run equity effects of the FEFP" (p. 14).   
This study seeks to provide that relevancy through the addition of current information 
and analysis to determine long-term trends in the equity of Florida‟s system for financing 
public K-12 education. 
Definition of Terms 
 The following terms were defined and utilized by the Shiver study.  Their 
definitions are presented here unchanged for consistency (Shiver, 1982, p. 18). 
Distributional Equality.  Distributional equality refers to the absence of disparities 
in the cost-adjusted distribution of per pupil, unweighted FTE, revenues. 
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Equalized Educational Opportunity.  Equalized educational opportunity means 
that every individual should have an equal chance to acquire the type and quality of 
education that will meet his personal needs and the needs of his society. 
Fiscal Neutrality.  When the quality of a child‟s education is unrelated to the 
wealth of the district in which the child lives, the school finance program is said to be 
fiscally neutral. 
Foundation Program.  A foundation program is a school finance system financed 
jointly by the state and local school districts in proportion to their relative taxpaying 
ability. 
Full Time Equivalent (FTE) Student.  An FTE student is a student who is enrolled 
in one or a combination of FEFP programs for not less than 25 hours per week in grades 
four through twelve or less than 20 hours per week if enrolled in kindergarten through 
grade three.  The 2008-2009 FEFP defined a full time equivalent student as “one student 
in membership in one or more FEFP programs for a school year or its equivalent (Florida 
Department of Education, 2008, p. 9). 
Revenue.  Revenue refers to the dollar amount of funds received from specified 
sources (e.g., state, local).  
Organization of the Study 
 This study is divided into five chapters.  Chapter one introduces the problem and 
the procedures to be used.  Chapter two is an overview of the historical development of 
public school finance in Florida from 1982-2009.  The methods and procedures to be 
used in the study as well as a brief discussion of the results of the previous study 
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comprise chapter three.  Chapters four and five will represent the application of the 
statistical tools to the identified variables of interest.  Specifically, chapter four will 
provide the analysis of the data and chapter five will present a summary of the findings, 
relevant conclusions, and recommendations for future practice. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
FLORIDA‟S SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAM FROM 1982 TO 2009 
 
 Florida‟s system for financing the operation of public school districts and schools, 
the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP), has remained relatively consistent since 
its implementation in 1973.   The FEFP bases funding on student enrollment, types of 
services or programs in which students participate, an annual monetary allocation per 
student, and the cost of operating a school district in local economies (Florida 
Department of Education [FLDOE], 1981).  In addition to these basic components of the 
FEFP, the formula also allows for categorical supplements and allocations.   
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the evolution of the FEFP from 1982 
through 2009.  The chapter will begin with an examination of the FEFP in 1982.  It will 
continue by exploring the changes the FEFP has undergone in each of five broad 
categories: 
1. Changes in the District Cost Differential  
2. Changes in the Program Cost Factors  
3. Inclusion and Exclusion of Various Adjustments 
4. Additional Allocations Outside of the Base FEFP Calculation 
5. The Inclusion of Lottery Dollars 
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The chapter will conclude by examining the most recent FEFP for 2008-09, discussing 
legal challenges brought against the FEFP, and drawing some conclusions about how the 
FEFP has changed over the last 27 years. 
The FEFP Funding Formula in 1982 
 Traditionally, state agencies have distributed dollars to school districts by 
formulas based upon instructional units or special services.  In 1973, the Florida 
Legislature passed the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP) which changed the 
focus for funding education in the state.  The Citizens Committee on Education, 
appointed in 1971 by Governor Askew, was generally credited with originating the basic 
thrust of the 1973 school finance bill.  Much of the committee‟s report was based on a 
National Education Finance Project (NEFP) study of Florida directed by R. L. Johns of 
the University of Florida (Shiver, 1982). 
 To provide equalization of educational opportunity in Florida, the FEFP formula 
recognized (1) varying program cost factors, (2) district cost differentials, (3) differences 
in per student cost for equivalent educational programs due to sparsity and dispersion of 
student population, and (4) required local effort. 
 The key feature of the finance program is to base financial support for education 
upon the individual student participating in a particular educational program rather than 
upon the number of teachers or classrooms.  FEFP funds are generated by multiplying the 
number of full-time equivalent students (FTE‟s) in each of the educational programs by 
cost factors to obtain weighted FTE‟s.  Weighted FTE‟s are then multiplied by a base 
student allocation and by a district cost differential to determine the state and local FEFP 
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funds.  Educational program cost factors are determined by the legislature and represent 
relative cost differences among the FEFP programs (FLDOE, 1981). 
 A total of $1,694,023,329 was appropriated for distribution in the Florida 
Education Finance Program for the 1981-82 school year (FLDOE, 1981).  A graphical 
illustration, Figure 1, of how the FEFP determines total state and local FEFP funds 
follows with a discussion of each of the components. 
Figure 1:  Calculation of State and Local FEFP in 1980 
 
 
 
 Full-time Equivalent (FTE) 
 A full-time equivalent in accordance with the provisions of the 1981-82 FEFP is 
one student on the membership roll of one school program or combination of school 
programs for five school days or the equivalent consisting of not less than a certain 
number of net hours as defined by the program type.  A combination of full or part-time 
students in one of the program areas is the equivalent of one full-time student based on 
certain criteria for each program type (FLDOE, 1981). 
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 To be eligible for full-time equivalent membership, a student must meet both of 
the following requirements: (1) The student must be in program membership at least one 
day during the survey period, and (2) The student must be in attendance at least one of 
the days of the survey period or one of the six days preceding the survey period on which 
students were in attendance (FLDOE, 1981). 
Program Cost Factors 
 To recognize the varying cost of educating students in different educational 
programs, the program cost factors provide a funding variable.  The Program Cost 
Factors for the 1981-82 fiscal year are listed in Table 1. 
Base Student Allocation 
The based student allocation is determined annually by the legislature.  For the 
1981-82 fiscal year, the base student allocation was $1,238.99 (FLDOE, 1981).   
Sparsity Supplement 
 Some school districts will qualify annually for a supplement for the extra costs of 
equivalent educational programs which have been caused by the sparsity of the student 
population.  This supplement was represented and discussed in the 1981-82 FEFP, but no 
funds were allocated for distribution. 
District Cost Differential 
 Just as the FEFP recognizes the varying cost of educating students in different 
educational programs, it also recognized the varying cost of educating students in 
different economies across the state.  The state policy objective for including cost  
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Table 1:  1981-82 Program Cost Factors (FLDOE, 1981) 
 
 Basic Program 
o Kindergarten and Grades 1, 2, and 3 1.234 
o Grades 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 1.000 
o Grades 10, 11, and 12 1.089 
o Educational Alternatives 1.869 
 
 Exceptional Student Programs 
o Educable Mentally Retarded 2.139 
o Trainable Mentally Retarded 2.803 
o Physically Handicapped 3.455 
o Physical & Occupational Therapy (part-time) 6.493 
o Speech and Hearing Therapy (part-time) 7.316 
o Deaf 3.775 
o Visually Handicapped (part-time) 10.983 
o Visually Handicapped 3.927 
o Emotionally Disturbed (part-time) 5.507 
o Emotionally Disturbed  3.287 
o Specific Learning Disability (part-time) 4.767 
o Specific Learning Disability 2.279 
o Gifted (part-time) 2.524 
o Hospital Homebound (part-time) 14.389 
o Profoundly Handicapped 5.628 
 
 Adult General Education Programs 
o Adult Basic Education & Adult High School 1.066 
 
 Vocational-Technical Programs 
 7-12 Job Adult  
                                                     Vocational      Preparatory     Supplemental 
o Agriculture 2.170 2.130 2.052 
o Business & Office 1.627 1.651 1.453 
o Distributive 1.508 1.585 1.293 
o Diversified 1.404 1.433 ------ 
o Health 2.097 2.157 1.491 
o Public Service 2.358 2.380 1.787 
o Home Economics 1.665 1.696 1.342 
o Industrial 2.077 2.023 1.683 
o Exploratory  1.399 ------ ------ 
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adjustments to state aid is to promote equity (Baker, 2008).  To that end, the FEFP 
includes a district cost differential.  The district cost differential is based upon an average  
of the previous three years of the Florida Price Level Index as determined by the 
Department of Administration.  The district cost differentials for the 1981-82 fiscal year 
are listed in Table 2 
Table 2:  1981-82 District Cost Differentials (FLDOE, 1981) 
 
Alachua ............... 0.9817 Hamilton ............. 0.9655 Okeechobee .. 0.9783 
Baker ................... 0.9590 Hardee ................. 0.9674 Orange ......... 0.9827 
Bay ...................... 0.9572 Hendry ................ 0.9770 Osceola ........ 0.9727 
Bradford .............. 0.9562 Hernando ............. 0.9681 Palm Beach .. 1.0203 
Brevard................ 0.9885 Highlands ............ 1.9687 Pasco ............ 0.9684 
Broward .............. 1.0213 Hillsborough........ 0.9894 Pinellas ......... 0.9974 
Calhoun ............... 0.9566 Holmes ................ 0.9540 Polk .............. 0.9750 
Charlotte .............. 0.9842 Indian River......... 0.9929 Putnam ......... 0.9511 
Citrus................... 0.9694 Jackson ................ 0.9636 St. Johns ....... 0.9786 
Clay ..................... 0.9815 Jefferson .............. 0.9708 St. Lucie ....... 0.9862 
Collier ................. 1.0168 Lafayette ............. 0.9678 Santa Rosa.... 0.9538 
Columbia ............. 0.9634 Lake .................... 0.9745 Sarasota ........ 1.0041 
Dade .................... 1.0442 Lee ...................... 1.0048 Seminole ...... 0.9872 
De Soto ............... 0.9703 Leon .................... 0.9669 Sumter .......... 0.9679 
Dixie ................... 0.9642 Levy .................... 0.9608 Suwannee ..... 0.9608 
Duval................... 0.9805 Liberty................. 0.9752 Taylor........... 0.9594 
Escambia ............. 0.9640 Madison .............. 0.9543 Union ........... 0.9656 
Flagler ................. 0.9873 Manatee ............... 0.9890 Volusia ......... 0.9911 
Franklin ............... 0.9818 Marion................. 0.9750 Wakulla ........ 0.9842 
Gadsden .............. 0.9603 Martin ................. 1.0157 Walton ......... 0.9670 
Gilchrist .............. 0.9716 Monroe ................ 1.0721 Washington .. 0.9576 
Glades ................. 0.9909 Nassau ................. 0.9641 
Gulf ..................... 0.9618 Okaloosa ............. 0.9758 
 
 
Declining Enrollment & Guaranteed Minimum Levels 
This supplement and guarantee was the only such provision of the 1981-82 FEFP.  
The funding component is a collection of three guaranteed minimum funding provisions.  
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The first of the minimum funding provisions is the declining enrollment supplement.  In 
those districts where there is a decline in the unweighted FTE‟s (enrollment), 50 percent 
of the decline is to be multiplied by the prior year‟s calculated FEFP program per 
unweighted FTE and added to the allocation of the district (FLDOE, 1981). 
The second guaranteed minimum funding level provision is then applied to the 
total of all of the preceding dollars including the declining enrollment provision.  It 
guarantees that each district will receive the greater of the total potential funding per full-
time equivalent student or the total funding available per full-time equivalent student in 
the previous year, multiplied by the current full time equivalent students (FLDOE, 1981). 
 The third provision provides that in addition to all other hold harmless provisions, 
each school district is entitled to receive additional state funds through the FEFP to 
compensate for reductions in funding related to certain federal programs (FLDOE, 1981). 
State & Local FEFP Dollars 
 The state and local FEFP dollars is the total amount allocated for the current 
operations of each school district.  It is subject to a reduction for local effort and various 
adjustments as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2:  Calculation of Net State FEFP in 1981-82 
 
 
 
State and 
Local FEFP 
Dollars 
- 
Required 
Local 
Effort 
= 
State 
FEFP 
Dollars 
+ 
- 
 
Adjustments = 
Net State 
FEFP 
Allocation 
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Required Local Effort 
 The district required local effort is subtracted from the basic amount for current 
operation or state and local FEFP dollars.  The required local effort is set by the 
legislature.  For the 1981-82 fiscal year, the legislature set the required local effort at 
$838,673,038.  The Commissioner of Education, based on the amount set by the 
legislature then sets the state-wide property millage levy necessary.  For the 1981-82 
fiscal year, the millage rate was 4.512 mills (FLDOE, 1981).  
State FEFP Dollars 
 The state portion of the FEFP or state FEFP dollars is the result of subtracting the 
required local effort from the state and local FEFP dollars. 
Adjustments 
A provision is also included in the 1981-82 FEFP to authorize the Department of 
Education to make prior-year adjustments in the allocation of funds to a district for 
arithmetical errors, assessment roll changes, full-time equivalent student membership 
errors, or allocation errors revealed in an audit report. 
Net State FEFP Allocation 
 As Figure 3 illustrates, by removing the adjustments from the state FEFP dollars, 
one can arrive at the net state FEFP allocation. The net state FEFP allocation is then 
increased by categorical program funds and special allocations to determine the total state 
allocation. 
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Figure 3: Calculation of Total State Allocation in 1981-82 
 
 
Categorical Program Funds 
 Categorical program funds are added to the FEFP allocation which is distributed 
to districts.  The 1981-82 FEFP included eight such programs with allocations totaling 
$291,134,427.  They are listed below (FLDOE, 1981): 
 Community Schools  $2,355,242 
 Comprehensive Health Education  1,272,868 
 Comprehensive School Construction and Debt Service  150,035,935 
o Public Education Capital Outlay   $92,035,935 
o Motor Vehicle License Sales  58,000,000 
 Diagnostic and Learning Resources  817,479 
 Instructional Materials  36,290,000 
 School Lunch  9,321,676 
 Student Development Services  20,659,148 
 Student Transportation  70,382,079 
 
Special Allocations 
 Special Allocations are added to the FEFP allocation which is distributed to 
districts.  Special allocations include all other sources of state aid for districts not 
classified by Florida Statutes as FEFP or categorical program funds.  The 1981-82 FEFP 
included eight such special allocations totaling $142,144,159.  They are listed below 
(FLDOE, 1981): 
Net State 
FEFP 
Allocation 
+ 
Categorical 
Program 
Funds 
+ 
Special 
Allocations = 
Total 
State 
Allocation 
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 Community Instructional Services $4,889,963 
 Compensatory Education Supplement 33,176,646 
 Educational Improvement Grants 469,673 
 Environmental Education 325,437 
 K-3 Improvement Program 79,899,792 
 Law Education 185,179 
 Migrant Education for 3 and 4 year olds 2,000,000 
 School Volunteer Program 319,929 
 School Bus Replacement 12,144,040 
 School Safety Fund – Pilot Program, Dade County 2,500,000 
 Writing Skills Enhancement 6,000,000 
 Governor‟s Summer Program for the Gifted 233,500 
 
Total State Allocation 
 The total state allocation is the result of adding the categorical program funds and 
the special allocations to the net state FEFP allocation.  The total state allocation 
represents the total state financial contribution to the operation of local school districts. 
The Evolution of the FEFP 
Changes to the District Cost Differentials 
The District Cost Differentials serve as a funding variable to adjust for the cost of 
doing business in the 67 county school districts in Florida.  Its function in the Florida 
Education Finance Program has remained unchanged throughout the 27 year period 
covered by this study. However, the method in which the District Cost Differentials has 
been calculated has varied during this period.   
Calculation of the District Cost Differential 
In 1981-82, the District Cost Differential was based upon the average of the three 
previous years of the Florida Price Level Index as determined by the Department of 
Administration (FLDOE, 1981).  This was consistent through the 1988-89 Florida 
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Education Finance Program.  The only change during this eight year period was a change 
in responsibility for determining the Florida Price Level Index being moved from the 
Department of Administration to the Executive Office of the Governor (FLDOE, 1988). 
The 1989-90 Florida Education Finance Program brought a significant change to 
the District Cost Differential.  It was no longer solely based on the three year average of 
the Florida Price Level Index.  The 1989 Legislature provided that each district with a 
calculated value below 1.000 would be set to 1.000 in determining FEFP allocations.  
Only 9 of the 67 county school districts had a District Cost Differential other than 1.000 
(FLDOE, 1989).  The practice of setting values at 1.000 for districts under 1.000 was 
repeated again in the 1990-91 Florida Education Finance Program.  Once again only 9 
districts had a District Cost Differential other than 1.000 (FLDOE, 1990). 
For a two year period beginning in 1991-92, the District Cost Differential was 
based on the three year average of the Florida Price Level Index with three major 
adjustments.  The first adjustment sought to tie the District Cost Differential to the salary 
component of school district operating costs.  To accomplish this, the averaged index 
factor was multiplied by 0.008 and 0.200 was added to the product.  The second 
adjustment indexed the calculated District Cost Differential so that the lowest value 
becomes 1.000.  This was a significant departure from simply resetting all values less 
than 1.000 at 1.000.  The third adjustment was that districts were placed in regions that 
correspond to the state‟s judicial circuits, and all districts in such regions or circuits are 
given the highest value calculated for any district assigned to that region (FLDOE, 1991). 
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The District Cost Differential calculation in 1993-94 and 1994-95 did not contain 
the provision of regions tied to the judicial circuits.  It did, however, continue to be based 
on a three year average of the index adjusted to the salary component and was still 
indexed so that the lowest score was 1.000 (FLDOE, 1993). 
The Florida Education Finance Program dropped the practice of indexing scores 
so that the lowest score was 1.000 in 1995-96.  The 1995-96 FEFP calculated the District 
Cost Differential based on the three year average of the Florida Price Level Index and 
adjusted for the salary component by multiplying by 0.800 and adding 0.200 to its 
product (FLDOE, 1995).  The District Cost Differential has continued to be calculated in 
this manner through the end of the study period in 2008-09 (FLDOE, 2008).   
The Florida Price Level Index 
The Florida Price Level Index is an economic measure determined by the state or 
a delegated agency.  Its use is not exclusive to the Florida Education Finance Program.  
The consumer price index is used to adjust other state allocations to various areas of the 
state.  The responsibility for determining the Florida Price Index currently belongs to the 
Executive Office of the Governor.     
The manner in which the Florida Price Level Index is calculated is not within the 
scope of this study.  It should be said, however, that changes and advancements in 
economic and statistical measures as well as political climates over the years has had an 
impact on how the Florida Price Level Index is calculated.  Any adjustment in the way 
the Florida Price Level Index is calculated will have a residual effect on how the District 
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Cost Differential is determined, ultimately effecting the distribution of educational 
funding throughout the state. 
Changes in the Program Cost Factors 
As discussed previously, the program cost factors serve as a funding variable that 
recognizes the varying expense of educating students in different educational programs.  
Its role as that funding variable has been consistent during the 27 year period from 1981-
82 through 2008-09.  Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the program cost factors for each year from 
1981-82 through 2008-09.   
The Number of Program Cost Factors 
In 1981-82, there were 44 different program cost factors (FLDOE, 1981).  The 
number of program cost factors steadily rose as the legislature added different funding 
categories.  By the 1996-97 fiscal year, there were 54 program cost factors (FLDOE, 
1996).   
The 1997-98 Florida Education Finance Program brought a dramatic change to 
the number of program cost factors, but not their role as a funding variable.  In 1997-98, 
there were only 12 program cost factors --- a significant decrease from the 54 of the 
previous year (FLDOE, 1997).    The decrease in program cost factors can be traced to 
Exceptional Student Education and Technical and Career Education.  In 1996-97, there 
were 18 program cost factors for Exceptional Student Education and 25 for Technical and 
Career Education (FLDOE, 1996).   In 1997-98, the program cost factors had been 
reduced to 5 and 1 respectively (FLDOE, 1997).  The reduction of program cost factors 
resulted in a streamlining of the calculation of district funds.     
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Program cost factors were further reduced in 2000-01.  In the 2000-01 Florida 
Education Finance Program, there are only 7 program cost factors (FLDOE, 2000).  This 
reduction is again attributable to a decrease in program cost factors for Exceptional 
Student Education (ESE).  Beginning in 2000-01, students in Exceptional Education 
levels 1, 2, and 3 received the same program weight as those students in the 
corresponding grade level basic program.  Funding for ESE students in levels 1, 2, and 3 
is appropriated in the ESE Guaranteed Allocation which was first included in the 2000-01 
FEFP. 
The following pages contain a table that depicts the program cost factors for each 
year from the 1981-82 FEFP to the 2008-09 FEFP. 
Program Caps 
During the 27 year period covered by this study, the program cost factors have been 
subject to a series of caps.  These caps serve to reduce the amount of weighted funding 
districts receive. As an example, the 1981-82 Florida Education Finance Program 
contained a cap on students enrolled in the Specific Learning Disability Part-Time (SLD 
PT) program.  The provision stated, “any unweighted FTE assigned to the SLD PT 
program in any district, which is in excess of .87% of the total K-12 unweighted FTE for 
that district, shall be adjusted to a factor of 1.  However, no district shall receive less than 
the unweighted FTE generated in 1978-79” (FLDOE, 1981, p. 10).   
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Table 3:   Program Cost Factors, 1981-82 to 1989-90 
 
 
Program 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 
Basic K-3 1.234 1.165 1.234 1.234 1.131 1.121 1.098 1.077 1.048 
Basic 4-8 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Basic 9-12 1.089 1.106 1.116 1.180 1.167 1.188 1.190 1.192 1.186 
Dropout Prevention             1.683 1.689 1.722 
Teenage Parent                   
Dropout Prevention / Teen Parent                   
Int. Eng./ESOL K-3             1.683 1.689 1.734 
Int. Eng./ESOL 4-8             1.683 1.689 1.727 
Int. Eng./ESOL 9-12             1.683 1.689 1.692 
Int. Eng./ESOL All levels                   
Basic "Educational Alternatives" 1.869 1.818 1.763 1.676 1.632 1.657       
Basic Mainstream K-3     2.352 2.468 2.262 2.242 2.196 2.144 2.096 
Basic Mainstream 4-8     2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Basic Mainstream 9-12     2.232 2.360 2.334 2.376 2.380 2.384 2.372 
Basic Mainstream "Ed. Alternatives"     3.526 3.352 3.264 3.314       
ESE Educable Mentally Retarded 2.139 2.149 2.154 2.172 2.189 2.184 2.188 2.182 2.176 
ESE Trainable Mentally Retarded 2.803 2.832 2.863 2.887 2.927 2.937 2.982 3.010 3.006 
ESE Physical Handicapped 3.455 3.472 3.539 3.718 3.839 3.896 3.821 3.812 3.752 
ESE PT/OT part-time 6.493 6.674 7.045 7.698 7.981 8.099 8.003 8.453 8.722 
ESE Speech, Lang. & Hearing (pt) 7.316 6.870 6.795 6.379 6.052 6.024 5.966 5.901 5.642 
ESE Speech, Lang. & Hearing (ft)       3.888 3.995 3.827 3.700 3.476 3.434 
ESE Deaf 3.775 3.835 3.840             
ESE Visually Handicapped (pt) 10.983 11.393 11.666 12.452 13.118 13.654 13.896 13.946 13.697 
ESE Visually Handicapped (ft) 3.927 4.248 4.316 4.587 4.793 4.860 4.957 4.989 4.861 
ESE Emotionally Disturbed (pt) 5.507 5.094 4.922 4.473 4.157 4.125 4.058 4.005 3.908 
ESE Emotionally Disturbed (ft) 3.287 3.242 3.183 3.100 3.026 2.976 2.931 2.896 2.867 
ESE SLD (pt) 4.767 4.391 4.309 3.950 3.688 3.604 3.506 3.402 3.246 
ESE SLD (ft) 2.279 2.347 2.294 2.286 2.275 2.266 2.272 2.241 2.182 
ESE Gifted (pt) 2.524 2.427 2.371 2.242 2.148 2.135 2.104 2.059 1.992 
ESE Hospital Homebound (pt) 14.389 13.295 12.873 11.610 10.442 10.004 9.965 10.592 11.457 
ESE Profoundly Handicapped 5.628 4.843 5.330 5.330 4.178 4.299 4.429 4.513 4.525 
ESE K-3 w/ services                   
ESE 4-8 w/ services                   
ESE 9-12 w/ services                   
ESE Support Level 1                   
ESE Support Level 2                   
ESE Support Level 3                   
ESE Support Level 4                   
ESE Support Level 5                   
Special Districts (HRS)         2.600 2.600       
Adult Basic & Adult High School 1.066 0.999 1.012 0.946 0.924 9.120       
Adult Basic Skills             0.929 0.904 0.860 
Adult Secondary Education             0.929 0.904 0.854 
Lifelong Learning             0.800 0.630 0.600 
Adult Handicapped                   
Vocational Education, 6-12                   
TCE Agriculture, 7-12 2.170 1.991 1.989 1.860 1.807 1.796 1.801 1.771 1.743 
TCE Agriculture, Job Prep 2.130 1.923 1.929 1.735 1.618 1.556 1.641 1.679 1.683 
TCE Agriculture, Adult 2.052 1.760 1.945 1.583 1.400 1.253 1.304 1.327 1.256 
TCE Business, 7-12 1.627 1.475 1.470 1.321 1.274 1.262 1.301 1.282 1.262 
TCE Business, Job Prep 1.651 1.499 1.479 1.346 1.301 1.336 1.372 1.366 1.352 
TCE Business, Adult 1.453 1.428 1.315 1.180 1.049 1.107 1.161 1.215 1.207 
TCE Distributive, 7-12 1.508 1.414 1.409 1.351 1.341 1.320 1.258 1.185 1.144 
TCE Distributive, Job Prep 1.585 1.471 1.467 1.400 1.378 1.434 1.468 1.495 1.464 
TCE Distributive, Adult 1.296 1.183 1.183 1.152 1.085 1.111 1.042 1.051 0.928 
TCE Diversified, 7-12 1.404 1.381 1.386 1.382 1.393 1.383 1.340 1.311 1.264 
TCE Diversified, Job Prep 1.433 1.370 1.336 1.222 1.128 1.120 1.199 1.441 1.368 
TCE Health, 7-12 2.097 1.967 1.952 1.833 1.775 1.763 1.743 1.717 1.642 
TCE Health, Job Prep 2.157 2.021 1.975 1.840 1.785 1.865 1.924 1.924 1.816 
TCE Health, Adult 1.491 1.251 1.393 1.248 1.208 1.212 1.244 1.378 1.369 
TCE Public Service, 7-12 2.358 1.975 2.052 1.865 1.821 1.870 1.902 1.857 1.494 
TCE Public Service, Job Prep 2.380 2.073 1.912 1.530 1.246 1.253 1.213 1.211 1.150 
TCE Public Service, Adult 1.787 1.437 1.472 1.192 0.994 0.873 0.868 0.936 0.970 
TCE Home Economics, 7-12 1.665 1.588 1.582 1.516 1.489 1.457 1.407 1.335 1.291 
TCE Home Economics, Job Prep 1.696 1.679 1.634 1.531 1.443 1.422 1.429 1.506 1.534 
TCE Home Economics, Adult 1.342 1.170 1.162 1.045 0.988 0.991 1.008 1.053 1.197 
TCE Industrial, 7-12 2.077 2.013 1.982 1.906 1.891 1.899 1.900 1.847 1.800 
TCE Industrial, Job Prep 2.023 1.823 1.785 1.595 1.506 1.514 1.527 1.548 1.543 
TCE Industrial, Adult 1.683 1.543 1.514 1.390 1.294 1.314 1.273 1.259 1.240 
Exploratory, 7-12 1.399 1.390 1.382 1.360 1.321 1.290 1.263 1.273 1.284 
Vocational Mainstream                   
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Table 4:   Program Cost Factors, 1990-91 to 1999-2000 
 
 
Program 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 
Basic K-3 1.031 1.018 1.014 1.017 1.029 1.041 1.049 1.054 1.057 1.057 
Basic 4-8 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Basic 9-12 1.196 1.213 1.225 1.224 1.210 1.198 1.190 1.169 1.138 1.115 
Dropout Prevention 1.731 1.707 1.656 1.615 1.571 1.495 1.474       
Teenage Parent           1.495 1.474       
Dropout Prevention / Teen Parent               1.438 1.399   
Int. Eng./ESOL K-3 1.695 1.692 1.644 1.600 1.478 1.311 1.280       
Int. Eng./ESOL 4-8 1.732 1.690 1.679 1.617 1.509 1.262 1.280       
Int. Eng./ESOL 9-12 1.773 1.748 1.649 1.454 1.318 1.310 1.280       
Int. Eng./ESOL All levels               1.245 1.201 1.211 
Basic "Educational Alternatives"               1.169 1.138   
Basic Mainstream K-3 2.062 2.036 2.028 2.034 2.058 2.082 2.098       
Basic Mainstream 4-8 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000       
Basic Mainstream 9-12 2.392 2.426 2.450 2.448 2.420 2.396 2.380       
Basic Mainstream "Ed. Alternatives"                     
ESE Educable Mentally Retarded 2.161 2.149 2.184 2.214 2.226 2.195 1.979       
ESE Trainable Mentally Retarded 2.990 2.954 2.922 2.899 2.934 2.977 3.111       
ESE Physical Handicapped 3.667 3.569 3.453 3.398 3.285 3.285 3.111       
ESE PT/OT part-time 9.033 9.079 9.527 10.664 11.729 12.971 13.690       
ESE Speech, Lang. & Hearing (pt) 5.520 5.478 5.475 5.392 5.312 5.313 5.333       
ESE Speech, Lang. & Hearing (ft) 3.337 3.200 3.176 3.130 3.103 2.992 2.777       
ESE Deaf                     
ESE Visually Handicapped (pt) 13.856 14.506 15.145 15.773 16.168 16.687 17.069       
ESE Visually Handicapped (ft) 4.657 4.417 4.353 4.309 4.558 4.660 5.333       
ESE Emotionally Disturbed (pt) 3.793 3.725 3.740 3.851 3.859 3.878 4.287       
ESE Emotionally Disturbed (ft) 2.837 2.821 2.812 2.807 2.740 2.751 2.777       
ESE SLD (pt) 3.113 3.001 2.914 2.816 2.766 2.769 2.777       
ESE SLD (ft) 2.117 2.078 2.049 1.998 1.939 1.920 1.979       
ESE Gifted (pt) 1.951 1.918 1.896 1.841 1.785 1.747 1.710       
ESE Hospital Homebound (pt) 11.380 11.505 11.611 12.114 12.606 12.522 12.690       
ESE Profoundly Handicapped 4.479 4.417 4.396 4.386 4.391 4.357 4.287       
ESE K-3 w/ services                     
ESE 4-8 w/ services                     
ESE 9-12 w/ services                     
ESE Support Level 1               1.341 1.341 1.341 
ESE Support Level 2               2.072 2.072 2.072 
ESE Support Level 3               3.287 3.287 3.287 
ESE Support Level 4               4.101 4.101 4.101 
ESE Support Level 5               6.860 6.860 6.860 
Special Districts (HRS)                     
Adult Basic & Adult High School                     
Adult Basic Skills 0.805 0.780 0.745 0.721 0.718 0.766 0.802       
Adult Secondary Education 0.807 0.788 0.763 0.758 0.785 0.853 0.802       
Lifelong Learning 0.726 0.700 0.700               
Adult Handicapped 1.614 1.575 1.337 1.140 0.933 0.994 0.962       
Vocational Education, 6-12               1.272 1.240 1.211 
TCE Agriculture, 7-12 1.716 1.711 1.728 1.710 1.676 1.612 1.513       
TCE Agriculture, Job Prep 1.617 1.559 1.537 1.455 1.452 1.454 1.477       
TCE Agriculture, Adult 1.322 1.363 1.516 1.614 1.676 1.807 1.477       
TCE Business, 7-12 1.239 1.224 1.229 1.235 1.250 1.254 1.248       
TCE Business, Job Prep 1.340 1.329 1.292 1.267 1.267 1.299 1.373       
TCE Business, Adult 1.162 1.142 1.114 1.190 1.272 1.371 1.373       
TCE Distributive, 7-12 1.134 1.124 1.112 1.124 1.140 1.176 1.174       
TCE Distributive, Job Prep 1.404 1.398 1.374 1.354 1.348 1.328 1.293       
TCE Distributive, Adult 0.861 0.795 0.806 0.827 0.959 1.038 1.293       
TCE Diversified, 7-12 1.237 1.185 1.185 1.204 1.231 1.241 1.232       
TCE Diversified, Job Prep 1.239 0.942 0.877 0.847 0.925 0.932 0.948       
TCE Health, 7-12 1.606 1.563 1.513 1.439 1.345 1.347 1.333       
TCE Health, Job Prep 1.729 1.608 1.506 1.429 1.410 1.451 1.488       
TCE Health, Adult 1.433 1.483 1.454 1.432 1.371 1.442 1.488       
TCE Public Service, 7-12 1.157 0.907 0.930 0.969 1.020 1.076 1.119       
TCE Public Service, Job Prep 1.097 1.020 0.959 1.011 1.045 1.113 1.155       
TCE Public Service, Adult 1.001 0.989 1.060 1.161 1.237 1.297 1.155       
TCE Home Economics, 7-12 1.278 1.274 1.261 1.247 1.254 1.272 1.277       
TCE Home Economics, Job Prep 1.560 1.477 1.433 1.383 1.369 1.293 1.265       
TCE Home Economics, Adult 1.292 1.424 1.367 1.356 1.272 1.290 1.265       
TCE Industrial, 7-12 1.764 1.752 1.746 1.740 1.758 1.764 1.743       
TCE Industrial, Job Prep 1.551 1.477 1.418 1.361 1.384 1.421 1.473       
TCE Industrial, Adult 1.232 1.294 1.332 1.463 1.573 1.778 1.473       
Exploratory, 7-12 1.308 1.303 1.276 1.238 1.222 1.215 1.198       
Vocational Mainstream   2.737 2.325 1.979 1.675 1.860 1.966       
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Table 5:   Program Cost Factors, 2000-01 to 2008-09 
 
 
Program 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 
Basic K-3 1.036 1.007 1.005 1.002 1.012 1.018 1.035 1.048 1.066 
Basic 4-8 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Basic 9-12 1.096 1.113 1.122 1.140 1.132 1.113 1.088 1.066 1.052 
Dropout Prevention               
Teenage Parent               
Dropout Prevention / Teen Parent               
Int. Eng./ESOL K-3               
Int. Eng./ESOL 4-8               
Int. Eng./ESOL 9-12               
Int. Eng./ESOL All levels 1.226 1.265 1.275 1.275 1.302 1.318 1.275 1.200 1.119 
Basic "Educational Alternatives"               
Basic Mainstream K-3               
Basic Mainstream 4-8               
Basic Mainstream 9-12               
Basic Mainstream "Ed. Alternatives"               
ESE Educable Mentally Retarded               
ESE Trainable Mentally Retarded               
ESE Physical Handicapped               
ESE PT/OT part-time               
ESE Speech, Lang. & Hearing (pt)               
ESE Speech, Lang. & Hearing (ft)               
ESE Deaf               
ESE Visually Handicapped (pt)               
ESE Visually Handicapped (ft)               
ESE Emotionally Disturbed (pt)               
ESE Emotionally Disturbed (ft)               
ESE SLD (pt)               
ESE SLD (ft)               
ESE Gifted (pt)               
ESE Hospital Homebound (pt)               
ESE Profoundly Handicapped               
ESE K-3 w/ services 1.036 1.007 1.005 1.002 1.012 1.018 1.035 1.048 1.066 
ESE 4-8 w/ services 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ESE 9-12 w/ services 1.010 1.113 1.122 1.140 1.132 1.113 1.132 1.066 1.052 
ESE Support Level 1               
ESE Support Level 2               
ESE Support Level 3               
ESE Support Level 4 3.948 3.948 3.948 3.948 3.948 3.818 3.734 3.625 3.570 
ESE Support Level 5 5.591 5.591 5.591 3.948 5.591 1.193 5.201 5.062 4.970 
Special Districts (HRS)               
Adult Basic & Adult High School               
Adult Basic Skills               
Adult Secondary Education               
Lifelong Learning               
Adult Handicapped               
Vocational Education, 6-12 1.211 1.206 1.186 1.190 1.187 1.193 1.159 1.119 1.077 
TCE Agriculture, 7-12               
TCE Agriculture, Job Prep               
TCE Agriculture, Adult               
TCE Business, 7-12               
TCE Business, Job Prep               
TCE Business, Adult               
TCE Distributive, 7-12               
TCE Distributive, Job Prep               
TCE Distributive, Adult               
TCE Diversified, 7-12               
TCE Diversified, Job Prep               
TCE Health, 7-12               
TCE Health, Job Prep               
TCE Health, Adult               
TCE Public Service, 7-12               
TCE Public Service, Job Prep               
TCE Public Service, Adult               
TCE Home Economics, 7-12               
TCE Home Economics, Job Prep               
TCE Home Economics, Adult               
TCE Industrial, 7-12               
TCE Industrial, Job Prep               
TCE Industrial, Adult               
Exploratory, 7-12               
Vocational Mainstream               
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The 2008-09 FEFP contained an enrollment ceiling for weighted programs.  This 
ceiling operated as a cap on weighted FTEs.  Student enrollment above the cap is funded 
at the basic level (1.000).  These caps are not uncommon and are found in various forms 
in each year of the Florida Education Finance Program. 
Additional Weighted FTE 
 The 2007-08 FEFP authorized five additional FTE supplements.  These FTE 
supplements are included in a districts weighted FTE and are subject to the other 
provisions of the FEFP.  The five additional FTE supplements are: 
 Small District ESE Supplement 
 Florida Virtual School 
 Small, Isolated High School Supplement 
 Bonus FTE Programs 
 Algebra Supplement 
 
The 2008-09 FEFP did not include the Algebra Supplement as an additional weighted 
FTE authorization.  The four remaining additional weighted FTE supplements were 
included in the 2008-09 FEFP. 
Inclusion and Exclusion of Various Adjustments 
An area that has undergone considerable change during the period from 1981-82 
through 2008-09 is the adjustments.  Adjustments include certain guarantees, 
supplements, and incentives. 
The Florida Education Finance Program allows for a series of adjustments, 
guarantees, supplements, and incentives.  These adjustments, guarantees, supplements, 
and incentives are found after the Base Allocation has been determined and are included 
in the calculation of Total State and Local FEFP Dollars.   
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In 1981-82, the Florida Education Finance Program had one adjustment, the 
Declining Enrollment Supplement (FLDOE, 1981).  In 2008-09, the Florida Education 
Finance Program has eleven (FLDOE, 2008).  In the 27 year period that falls between the 
1981-82 FEFP and the 2008-09 FEFP, there have been 14 different adjustments, 
guarantees, supplements, and incentives that have come and gone. 
In the section that follows, a discussion of each of the 25 Adjustments, 
Guarantees, Supplements, and Incentives that have been included in the Florida 
Education Finance Program at some point during the last 27 years is defined and 
discussed as well as when it appeared in the FEFP. 
Declining Enrollment Supplement and Guaranteed Minimum Levels 
 This supplement and guarantee was the only such provision of the 1981-82 FEFP.  
This funding component is a collection of three guaranteed minimum funding provisions.  
The first of these is the declining enrollment supplement.  In those districts where there is 
a decline in the unweighted FTE‟s (enrollment), 50 percent of the decline is to be 
multiplied by the prior year‟s calculated FEFP program per unweighted FTE and added 
to the allocation of the district (FLDOE, 1981). 
 The second guaranteed minimum funding level provision is then applied to the 
total of all of the preceding dollars including the declining enrollment provision.  It 
guarantees that each district will receive the greater of the total potential funding per full-
time equivalent student or the total funding available per full-time equivalent student in 
the previous year, multiplied by the current full-time equivalent students (FLDOE, 1981). 
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 The third provision provides that in addition to all other hold harmless provisions, 
each school district is entitled to receive additional state funds through the FEFP to 
compensate for reductions in funding related to certain federal programs (FLDOE, 1981). 
 The Declining Enrollment Supplement and Guaranteed Minimum Levels 
component was the first such component of the FEFP.  In 1982-83, the component was 
reduced to simply a Declining Enrollment Supplement removing the Guaranteed 
Minimum Level and federal funding provisions (FLDOE, 1982).  The Declining 
Enrollment Supplement is included in the funding formula for the most recent FEFP 
(FLDOE, 2008).  
Guaranteed Minimum Level 
 A separate Guaranteed Minimum Level component was included in 1983-84 
FEFP (FLDOE, 1983).  The component was also included in the 1984-85 and 1985-86 
FEFPs.  It was discontinued in 1986-87 (FLDOE, 1987). 
Quality Assurance Guarantee 
 The Quality Assurance Guarantee was implemented in the 1982-83 FEFP.  This 
provision guarantees at least a ten percent increase per FTE student in state funds over 
the amount received the previous year.  If the amount received in the current year per 
FTE does not equal or exceed ten percent above the previous year‟s amount per FTE, the 
district will be given a special allocation in the amount of the deficiency (FLDOE, 1982).  
This guarantee was included for three years beginning in 1982-83. 
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Equalization of Discretionary Levy 
The 1982 Legislature provided state funds to equalize up to ½ mill of 
discretionary operating millage for each district when the value of a mill of taxation per 
student is below the state average value.  Only discretionary millage levied by a district in 
excess of 1.1 mills is eligible for equalization.  For qualifying districts, a state supplement 
will be provided representing the difference between the state average value of a mill per 
student and the district value of a mill per student, multiplied by the millage levied in 
excess of 1.1 mills, multiplied by the unweighted FTE membership of the district.  This 
supplement was implemented in the 1982-83 FEFP (FLDOE, 1982).  It was renamed the 
Discretionary Tax Equalization Entitlement in 1983-84 (FLDOE, 1983).  It appeared as 
the Discretionary Tax Equalization Entitlement through 1985-86 (FLDOE, 1985).  From 
1986-87 through 1993-94, the supplement was not included. 
In 1994-95 Discretionary Tax Equalization supplement was reintroduced.  The 
1994-95 FEFP called for additional funding for districts that levy the discretionary 0.51 
mill and an additional .25 mill.  An amount was provided to ensure that each district 
receives $50 per FTE when combined with the amount raised by the 0.25 mill (FLDOE, 
1994).  The Discretionary Tax Equalization component has been included in every FEFP 
since it was reintroduced in 1994-95.  The 2008-09 FEFP called for additional funding 
for districts that levy a discretionary 0.498 mill and an additional .25 mill.  Districts shall 
receive a supplement if the additional 0.25 mills realize less than $100 per FTE (FLDOE, 
2008). 
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Profoundly Handicapped Adjustment 
 The 1985-86 FEFP contained an adjustment to provide additional funds to 
districts whose preceding fiscal year‟s per unweighted FTE expenditure level in the 
profoundly handicapped program exceeds the preceding fiscal year‟s unweighted FTE 
revenue allocated to the program by at least 105 percent.  The incremental district 
expenditure difference per unweighted FTE above 105 percent of district generated 
revenue per unweighted FTE is multiplied by the district‟s preceding fiscal year 
unweighted FTE to determine each district‟s adjustment allocation (FLDOE, 1985).  The 
allocation was expanded from the Profoundly Handicapped Adjustment to the Profoundly 
Handicapped and Intensive English/ESOL Adjustment in 1986-87.   
 The 1986-87 FEFP provided additional funding for courses provided for students 
whose native language is other than English, such as English for Speakers of Other 
Languages (ESOL).  An adjustment in funding is provided when such students are in 
membership in ESOL, intensive English or other basic courses.  This adjustment is 1.25 
times the funding weight for the respective basic program (FLDOE, 1986).  The 
supplement returned to simply the Profoundly Handicapped Adjustment in 1988-89 when 
the ESOL provision was removed and addressed in the Program Cost Factors (FLDOE, 
1988).  The last year the Profoundly Handicapped Adjustment appeared in the FEFP was 
1989-90. 
Sparsity Supplement 
 The 1987-88 FEFP recognized the relative increase in expense of a smaller 
district through a statutory formula in which the variable factor is a Sparsity index.  The 
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index is computed by dividing FTE of the district by the number of permanent senior 
high school centers, not to exceed three.  Participation was limited to the smallest of 
districts.  Each eligible district‟s allocation is subject to an adjustment for relative wealth 
of the district.  This adjustment is based on per FTE value of the maximum discretionary 
levy in the district relative to the state average.  If a district‟s value per FTE exceeds the 
state average, the Sparsity entitlement is negatively adjusted by an amount equal to the 
district‟s FTE multiplied by the per FTE amount which the district‟s maximum 
discretionary value per FTE exceeds the state average (FLDOE, 1987).  The component 
was allocated as a categorical program in 1986-87 (FLDOE, 1986).  The Sparsity 
Supplement has enjoyed one of the longest runs in the FEFP being introduced in 1987-88 
and continuing through the most recent FEFP.  Participation in the Sparsity Supplement 
is limited to districts of 20,000 or fewer FTE (FLDOE, 2008). 
Salary Allocation and Assigned Allocation 
 The FEFP included a one-year provision of a salary allocation in 1987-88.  The 
Salary Allocation and Assigned Allocation of 20 million dollars were allocated to 
districts based on each district‟s proportion of the state total number of instructional 
personnel.  There was an additional assigned allocation in excess of 12 million dollars in 
the 2007-08 FEFP (FLDOE, 1987). 
 An allocation similar to the Salary Allocation and Assigned Allocation appeared 
in 1990-91 as the Salary Improvement Incentive.  The Salary Improvement Incentive 
provided a one-year enhancement of in excess of 100 million dollars (FLDOE, 1990). 
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Rapid Growth Supplement 
 The 1989-90 and 1990-91 FEFPs included an added component to address the 
needs of districts where growth exceeded the state average change in unweighted FTE 
enrollment from the actual enrollment count from the previous year to the next year‟s 
estimate.  The percentage amount by which each district‟s enrollment growth exceeds the 
statewide average is to be multiplied by the district current unweighted FTE student 
count and the result used to distribute the funds allocated to this supplement (FLDOE, 
1989). 
Extended Day Allocation 
 The 1990-91 FEFP provided funds on a one-year basis for extended day and 
seven-period day programs for 9-12 grade students.  Districts were allowed to implement 
one of two programs.  The first was a seven period day.  It called for seven periods of 50-
minutes or more per day and was funded at the rate of $280.35 per student.  The second 
option allowed for six periods of 60-minutes of instruction, it was funded at the rate of 
$138.38 per student.  There was also a provision to fund students in grades 6-8 if the 
school has a ninth or tenth grade, but not an eleventh or twelfth grade.  Such students will 
be funded if enrolled in seven periods of at least 50-minutes each or an equivalent 
amount of time (FLDOE, 1990).   
Adequacy Supplement 
 The 1990-91 FEFP also provides funds to guarantee a 5% weighted FTE increase 
in funding.  This increase is measured based on total state and local FEFP, discretionary 
   
49 
local funds, and the major formula based categoricals.  The funding for this provision was 
for the 1990-91 FEFP only (FLDOE, 1990).  
Math/Science Incentive 
 The 1990-91 FEFP sought to increase student enrollment in higher level math and 
science courses through the Math/Science Incentive.  These funds were to be used to 
enhance the quality of each district‟s math and science curricula (FLDOE, 1990).  It was 
implemented for one year in 1990-91. 
Funding Adjustment 
 A Funding Adjustment was included in the 1991-92 and 1992-93 FEFP.  This 
adjustment provides for each district to receive an equal change (increase or decrease) in 
funding relative to the previous year‟s funding on a weighted FTE student basis.  The 
calculation included state FEFP, major categorical funds, and local required and 
discretionary tax proceeds in four steps.  Step one:  Divide the funds from the previous 
year by that year‟s weighted FTE students.  Step two:  Multiply result in step one by 
district‟s current funded weighted FTE.  Step three:  Prorate result in step to achieve a 
state total amount equal to the sum of all district‟s unadjusted total potential funds.  Step 
four:  Subtract each district‟s step three prorate amount from the district's current 
unadjusted total potential funds amount.  The result is the district‟s funding adjustment 
which assures that each district receives the same percentage change in funds per 
weighted FTE student (FLDOE, 1991). 
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Hold Harmless Adjustment 
 An adjustment to provide each district with a minimum percentage increase in 
funding to their previous year‟s funding on a weighted FTE student basis was 
implemented in 1993-94.  The calculation includes state FEFP, major categorical funds, 
discretionary lottery fund, local required effort taxes and fees, and discretionary tax 
process (FLDOE, 1993).  The Hold Harmless Adjustment was introduced in the 1993-94 
FEFP.  It was included in eight consecutive FEFPs through 2000-01.  It was not included 
for the first time in 2001-02. 
Safe Schools Allocation 
 In 1994, an amount was appropriated for Safe Schools.  The Safe Schools 
Allocation was included in the FEFP for the first time in 1994-95.  The allocation has run 
continuously through the current FEFP.  The Safe Schools Allocation distributes funds to 
every district on a weighted FTE basis.  Districts may not use these funds to supplant 
funds currently used for these programs.  The funds are available for after school 
programs for at-risk students in middle schools.  Districts are encouraged to build on 
existing after school programs within their communities.  Districts are further encouraged 
to form partnerships with community groups in an effort to maximize resources.  These 
funds are also available for alternative school programs for students involved with the 
Juvenile Justice System and security programs that will provide for school resource 
officers, equipment, and other improvements to enhance the environment for learning.  
Districts must develop plans for the implementation of the specified programs and each 
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affected school will report on the progress of the programs in the Annual School Report 
(FLDOE, 1994). 
 The 2008-09 FEFP guaranteed each district a minimum of $71,538 under the Safe 
School Allocation.  Additional funds are awarded based on two variables: the Florida 
Crime Index and the district‟s share of the total state unweighted FTE (FLDOE 2008). 
First Grade Class Size Reduction 
 An amount of 40 million dollars was allocated to achieve the constitutionally 
mandated objective that for each elementary school, class size for grades one, two, and 
three shall not exceed 20 students, with a ratio of one teacher per 20 students.  These 
funds were distributed through the First Grade Class Size Reduction supplement.  For the 
purpose of this provision, class sizes that exceed 20 students meet the goal if, for every 
10 students above a base of 20 students there is at least one full-time teacher aide.  First 
priority for the use of these funds shall be the reduction of class size for grade level one, 
second priority shall be for grade level two, and the third priority shall be the third grade.  
These funds were available only in the 1995-96 FEFP (FLDOE, 1995). 
Remediation Reduction Incentive 
 The amount of 30 million dollars was appropriated for the Remediation Reduction 
Incentive in the 1996-97 FEFP.  The funds were allocated in two parts.  Part 1 allocated 
twenty million dollars based on each district‟s share of the state total number of students 
who pass one or more subtests of the college placement test.  Part 2 allocates an 
additional ten million dollars based on each district‟s enrollment in math and English 
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courses (FLDOE, 1996).  Similar amounts were distributed in 1997-98 and 1998-99 
(FLDOE, 1998).  The Remediation Reduction Incentive was discontinued in 1999-2000. 
Disparity Compression Adjustment 
 The 1996 Legislature created a component to reduce the disparity in state and 
local potential funding per unweighted FTE student through the Disparity Compression 
Adjustment.  Districts below the state average receive additional funding based on the 
greater of two calculations.  In the first calculation, if a district‟s funding per FTE is less 
than the calculation of one standard deviation below the mean of funding for all districts, 
then the district‟s funding is increased to one standard deviation below the mean.  In the 
second calculation, if a district‟s funding per FTE is less than the mean of all districts, 
then the difference below the mean is multiplied by an equal percentage within the 
resources provided by the appropriation (FLDOE, 1996).  This adjustment was included 
in the 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000 FEFP. 
Dropout Prevention Incentive 
 The 1997-98 and 1998-99 FEFP included a performance based incentive entitled 
the Dropout Prevention Incentive.  The grades 9-12 educational alternative program was 
funded at the basic 9-12 program weight and supplemented by an incentive allocation.  
The statewide amount of the incentive is the difference between grades 9-12 basic weight 
and the dropout prevention weight multiplied by the grades 9-12 educational alternatives, 
FTE, and the base student allocation.  Each district‟s share was determined by the 
performance of students in the educational alternatives program (FLDOE, 1997). 
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Supplemental Academic Instruction 
 The Supplemental Academic Instruction component provides funding to be used 
to help students gain at least a year of knowledge for each year in school.  Supplemental 
academic strategies may include; but are not limited to; modified curriculum, reading 
instruction, after-school instruction, tutoring, mentoring, class size reduction, extended 
school year, intensive skills development in summer school, and other methods of 
improving student achievement.  The 1999 legislature originally created Supplemental 
Academic Instruction as a categorical fund for 1999-2000 (FLDOE, 1999); however for 
2000-01 and subsequent years, it is a component of the FEFP (FLDOE, 2000).  The 
adjustment for Supplemental Academic Instruction continues through the current FEFP. 
ESE Guaranteed Allocation 
 Exceptional education services for students whose level of service is less than 
Support Levels 4 and 5 are funded through the ESE Guaranteed Allocation.  The ESE 
Guranteed Allocation replaces weighted program cost factors that were included in 
previous FEFPs.  The students generate FTE funding using the appropriate Basic 
Program weight for their grade level.  The allocation provides for the additional services 
needed.  The ESE Guaranteed Allocation was first implemented in 2000-01 and 
continues to the current FEFP (FLDOE, 2008).  
Minimum Guarantee Adjustment 
 The Minimum Guarantee Adjustment guarantees each district a 1% increase in 
potential funding on an unweighted FTE K-12 student basis.  The calculation includes 
state FEFP programs, major categorical funds, discretionary lottery funds, required local 
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effort proceeds, discretionary tax equalization funds, and potential discretionary 
proceeds.  The adjustment was included in its current format in the 2001-02 FEFP.  It has 
been included in various formats since the FEFP was introduced (FLDOE, 2001).  The 
Minimum Guarantee Adjustment continued through the current 2007-08 FEFP.  It was 
not included in the 2008-09 FEFP. 
Lab School Discretionary Contribution 
Developmental Research School (lab schools) and the Florida Virtual School are 
established as separate school districts for purposes of FEFP funding.  In 2003-04, the 
FEFP allocated funds for the lab school in lieu of discretionary local tax revenue, which 
is already allocated and used by the district in which the lab school is located.  The 
Florida Virtual School discretionary contribution is calculated by multiplying the 
maximum allowable nonvoted discretionary millage for operations by the value of 95 
percent of the current year‟s taxable value for school purposes for the state; divide the 
result by the total full-time equivalent membership of the state; and multiply the result by 
the full-time equivalent membership of the school (FLDOE, 2003).  The Lab School 
Discretionary Contribution was continued through the 2006-07 FEFP.  The 2007-08 and 
2008-09 FEFPs allocated funds under a renamed Discretionary Contribution to the lab 
schools. 
Summer Reading Allocation 
Twenty-five million dollars of non-recurring lottery funds were allocated by the 
2003-04 Florida Education Finance Program to support and assist students who have not 
yet mastered the necessary skill for promotion or graduation.  This Summer Reading 
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Allocation is to be used by third and twelfth grade students and for students needing 
supplemental instruction during the 2003-04 school year to reduce the need for summer 
remedial programs.  These funds were in addition to the annual recurring funds 
appropriated for Supplemental Academic Instruction and were allocated to all school 
districts based on FTE student enrollment (FLDOE, 2003).  An additional $25,000,000 
was allocated for Summer Reading in the 2004-05 school year (FLDOE, 2004). 
Reading Program Allocation 
 The 2005-06 FEFP allocated funds in the amount of $89,000,000 for the Reading 
Program.  Each district was allocated $50,000 with the remaining amount distributed 
based on each district‟s portion of the total state K-12 base funding.  Participation 
required districts to submit a plan prescribed by the Just Read Florida! Office.  The 2006-
07, 2007-08, and 2008-09 FEFPs allocated funds using the same parameters.  
0.51 (0.498) Mills Discretionary Compression 
 For the 2005-06 FEFP, the 0.51 Mills Discretionary Compression adjustment was 
available to districts.  If a school board‟s 0.51 mill discretionary levy provides less than 
$200 per unweighted FTE, the school district shall receive from the state an amount, 
when added to the funds generated by the 0.51 mill that equals $200 (FLDOE, 2005).  
The Discretionary Compression was included in the 2006-07 and 2007-08 FEFP 
allocations.  In 2008-09, the discretionary millage was reduced to 0.498 and the 
supplement was renamed.  Eligibility for the supplement was based on the state average 
yield of the 0.498 assessment. 
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Special Teachers are Rewarded (STAR) Plan Allocation 
 The 2006-07 FEFP allocated funds for the Special Teachers are Rewarded 
(STAR) Plan Allocation.  The allocation of $147,500,000 was allocated for performance 
pay rewards for instructional personnel based on improved student achievement.  
Participating school districts must submit STAR plans to the state for approval.  Plans 
must include automatic eligibility for all instructional personnel and rewards of at least 
five percent of the base pay of the top twenty-five percent of instructional personnel 
(FLDOE, 2006). 
Merit Award Program (MAP) Allocation 
 The 2007-08 FEFP allocated $147,500,000 to districts for performance pay to 
instructional and school-based administrative staff (FLDOE, 2007).  This allocation was 
in place of the 2006-07 FEFP's Special Teachers are Rewarded (STAR) Plan Allocation.  
The allocation was reduced to $32,072,461 in the 2008-09 FEFP (FLDOE, 2008). 
DJJ Supplement 
 A supplement to school districts offering Department of Juvenile Justice 
education programs was included in the 2007-08 FEFP.  This supplement was continued 
in the 2008-09 FEFP. 
Additional Allocations Outside of the Base FEFP Calculation 
For a four-year period beginning in 1989-90, the FEFP included a series of 
supplements.  The supplements, four total, were add-ons to the FEFP after the calculation 
of State FEFP Dollars and any adjustments (FLDOE, 1989).  No additional allocations 
outside of the base FEFP calculation were found after the 1991-92 FEFP (FLDOE, 1992). 
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Extended Day / Seventh Period 
Amounts were appropriated in 1988-89 and again in 1989-90 for an extended day 
and seventh period.  Districts could implement seven periods of 50 minutes or more or 
six periods of 60 minutes or more for full-time students in grades 9-12 during the 180 day 
school year and would be eligible for this enhancement.  Under either option, the school 
day must be contiguous, excluding dual enrollment periods (FLDOE, 1988). 
Adequacy Supplement 
To guarantee an 8 percent weighted FTE increase in funding, the 1989-90 FEFP 
included an Adequacy Supplement.  The increase was based on total state and local 
FEFP, discretionary local funds, and the major formula based categoricals.  This was 
included in the FEFP in this format in 1989-90 only (FLDOE, 1989). 
Caps Adjustment Supplement 
The 1989 Legislature provided a Caps Adjustment Supplement to use up to 10 
percent of any remaining funds in the FEFP appropriation after all components have been 
calculated and allocated.  Any available funds were to be used to fund weighted FTE over 
group ceiling.  This supplement was included in the FEFP for only one year, 1989-90 
(FLDOE, 1989). 
Additional State Allocation 
Through a supplemental appropriation, the 1991 Legislature added ninety million 
dollars to the Florida Education Finance Program.  This was a prorated amount districts 
received based on the product of weighted funded FTE students multiplied by the District 
Cost Differentials (FLDOE, 1991). 
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The Inclusion of Lottery Dollars 
With the passing of an amendment to the state constitution in 1986, the state of 
Florida began to operate a statewide lottery with proceeds to benefit education in the 
state.  From 1986 through the 1991, lottery dollars were appropriated for the benefit of 
public school districts.  During this time, lottery funds were not specifically identified in 
the Florida Education Finance Program.  The lottery was used to fund categorical 
programs and special allocations but the source of the funds were not specifically 
attributed to the lottery.  The 1991-92 Florida Education Finance Program included a 
specific reference to lottery dollars for the first time.  Proceeds from the Florida Lottery 
were used to finance four appropriations: District Discretionary Lottery Funds, Pre-
School Projects, High Performance Incentives, and Instructional Technology (FLDOE, 
1991). 
The FEFP, beginning in 1991-92, distributed the District Discretionary Lottery 
Funds as an enhancement included after the calculation of the Net State FEFP Allocation.  
An amount of $495,369,799 was appropriated in 1991-92 from the Educational 
Enhancement Trust Fund (Lottery) to be expended in accordance with school district 
adopted policies and procedures that define enhancement and the types of expenditures 
consistent with that definition (FLDOE, 1991).  Districts were required to provide the 
Department of Education with a copy of the policies and procedures and to submit an 
annual report showing all actual expenditure of enhancement funds.  Special language 
was included to insure that districts complied with state regulations pertaining to school 
improvement plans.  In 1991-92, school districts were required to allocate a minimum of 
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$4 per student to the school level for implementation of the school improvement process 
(FLDOE, 1991).     
The 2008-09 appropriation for the District Discretionary Lottery Funds is 
$217,406,176.  This allocation included School Recoginition Funds.  Language was also 
present regarding school improvement plans.  The 2008-09 appropriation called for a 
minimum of $5 per student to the school level for implementation of the school 
improvement process (FLDOE, 2008). 
In the eighteen year period between the first inclusion of lottery dollars, 1991-92, 
and the 2008-09 Florida Education Finance Program, the distribution of lottery dollars 
has undergone significant changes. The period included the 1997 Classrooms First 
Initiative that was funded with an annual appropriation of $180,000,000 from the 
Educational Enhancement Trust Fund (Lottery) as well as the voter mandated class size 
reduction which had its own implications for school finance and lottery fund distribution 
(FLDOE, 1997). 
The FEFP Funding Formula in 2008 
 The Florida Educational Finance Program enacted by the Florida Legislature in 
1973 forms the basis for the current version of Florida‟s system for funding education in 
the state.  
 A total of $9,007,286,039 was appropriated for distribution in the Florida 
Education Finance Program for the 2008-09 fiscal year compared to $1,694,023,329 for 
the 1981-82 fiscal year (FLDOE, 2008). 
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 A graphical illustration, Figure 4, depicting how the 2008-09 FEFP calculates 
Gross State and Local FEFP dollars is included below.  A discussion of each component 
follows. 
Figure 4: Calculation of FEFP in 2008-09 
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An FTE for FEFP funding purposes is one student in membership in one or more 
FEFP programs for a school year or its equivalent.  The time equivalent for a school year 
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students must me engaged in 720 hours of instruction annually. Students in schools on 
double session or a school utilizing a special calendar approved by the State Department 
of Education have their hours reduced to 810 and 630 respectively.  Special rules for 
determining FTE exist for students enrolled with the Florida Virtual School and schools 
associated with the Department of Juvenile Justice (FLDOE, 2008). 
Program Cost Factors 
Program Cost Factors serve to assure that each program receives its equitable 
share of funds in relation to its relative cost per student.  Through the annual program 
cost report, districts have reported the expenditures for each FEFP program.  The cost per 
FTE student of each FEFP program has been used to produce an index of relative costs 
with the cost per FTE of Basic, Grade 4-8, established as the 1.000 base. 
The Program Cost Factors for the 2008-09 fiscal year are listed in Table 6. 
Table 6:  2008-09 Program Cost Factors (FLDOE, 2006) 
 
 Basic Program 
o Kindergarten and Grades 1, 2, and 3 1.066  
o Grades 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 1.000  
o Grades 10, 11, and 12 1.052 
 Exceptional Student Programs 
o Kindergarten and Grades 1, 2, and 3 w/ ESE Services 1.066 
o Grades 4, 5, 6, and 8 w/ ESE Services 1.000 
o Grades 9, 10, 11, and 12 w/ ESE Services 1.052 
o Support Level 4 3.570 
o Support Level 5 4.970 
 English for Speakers of Other Languages 1.119 
 Programs for grades 9-12 Vocational Education 1.077 
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To provide for the planned use of FEFP funds, the Legislature has established the 
following combination of programs during the 180-day regular school year and summer 
school. 
  Group  Program Group Title 
1 Basic Education Programs 
2 Exceptional Education for Support Levels 4 and 5 
English for Speakers of Other Languages 
Grades 9-12 Vocational Education Programs 
 
The Florida Virtual School and schools associated with the Department of 
Juvenile Justice are the only schools that are eligible for summer school FTE reporting. 
Program Group 2 has an enrollment ceiling (cap) which is established based on 
each district's estimates (with modifications) of FTE in each FEFP program.  District 
estimates are reviewed and approved by a state enrollment estimating conference. 
Additional Weighted FTE 
 The 2008-09 FEFP authorized five additional FTE supplements.  These FTE 
supplements are included in a districts‟ weighted FTE and are subject to the other 
provisions of the FEFP.  The four additional FTE supplements are: 
 Small District ESE Supplement 
 Florida Virtual School 
 Small, Isolated High School Supplement 
 Bonus FTE Programs 
 
Base Student Allocation 
The based student allocation is determined annually by the legislature.  For the 
2008-09 fiscal year, the base student allocation is $3,971.74 (FLDOE, 2008).  The base 
student allocation was $1,238.99 in the 1981-82 FEFP (FLDOE, 1981). 
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District Cost Differential 
 Just as the FEFP recognizes the varying cost of educating students in different 
educational programs, it also recognized the varying cost educating students in different 
economies across the state.  To that end, the FEFP continues to include a District Cost 
Differential (DCD).  The DCD is based upon an average of the previous three years of 
the Florida Price Level Index as determined by the Department of Administration.  The 
three year average is multiplied by 0.800 and 0.200 is added to the product to determine 
the DCD.  This additional calculation is intended to limit the DCD adjustment to just the 
portion of a districts‟ operations that constitute salaries (80%).    The District Cost 
Differentials for the 2008-09 fiscal year are presented in Table 7, for comparative 
purposes the DCD for each district in 1981-82 is shown in parenthesis (FLDOE, 2008): 
Adjustments 
 
The 2008-09 Florida Education Finance Program included eleven adjustments, 
guarantees, supplements, and incentives.  They are (FLDOE, 2008): 
 Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) 
Declining Enrollment Supplement 
 Sparsity Supplement 
 Discretionary Contribution 
Discretionary Tax Equalization 
0.498 Mills Discretionary Compression 
Safe Schools Allocation 
 Reading Allocation 
 Supplemental Academic Instruction 
 ESE Guaranteed Allocation 
 Merit Award Program 
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Table 7:  2008-09 District Cost Differentials 
 
Alachua ............... 0.9813 (0.9817) Hamilton................. 0.9318 (0.9655) Okeechobee ..... 0.9701 (0.9783) 
Baker................... 0.9793 (0.9590) Hardee .................... 0.9672 (0.9674) Orange ............ 1.0090 (0.9827) 
Bay...................... 0.9424 (0.9572) Hendry.................... 1.0012 (0.9770) Osceola ........... 0.9903 (0.9727) 
Bradford .............. 0.9747 (0.9562) Hernando ................ 0.9784 (0.9681) Palm Beach ..... 1.0364 (1.0203) 
Brevard ............... 0.9843 (0.9885) Highlands ............... 0.9578 (0.9687) Pasco............... 0.9939 (0.9684) 
Broward .............. 1.0279 (1.0213) Hillsborough ........... 1.0158 (0.9894) Pinellas ........... 1.0053 (0.9974) 
Calhoun ............... 0.9172 (0.9566) Holmes ................... 0.9043 (0.9540) Polk ................ 0.9804 (0.9750) 
Charlotte.............. 0.9689 (0.9842) Indian River ............ 0.9834 (0.9929) Putnam ............ 0.9654 (0.9511) 
Citrus .................. 0.9538 (0.9694) Jackson ................... 0.9144 (0.9636) St. Johns .......... 0.9873 (0.9786) 
Clay .................... 0.9957 (0.9815) Jefferson ................. 0.9413 (0.9708) St. Lucie .......... 0.9879 (0.9862) 
Collier ................. 1.0530 (1.0168) Lafayette................. 0.9270 (0.9678) Santa Rosa ...... 0.9349 (0.9538) 
Columbia ............. 0.9505 (0.9634) Lake ....................... 0.9810 (0.9745) Sarasota........... 1.0007 (1.0041) 
Dade .................... 1.0145 (1.0442) Lee ......................... 1.0132 (1.0048) Seminole ......... 0.9986 (0.9872) 
De Soto ............... 0.9779 (0.9703) Leon ....................... 0.9635 (0.9669) Sumter ............ 0.9637 (0.9679) 
Dixie ................... 0.9385 (0.9642) Levy ....................... 0.9543 (0.9608) Suwannee ........ 0.9313 (0.9608) 
Duval .................. 1.0146 (0.9805) Liberty .................... 0.9236 (0.9752) Taylor ............. 0.9191 (0.9594) 
Escambia ............. 0.9376 (0.9640) Madison .................. 0.9162 (0.9543) Union .............. 0.9661 (0.9656) 
Flagler ................. 0.9551 (0.9873) Manatee .................. 0.9971 (0.9890) Volusia............ 0.9584 (0.9911) 
Franklin ............... 0.9105 (0.9818) Marion .................... 0.9569 (0.9750) Wakulla........... 0.9438 (0.9842) 
Gadsden .............. 0.9434 (0.9603) Martin..................... 0.9930 (1.0157) Walton ............ 0.9307 (0.9670) 
Gilchrist .............. 0.9555 (0.9716) Monroe ................... 1.0149 (1.0721) Washington ..... 0.9134 (0.9576) 
Glades ................. 0.9874 (0.9909) Nassau .................... 0.9925 (0.9641)  
Gulf ..................... 0.9152 (0.9618) Okaloosa................. 0.9542 (0.9758) 
 
 
Each of the adjustments, guarantees, supplements, and incentives included in the 
2008-09 FEFP was defined and discussed in the previous section dedicated to their 
inclusion and exclusion over the years. 
 
State & Local FEFP Dollars 
 The state and local FEFP dollars is the total amount allocated for the current 
operations of each school district.  It is subject to a reduction for local effort and various 
adjustments as illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Calculation of Net State FEFP Allocation in 2008 
 
 
Required Local Effort 
 The district required local effort is subtracted from the basic amount for current 
operation.  The required local effort is set by the legislature.  For the 2008-09 fiscal year, 
the legislature set the required local effort at $8,267,476,267 (FLDOE, 2008).  The 
Commissioner of Education, based on the amount set by the legislature, then sets the 
state-wide property millage levy necessary.  For the 2008-09 fiscal year, the average 
millage rate was 5.136 mills (FLDOE, 2008).    
The average millage rate is subject to adjustment if any district‟s required local 
effort exceeds 90% of the districts total FEFP entitlement.  In 2008-09, there were twelve 
districts which benefited an adjustment of their required local effort based on this 
provision (FLDOE, 2008). 
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required local effort from the state and local FEFP dollars. 
Adjustments 
 A provision is also added to authorize the Department of Education to make prior-
year adjustments in the allocation of funds to a district for arithmetical errors, assessment 
Gross State 
and 
Local FEFP 
Dollars 
- 
Required 
Local 
Effort 
= 
Gross 
State 
FEFP 
+ 
- 
 
Adjustments = 
Net State 
FEFP 
Allocation 
   
66 
roll changes, full-time equivalent student membership errors, or allocation errors revealed 
in an audit report. 
Net State FEFP Allocation 
By removing the adjustments from the state FEFP dollars, one can arrive at the 
net state FEFP allocation as demonstrated in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Calculation of Total State Finance Program in 2008-09 
 
 
District Discretionary Lottery Funds 
An amount of $217,406,176 was appropriated from the Educational Enhancement 
Trust Fund (Lottery) for School Recognition Funds and District Discretionary Lottery 
Funds to be expended according to school district policies and procedures that define 
enhancement and the types of expenditures consistent with that definition.  District 
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funding entitlement to the amount of the lottery appropriation.  Local school boards must 
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Categorical Program Funds 
 Categorical program funds are added to the FEFP allocation which is distributed 
to districts.  The 2008-09 FEFP included four such programs with allocations totaling 
$3,576,466,185.  They are listed below (FLDOE, 2008):  
 Class Size Reduction Allocation  2,809,079,054 
 Instructional Materials Formula Funds  259,551,440 
 Student Transportation  471,078,862 
 Florida Teachers Lead  36,756,829 
 
Special Allocations 
 The 2008-09 FEFP did not contain any special allocations. 
Total State Allocation 
 The total state allocation is the result of adding the categorical program funds and 
the district discretionary lottery funds to the net state FEFP allocation.  The total state 
allocation represents the total state financial contribution to the operation of local school 
districts. 
Legal Challenges 
Since the Serrano v. Priest decision in 1971, the vast majority of states have faced 
challenges to their school finance systems.  In 1973 the United States Supreme Court 
ruled five to four in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez that the Texas school 
finance system did not violate the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution 
guaranteeing equal protection. The Court held that education was not a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the federal constitution and that the Texas system satisfied the legitimate 
state purpose of local autonomy.  The Rodriguez case did not stop efforts by plaintiffs at 
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the state level who were able to cite education clauses in state constitutions (Berne, 
Moser, & Stiefel, 1999).  Despite differences in the legal strategies employed in these 
cases, most have centered on the inter-district equity of funding within states 
(Rubenstein, Doering, & Gess, 2000).  Because of the high degree of inter-district equity 
built into its school finance formula, the state of Florida has been spared much of the 
judicial and legislative turbulence that has marked public school financing in many states 
(Herrington & Weider, 2001).   
Florida‟s system of funding public education has withstood attacks based on the 
equity of the system.  Although some equity issues continue to be raised, current 
challenges focus on whether Florida is spending enough on education to enable the 
system to provide a high quality education to all of the students (Herrington & Weider, 
2001).   
Challenges to Florida‟s system of financing public education can be classified 
into two distinct categories:  equity challenges and adequacy challenges.  A discussion of 
the legal history of Florida‟s financing of public education would be incomplete without 
also including an overview of the 1998 amendment to the state constitution.   
Equity Challenges 
 Equity challenges have centered on whether some students or districts receive 
more funds for their education than other students or districts in the state (Herrington & 
Weider, 2001).  The first challenge to Florida FEFP was in 1979.  In 1979, the school 
board of Escambia County, a property-poor district, challenged the discretionary millage 
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provision of the FEFP.  In Gindl v. The Department of Education, the board argued that 
the provision allowing districts to levy discretionary millage resulted in funding 
disparities between districts with significant property wealth and those considered 
property poor.  The argument was based on the equal protection clause of the state 
constitution.  The Florida Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state.  The ruling stated 
that some variance in funding was acceptable as long as it was not “substantial” 
(Herrington & Weider, 2001). 
 The FEFP was again challenged under equity arguments in 1993.  Department of 
Education v. Glasser, brought by the Sarasota School Board, challenging the 
discretionary millage provision from the perspective of a property rich district.  The 
argument was based on an article of the Florida Constitution that authorized a maximum 
of 10 mills for the support of schools.  The Florida Supreme Court again ruled in favor of 
the state.  The ruling stated that the article cited only set a maximum, and that the state 
was in its rights to limit the levy (Herrington & Weider, 2001). 
 In both equity cases discussed, the courts refused to tightly constrain the state 
under the constitution‟s education clause.  Florida‟s education clause calls for a 
“uniform” system of education.   
Adequacy Challenges 
 Adequacy challenges focus on whether the amount of money available for public 
education is sufficient to meet the academic standards set forth from the state (Thompson 
& Crampton, 2002).  Two lawsuits have challenged the FEFP, but neither was successful, 
leaving the system largely unchanged almost three decades after its adoption.  Following 
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other state courts, the Florida Supreme Court asserted in its decisions that the vagueness 
of state constitutional requirements and the importance of legislative discretion prevented 
justices from intervening (Harris, 2005).  
 Funding advocates lost a third case before the Florida Supreme Court in 1996, 
Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles.  The coalition 
suit was filed before the Florida Constitution was amended by voters in 1998.  An 
overview of that amendment is included in the subsequent section.  The second suit, 
Faith L Honore v. Florida State Board of Education, was filed after the constitution was 
amended. 
 In 1995, the Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. 
Chiles challenged Florida‟s system of funding education on the basis of adequacy.  The 
Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness filing challenged the amount of funding available 
for public education.  This argument was based on the state‟s education clause.  In 
denying the claim, the Florida Supreme court stated that the education clause did not 
provide sufficient guidance to them on what an adequate education might be (Herrington 
& Weider, 2001).  This led to the constitution‟s amendment. 
 In 1999, after the adoption of the substantially stronger education clause in the 
Florida Constitution, a new adequacy case was filed.  Faith L Honore v. Florida State 
Board of Education was filed after the adoption of the amendment but before it legally 
took effect.  It was rejected under similar arguments as Coalition for Adequacy and 
Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles.  In its ruling, however, the Florida Supreme 
court refused to close the door to future adequacy claims (Herrington & Weider, 2001). 
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Constitutional Amendment 
 In 1998 the citizens of Florida considerably strengthened the education article in 
the state‟s constitution.  It has resulted in what many consider to be the strongest 
education language to be found in any state constitution (Herrington & Weider, 2001).  
Article IX – Education Section of the Florida Constitution reads (italicized language was 
added by the 1998 amendment): 
1.  Public education – The education of children is a fundamental value of 
the people of the State of Florida.  It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the 
state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing 
within its borders.  Adequate provision shall be made by law for a 
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public 
schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and for the 
establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher 
learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people 
may require. 
 
Conclusion 
 Florida‟s system for funding public education has been subject to changes each 
year in the 27-year period from 1981-82 through 2008-09.  Yet, with all the change that 
has taken place, the fundamental principles that the Florida Education Finance Program 
was based upon has not changed.  Those principles include a variable for educational 
setting, the program cost factor, and a variable for economic and geographical 
considerations, the district cost differential, and have been consistent in their purpose.   
 In 1981-82, the Legislature appropriated $1,694,023,329 for public education in 
the State of Florida (FLDOE, 1981).  By 2006-07, the appropriation had more than 
quintupled to $9,007,286,039 (FLDOE, 2008).  In that same period, the source of funding 
for school districts has slowly shifted from the state to local counties.  In 1981-82, state 
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funding accounted for 56.4% of district allocations and local funds accounted for 32.3% 
(FLDOE, 1981).  By 2008, the state was only contributing 40.63% of funds compared to 
50.47% locally (FLDOE, 2008). 
 During this same period, the FEFP has withstood legal challenges on the basis of 
both equity and adequacy.  The 1998 constitutional amendment has opened the door to 
future litigation using adequacy arguments.  Its language is specific and could call into 
question the amount of money allocated to public education in the State of Florida.  There 
is nothing in the constitutional amendment that suggests that the equity, or means of 
distribution of funding, may be in some legal peril. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS AND PREVIOUS FINDINGS 
 The methods and procedures in the statistical analysis and the historical review of 
the Florida Education Finance Program is the focus of this chapter.  Included is a 
discussion of the statistical tools employed, as well as the findings from the previous 
study in 1982.  Much of the language and definitions presented in this chapter come 
directly from Dr. Shiver‟s work (1982).  This is by design.  This section also details the 
current statistical tools available to evaluate the equitability of a state‟s school finance 
distribution mechanisms.  Ultimately, Dr. Shiver‟s statistical method is replicated on data 
through the 2008-09 school year and those findings are presented along side an analysis 
using the current statistical tools discussed in this chapter.  The chapter concludes with a 
brief discussion of similar linear studies found in the literature.  These studies come from 
six different states all with the common goal of determining the equity of each state‟s 
distribution of available funding for education. 
 This chapter is divided into four distinct subsections.  Those subsections are 
entitled Method for Conducting the Historical Review, Measures of Distributional 
Equity, Relationships Between Revenue Measures and Selected Independent Variables, 
and Equity Studies in the Literature.  A discussion of the findings from 1982 as well the 
statistical tools employed is included in each section.  Application of the statistical tools 
to the period from 1982-2009 is the basis of this study.  
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Method for Conducting the Historical Review 
The first phase of this study seeks to conduct a historical review of the changes in 
the Florida Education Finance Program.  The historical review was conducted to 
document the changes to the State of Florida‟s funding system for education.  This 
review is for the fiscal years from 1982-83 through 2008-09.  To complete the review, 
copies of the Florida Department of Education‟s annual statistical report, Funding for 
Florida School Districts, was obtained for the 27-year period beginning in 1982-83 and 
ending with the 2008-09 publication.  The statistical reports were used to document the 
Florida Education Finance Program funding formula in 1982-83, changes to the formula 
during the period from 1982-83 through 2008-09, and the structure of the funding 
formula in 2008-09.   
The historical review has been completed and is included as Chapter 2 of this 
study.  The historical review forms one of the compelling arguments for enacting the 
statistical components of this proposal. 
Measures of Distributional Equality 
 The second phase of this study aims to investigate the effect of the FEFP on the 
degree of distributional equity achieved by the state‟s school finance plan.  The State of 
Florida‟s Florida Education Finance Program is analyzed at three different levels of 
revenue aggregation: total state revenue per pupil, total local revenue per pupil, and total 
state and local revenue per pupil.  At each of these levels, the variables of interest are 
subjected to three separate, distinct cost adjustments.  The end result is a total of twelve 
revenue figures to which our measures of variability are applied.  This is a major 
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departure from the Shiver study.  The Shiver study did not allow for different cost-of-
living adjustments for the 67 school districts.  Ultimately, this is a major source of 
criticism of the original study. 
Adjustment of Revenue Measures 
The proposed study takes a major departure from the original study when it comes 
to the adjustment of revenue measures.  The original Shiver study does not use an 
adjustment to any of its revenue measures; in fact, it calls into question the Florida 
Education Finance Program‟s cost adjustment component, the District Cost Differential.  
This study calls for the use of three separate, distinct cost adjustments of the revenue 
measures.   
Inclusion of cost adjustments indicates that a portion of the apparent revenue 
advantage may simply compensate for the higher costs these districts face and may not 
provide substantially more educational “buying power” (Rubenstein, Doering, & Gess, 
2000). The consideration of the cost variations in educational services is a fundamental 
part of analyzing the equity of the system (Cohen-Vogel, & Cohen-Vogel, 2001).  
Common sense suggests that some school districts must pay more to hire good teachers 
than other school districts (Taylor, Alexander, Gronberg, Jansen, & Keller, 2002). Due to 
local economic factors, costs are higher in some districts than others largely because 
more resources are required to educate some students compared to others and because 
some districts will have to pay more money than other districts to attract high-quality 
teachers (Reschovsky & Imazeki, 2001). 
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Most states, including Florida, have cities where the cost of living differs widely 
from the state average (Kramer, 2002). The basic premise underlying the cost of living 
approach is that areas with a high cost of living will have to pay higher salaries to attract 
school employees, thus increasing the cost of education.  The cost of living becomes a 
proxy for the cost of education that cannot be directly influenced by school policy 
(Taylor et al., 2002). 
The three cost adjustments this study implements are the District Cost 
Differential, the Geographic Cost of Education Index, and the Comparable Wage Index. 
The District Cost Differential 
 The District Cost Differential (DCD) is the Florida Education Finance Program‟s 
cost adjustment component.  The DCD has been fundamental to the FEFP since its 
enactment.  This study proposes to use the DCD as an adjustment to the revenue 
measures.  Each of the three revenue measures – total local revenue per pupil, total state 
revenue per pupil, and total state and local revenue per pupil – for each district is divided 
by the DCD.  Since the DCD is used in the formula to determine funding to the districts, 
dividing available funding by the DCD will greatly reduce its impact.  The DCD in effect 
cancels itself out in the calculation. 
The Geographic Cost of Education Index 
 The Geographic Cost of Education Index (GCEI) was developed by Jay 
Chambers in 1998 with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Education, Office of 
Educational Research and Development.  The GCEI was developed to focus directly on 
school inputs and attempts to adjust for qualitative differences in those inputs employed 
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across geographical locations.  The index controls for variations in a wide range of 
personnel and job characteristics that affect the supply of, and demand for, school 
personnel.  It reflects differences across geographic locations in factors that underlie cost 
of living differences and differences in the characteristics of regions that affect their 
desirability as places to live and work (Chambers, 1998). 
 The Geographic Cost of Education Index was calculated for every school district 
in the country for the 1987-88, 1990-91, and 1993-94 school years.  The correlation 
between each pair of GCEI‟s across the 3-year intervals is .98; the correlation between 
GCEI‟s across the full 6-year interval is .96.  This suggests that the patterns of 
geographic variations in costs do not change substantially over time and the GCEI 
estimated for any given year provides a reasonable estimate of the GCEI for adjacent and 
future years (Chambers, 1998).  Dr. Chambers‟s research shows that the GCEI does not 
need to be updated every year.  
 For the purposes of this study, Chambers GCEI from 1987-88 was used to adjust 
the 1988-89 revenue measures.  The GCEI calculated for the 1990-91 school year was 
used to adjust the 1990-91 and 1992-93 revenue measures.  Finally, the GCEI calculated 
for the 1993-94 school year – the last year it is available - was used to adjust the 1994-95, 
1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03, 2004-05, 2006-07, and 2008-09 revenue measures.  
The Comparable Wage Index 
 In May of 2006, Lori Taylor in conjunction with the National Center for 
Educational Statistics released the Comparable Wage Index (CWI).  The basic premise of 
the CWI is that all types of workers – including teachers – demand higher wages in areas 
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with a higher cost of living or lack of amenities.  The CWI reflects the systematic, 
regional variations in the salaries of college graduates who are not educators.  Provided 
that these noneducators are similar to educators in terms of age, educational background, 
and tastes for local amenities, a CWI can be used to measure the uncontrollable 
component of variations in the wages paid to educators (Taylor, 2006). 
 The CWI offers a complete picture of labor costs because it reflects not only 
differences in the price of goods and services, but also any influence on wages due to 
differences in important community characteristics such as climate, crime rates, or 
cultural amenities (Taylor, 2006).   
 Evidence suggests that demographic profiles are remarkably stable over time, so 
any bias in the growth rates induced by demographic shifts should be modest.  Among 
metropolitan areas, there is a 0.968 correlation between 2002 and 2004.  This allows for 
the use of a prior year‟s CWI in future years.  
 The Comparable Wage Index (CWI) was first calculated in 1997 and is available 
from 1997 through 2003.  For the purposes of this study, the CWI for 1998 was used to 
adjust the 1998-99 revenue measures; the 2000 CWI was used to adjust the 2000-01 
revenue measures, and the 2002 CWI was used to adjust the 2002-03, 2004-05, 2006-07, 
and 2008-09 revenue measures.   
Selected Years for Study 
To facilitate assessment of changes in the distribution of the selected per pupil 
revenue measures across the state‟s school districts, six school years were selected by the 
original study for analysis over an 11-year time span, 1970-71 and 1972-73, prior to the 
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FEFP‟s enactment, and every other subsequent year, 1974-75, 1976-77, 1978-79, and 
1980-81.  Using the same selection method, 14 years have been selected for analysis by 
this study -- 1982-83, 1984-85, 1986-87, 1988-89, 1990-91, 1992-93, 1994-95, 1996-97, 
1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03, 2004-05, 2006-07, and 2008-09.  The years cover a 27-year 
time span from the end of the original study in 1982 through 2009.  
Equity Measures 
 Seven measures of central tendency and variation were selected by the previous 
study and are utilized in this study.  Three additional measures of dispersion or variability 
that are prevalent in the current literature were employed, bringing to ten the number of 
measures employed by this study.  Nine of the equity measures are discussed here.  
Discussion and analysis using the Gini coefficient is divided into a separate subsections. 
Percentile Ranks.  A percentile rank is a value on a transformed scale which 
corresponds to the percentile point.  For example, if $2500 per pupil is an amount at or 
below which 75 percent of the school districts fall, the 75 is the corresponding percentile 
rank.  The districts were ranked according to the per pupil revenue amount from highest 
to lowest.  Values are listed for the 100
th
 (highest), 95
th
, 75
th
, 50
th
 (median), 25
th
, 5
th
, and 
1
st
 (lowest) percentile rank.  A commonly used measure of central tendency, the median 
is the point of a scale of distribution such that half the observations fall above it and half 
below it. 
 Range.  The simplest measure of variation is the range that is the difference 
between the lowest and highest measurements in a distribution.  Although the range is not 
very stable because it is based on only two measurements or values and does not provide 
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any information about the variability of those per pupil amounts lying between the largest 
and smallest revenue measurements, it facilitates the comparison of changes in a 
particular aspect of distributional equality which may lead to the discovery of less 
obvious disparities lying elsewhere. 
 Restricted Range.  A measure less sensitive to extreme values than the range, the 
restricted range is the difference between two selected values in a distribution, usually in 
terms of percentiles.  For the purpose of this study, the restricted range is the difference 
between the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile of per pupil revenue. 
Federal Range Ratio.  The federal range ratio is the restricted range divided by 
the per-pupil revenue measure at the 5
th
 percentile.  This measure is prevalent in the 
current literature.  It was not in practice at the time of the original Shiver study.  Data will 
only be made available for the fourteen selected years of the current analysis. 
 Mean.  The mean is the sum of a set of measurements divided by the number of 
measurements in the set.  Unlike the median, the mean is based on all the values in a 
distribution and the quantity of the measurements.  Its measurement over time facilitates 
assessment of the growth in the average per pupil revenue amount received by school 
districts. 
 Standard Deviation.  A better index of dispersion or variability than either of the 
range measures, the standard deviation is equal to the square root of the variance that is 
the mean of the squared deviation scores.  The standard deviation is by far the most 
commonly used measure of variability and is based upon all the values in a distribution. 
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 Coefficient of Variation.  The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation 
divided by the mean of distribution and measures equality relative to the mean.  The 
lower the coefficient of variation, the more equal the distribution. 
McLoone Index.  The McLoone index is the sum of the per-pupil revenue measure 
for students at or below the median divided by the sum of per-pupil revenue measure if 
all the students below the median received the median amount.  This measure is prevalent 
in the current literature.  This index quantifies the relationship between students below 
the mean in per-pupil revenues and the mean.  It also shows how far these students fall 
below what equal per-pupil funding would generate.  It was not in practice at the time of 
the original Shiver study.  Data is only available for the fourteen years of the current 
analysis. 
Verstegen Index.  The Verstegen index is the sum of per-pupil revenue measure 
for students at or above the median divided by the sum of per-pupil revenue measure if 
all the students above the median received the median amount.  This index quantifies the 
relationship between students above the mean in per-pupil revenues and the mean and 
shows how far these students rise above what equal per-pupil funding would generate.  
This measure is prevalent in the current literature.  It was not in practice at the time of the 
original Shiver study.  Data is only available for the fourteen years of the current 
analysis. 
 Data for the pre-FEFP years 1970-71 and 1972-73 was obtained by Dr. Shiver 
from The Annual Report of the Commissioner of Education.  Data for the 1974-75, 1976-
77, 1978-79, and 1980-81 school years were obtained from Profiles of Florida School 
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Districts.  Data for the 1982-83, 1984-85, 1986-87, 1988-89, 1990-91, 1992-93, 1994-95, 
1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03, 2004-05, 2006-07, and 2008-09 years are extracted 
from the First Calculation from the year of interest made available from the 
Commissioner of Education.  The First Calculation was selected as the data source for the 
current study so that analysis takes place using the same figures the legislature uses in its 
annual deliberations. 
Total State Revenue Measures 
Tables 8 and 9 show the framework for evaluating the distribution of total state 
revenue.  Tables 8 and 9 are populated with data from the original study.  Data from the 
original study did not use any means of cost adjustment and is listed as “unadjusted.”  
Findings from the Original Study 
Table 8 shows that total state revenue per pupil has increased steadily across the 
percentile ranks except for the first and last two-year intervals at the 1
st
 percentile and the 
period between 1976-77 and 1978-79 at the 25
th
 percentile.  From 1970-71 to 1980-81 the 
median increased 170 percent, the largest increase of any percentile rank for the same 
period.  During the same period, the 100
th
 percentile rank, representing the district which 
received the most state revenue per pupil each of the six years, increased 145 percent as 
compared to the 1
st
 percentile rank, representing the district which received the least state 
revenue per pupil, which increased only 43 percent.   
These findings from the original study show a growing disparity between the so 
called rich and poor districts.  It is important to note that only unadjusted figures are 
available for this period.  Is the funding between the rich and poor growing or is the cost  
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of doing business in these districts changing?  The inclusion of cost adjusted revenues 
will provide data to more accurately judge this disparity. 
Table 8:  Percentile Distribution of Total State Revenue per Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
  Year  Revenue Type 100
th
 95
th
 75
th
 50
th
 25
th
 5
th 
1
st
   
 
1970-71 Unadjusted 922.09 768.58 618.33 533.19 480.79 427.82 382.30 
1972-73 Unadjusted 984.44 839.75 687.35 593.42 537.89 445.30 363.98 
1974-75 Unadjusted 1397.91 1093.60 911.18 815.57 702.45 536.84 366.84 
1976-77 Unadjusted 1577.74 1282.76 1058.85 922.20 829.12 557.84 409.34 
1978-79 Unadjusted 1896.99 1716.93 1204.10 1022.78 819.79 604.88 548.47 
1980-81 Unadjusted 2262.73 1727.10 1540.98 1442.46 1273.75 1032.69 544.55 
 
 
 In Table 9, the range of the distribution again increased steadily with the greatest 
percentage coming between 1972-73 and 1974-75, the years immediately prior and 
subsequent to the establishment of the FEFP.  From 1970-71 to 1980-81 the range more 
than tripled in size while the restricted range only doubled.  The substantial decrease in 
the size of the restricted range between 1978-79 and 1980-81 is reflected by the 
coefficient of variation and standard deviation recorded for 1980-81. 
 The mean total state revenue per pupil increased 151 percent between 1970-71 
and 1980-81.  For the same period, the standard deviation grew by almost 111 percent 
with a 19 percent decrease in the size between 1978-79 and 1980-81.  Overall, disparities 
in the distribution of total state revenue appear to have increased for each year except 
1980-81 when the coefficient of variation was the lowest of any year studied.  With 1980-
81 being the last year of the previous study, it is important that the variation was the 
lowest of any year studied.  Was this a sign of things to come, or, simply an abnormality 
that dissipated in subsequent years?  Only continued study can address this issue.   
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Table 9:  Measures of the Variation in the Distribution of Total State Revenues  
per Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
 
   Restricted  Standard Coefficient of 
   Year  Revenue Type Range Range Mean Deviation Variation  
 
1970-71 Unadjusted 539.79 340.56 560.14 117.58 .210 
1972-73 Unadjusted 620.46 394.45 621.47 128.66 .207 
1974-75 Unadjusted 1031.06 556.76 813.95 176.65 .217 
1976-77 Unadjusted 1168.40 724.92 931.22 215.39 .231 
1978-79 Unadjusted 1348.52 1112.05 1054.66 293.66 .278 
1980-81 Unadjusted 1718.17 694.41 1407.66 247.68 .176 
 
 
Total Local Revenues 
Tables 10 and 11 show the framework for evaluating the distribution of total local 
revenue.  Tables 10 and 11 are populated with data from the original study.  Data from 
the original study did not use any means of cost adjustment and is listed as “unadjusted.”  
Beginning with the first year of the proposed study, 1982-83, the tables are formatted to 
allow for both “unadjusted” and “DCD Adjusted” total local revenue per pupil.  The 
tables expand in 1988-89 and again in 1996-97 to reflect the inclusion of the “GCEI 
Adjusted” and “CWI Adjusted” respectively as these indices became available.  
Findings from the Original Study 
Table 10 presents the percentile distribution of total local revenue per pupil that 
combines the local discretionary effort with the required local effort per pupil.  The 
percentile ranks show a steady increase during the 11-year period of the original study 
except for a nominal decrease at the 5
th
 percentile rank between 1970-71 and 1972-73 
and a 13 percent decline at the 1
st
 percentile rank between 1974-75 and 1976-77.  From 
1970-71 to 1980-81 the median increased 175 percent. 
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Table 10:   Percentile Distributions of Total Local Revenue per Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
 
  Year  Revenue Type 100
th
 95
th
 75
th
 50
th
 25
th
 5
th 
1
st
   
 
1970-71 Unadjusted 679.91 486.48 316.92 221.00 150.54 107.02 80.84  
1972-73 Unadjusted 272.24 530.76 347.68 246.16 167.89 106.37 99.16 
1974-75 Unadjusted 1129.81 756.74 539.00 391.69 276.83 176.98 161.62 
1976-77 Unadjusted 1246.43 1041.33 650.35 446.28 311.77 213.39 142.66 
1978-79 Unadjusted 1390.76 1251.91 864.70 569.09 374.82 228.18 203.81 
1980-81 Unadjusted 1971.77 1339.94 907.34 606.68 393.93 243.66 217.64 
 
 
During the same period, the largest increase in total local revenue per pupil across 
all percentile ranks was between 1972-73, the year before the FEFP was enacted, and 
1974-75, the year immediately after.  The measures of variation presented in Table 11 
along with the mean summarized the changes in the distribution of total local revenue per 
pupil over the 11-year period of study.  Continued analysis will provide an additional 25-
year period of current data. 
 Both the range and the restricted range nearly doubled in size with the largest 
percentile change in the range coming between the years immediately preceding and 
following the year the FEFP was implemented.  The mean grew by 172 percent and, like 
the standard deviation, experienced the largest percentage increase during the same years 
as the range and restricted range.  The relatively large increase in per pupil local revenues 
Table 11:   Measures of the Variation in the Distribution of Total Local Revenues 
per Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
 
   Restricted Standard Coefficient of 
   Year  Revenue Type Range Range  Mean Deviation Variation  
 
1970-71 Unadjusted 599.07 379.46 251.12 126.26 .503  
1972-73 Unadjusted 628.08 424.39 278.63 138.85 .498 
1974-75 Unadjusted 968.19 579.78 425.16 197.01 .463 
1976-77 Unadjusted 1103.77 827.94 502.24 254.12 .506 
1978-79 Unadjusted 1186.95 1023.73 635.00 308.38 .486 
1980-81 Unadjusted 1754.13 1096.28 683.46 369.68 .541 
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between 1972-73 and 1974-75 may be attributable to a variation in the required local 
effort set by the legislature for the same period. 
Although the coefficient of variation fluctuated, it was approximately 8.4 percent 
higher in 1980-81 than in the year before the FEFP.  This observation coupled with the 
steady increase in the standard deviation between 1970-71 and 1980-81 reflected the 
growing disparity in the distribution of total local revenue per pupil.  This disparity may 
or may not have continued in subsequent years.  The trend may have stabilized or 
continued.  The analysis of additional data, data that includes cost adjustments, and a 
wider time period will allow for conclusions to be drawn that are current and relevant to 
contemporary practice. 
Total State and Local Revenue Measures 
 
Tables 12 and 13 show the framework for evaluating the distribution of total state 
and local revenue.  Tables 12 and 13 are populated with data from the original study.  
Data from the original study did not use any means of cost adjustment and is listed as 
“unadjusted.”  
Findings from the Original Study 
Table 12 presents the percentile ranks for the distribution of total state and local 
revenue per pupil across the selected years of the previous study.  With the exception of 
the first two-year interval at the 100
th
 percentile, total state and local revenue per pupil  
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Table 12:   Percentile Distributions of Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil,  
1970-1980 
 
 
   Year  Revenue Type 100
th
 95
th
 75
th
 50
th
 25
th
 5
th 
1
st
   
 
1970-71 Unadjusted 1164.83 1003.20 862.71 793.95 734.54 663.94 610.77  
1972-73 Unadjusted 1129.87 1114.64 964.13 887.40 829.56 758.57 673.46 
1974-75 Unadjusted 1647.37 1463.89 1293.76 1236.22 1153.54 1101.13 986.71 
1976-77 Unadjusted 1951.39 1770.89 1562.84 1393.38 1290.21 1158.28 1063.23 
1978-79 Unadjusted 2210.67 2086.37 1782.46 1667.44 1549.98 1459.30 1346.13 
1980-81 Unadjusted 2745.60 2587.57 2184.75 2061.07 1912.76 1793.31 1756.22 
 
 
increased steadily across the percentile ranks since 1970-71.  From 1970-71 to 1980-81 
total state and local revenue per pupil at the 95
th
 percentile increased 158 percent while 
the 5
th
 percentile increased only a slightly higher 170 percent.  The median fluctuated in 
the degree of percentage change in total state and local revenue per pupil with a 
minimum increase of 11.7 percent between 1970-71 and 1972-73 and a maximum of 39.3 
percent between 1972-73 and 1974-75, the years immediately before and after the 
establishment of the FEFP. 
The first percentile, representing the district which received the least total state 
and local revenue per pupil, showed the greatest increase from 1970-71 to 1980-81, i.e., 
187 percent.  The 100
th
 percentile, representing the district that received the most total 
state and local revenue per pupil, increased the least of the percentile ranks, i.e., 136 
percent.  From 1970-71 to 1980-81 the median increased 160 percent. 
While there appears to have been an equalization effect across the 95
th
 and 5
th
 
percentile ranks between 1970-71 and 1980-81, the ranks represent roughly only 10 
percent of the total number of districts, and a comparison of districts‟ wealth and their 
total state and local revenue receipts per pupil above and below the upper quartile (half 
the number of districts) indicates movement away from fiscal neutrality, a disequalizing 
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effect.   A judgment cannot and should not take place on the equity of the distribution of 
total state and local revenue based on unadjusted revenue.  The current study will provide 
more complete data over a longer period and therefore will provide a better foundation 
from which to draw conclusions.  
Table 13 presents the range, restricted range, mean, standard deviation, and 
coefficient of variation for the distribution of total state and local revenue for the selected 
years of study.  Total state and local revenues per pupil increased by about 185 percent 
between 1970-71 and 1980-81. 
 In 1972-73 and 1978-79 the range decreased in relation to its size two years 
earlier.  For the 11-year period of study, the range grew by about 79 percent while the 
restricted range increased steadily by about 135 percent, the largest increase coming 
between 1974-75 and 1976-77.  For the same period, the mean increased almost 158 
percent. 
 
Table 13:   Measures of the Variation in the Distribution of Total State and Local 
Revenues per Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
 
   Restricted  Standard Coefficient of 
   Year  Revenue Type Range Range Mean Deviation Variation  
 
1970-71 Unadjusted 554.06 339.26 881.26 110.38 .136      
1972-73 Unadjusted 456.41 356.07 900.10 103.01 .114 
1974-75 Unadjusted 660.66 362.76 1239.10 117.24 .095 
1976-77 Unadjusted 888.16 612.61 1433.46 193.28 .135 
1978-79 Unadjusted 864.54 627.54 1689.66 187.65 .111 
1980-81 Unadjusted 989.38 794.26 2091.12 233.40 .112 
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 The standard deviation has doubled between 1970-71 and 1980-81 with decreases 
corresponding to reductions in the size of the range for 1972-73 and 1978-79.  The 
smallest increase in the variability of the distribution of total state and local revenue per 
pupil between any of the selected years was between the year immediately prior to the 
FEFP‟s establishment, 1972-73, and the year immediately following, 1974-75. 
 Fluctuations in the coefficient of variation prohibit estimations of distributional 
equalizing or disequalizing effects; although it is worth noting that the coefficient of 
variation for the year immediately preceding the FEFP and the coefficient for the most 
recent year are virtually the same.   
Assessing Distributional Patterns of Per Pupil Revenues 
Using Lorenz Curves and Gini Coefficients 
 
 The purpose of this sub-section is to examine the overall pattern of the 
distribution of revenues per pupil among Florida school districts using an analysis 
separate from the measures presented in the previous sub-section to assess changes in the 
degree of inequality associated with school revenue distribution between 1970-71 and 
2008-09.  Data from the initial study is presented here and includes the period from 1970-
71 through 1980-81.  The current study presents data from 1982-83 through 2008-09.  
The most widely used measure of equality, the Gini coefficient, which is based on the 
Lorenz curve, has often been used by economist and school finance researchers to study 
various distributional patterns.  In this section, the equalizing or disequalizing effect of 
the three selected per pupil revenue measures – total state and local revenue, total state 
revenue, and total local revenue – is analyzed using the Lorenz curve and the Gini 
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coefficient to assess the role each plays in the degree of fiscal neutrality achieved by the 
state‟s school finance plan. 
 Figure 7 illustrates the hypothetical Lorenz curve and is constructed as follows:  
The X axis depicts the cumulative percentage increase of the state‟s pupil population 
ordered for poor to rich based on the assessed valuation per pupil in each district.  As 
each district‟s pupil population is accounted for, the membership figure represents a 
percentage of the total state population.  The Y-axis is the cumulative percentage of total 
school revenues accruing to the population on the X-axis.  The 45-degree “line of 
equality” which bisects the graph, represents a distribution where total school revenues 
per pupil are the same for the entire population if we assume equal unit on each axis.  
Thus, 25 percent of the pupil population would receive 25 percent of the total school 
revenues, half of the population would receive half the revenues, etc. 
Figure 7:  A Sample Lorenz Curve (Shiver, 1982) 
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The Lorenz curve has the ability to show that at point A the poorest 30 percent of 
the state‟s pupils only receive approximately 18 percent of the state‟s school revenues, 
while point B shows that the richest 30 percent of the pupils receive 45 percent of the 
revenues.  A Lorenz curve that coincided with the line of equality would indicate perfect 
fiscal neutrality, since pupils in each district would receive an equal share of the total 
state school revenues. 
 The Gini coefficient is derived by dividing the area between the Lorenz curve and 
the line of equality by the area of the triangle below the line of equality.  The resulting 
quotient characterizes the degree of inequality in a distribution and is shown by the 
following formula: 
   GC = A / B 
Where GC is the Gini coefficient, A is the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of 
equality, and B is the triangular area below the line of equality.  For example, if the 
shaded area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality equaled 1.5 square inches 
and the triangular area under the line of equality were six square inches, the Gini 
coefficient for total school revenues would be: 
   GC = 1.5 / 6 = .250 
If the Lorenz curve were to lie above the line of equality, the Gini coefficient would carry 
a negative sign, thus reflecting the disproportionally larger percentage of revenue 
received by the poorer students.  As school revenues are more equally distributed among 
districts of varying fiscal capacity, the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of 
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equality becomes smaller.  The closer the Gini coefficient approaches zero, the greater 
the degree of fiscal neutrality achieved by the state‟s school finance plan. 
 Tables 14, 15, and 16 show the framework for evaluating the distribution of 
revenues using Lorenz curves and the resulting Gini coefficients  
Findings from the Original Study 
 Total Local Revenue.  Lorenz curves for the distribution of total local revenue 
across each of the six selected years of the original study were produced and the Gini 
coefficient calculated for each year by Dr. Shiver.  Table 14 shows the Gini coefficients 
for each of these years.  Although there is little difference between the distributions for 
1970-71, 1972-73, and 1980-81, it was noted that immediately following establishment of 
the FEFP, total local revenues were more equally distributed than at any other time 
during the selected years of the original study.  The inequality in the distribution of total 
local revenues was greater in 1980-81 than in any of the earlier years studied based on the 
unadjusted revenues. 
Table 14:  Gini Coefficients of the Distribution of Total Local Revenues per 
Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
 
 Unadjusted       
 Total  Local  
  Year Revenue  
 
1970-71 0.1996    
 
1972-73 0.1959  
 
1974-75 0.1582 
 
1976-77 0.1863  
 
1978-79 0.1817  
 
1980-81 0.2044  
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Total State Revenues.  The Lorenz curves for total state revenues were also 
produced and Gini coefficients determined.  Table 15 shows the Gini coefficients for total 
state revenues.  Total state revenues were distributed in favor of the poorer districts each 
year.  The equalizing power of total state revenue to the poorest districts, however, 
actually decreases between 1972-73 and 1980-81.  A comparison of the Gini coefficients 
for total state revenues reveals that in 1980-81, state aid was less effective in offsetting 
the unequal distribution of total local revenues that in any other year.   
The larger the value of the negative total state revenue Gini coefficient, the more 
effectively it contributes to fiscal neutrality by reducing the Gini coefficient of total state 
and local revenue inequality.   
Table 15:  Gini Coefficients of the Distribution of Total State Revenues per 
Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
 
 Unadjusted      
 Total  State   
  Year Revenue   
 
1970-71 -0.0376   
 
1972-73 -0.0650  
 
1974-75 -0.0498  
 
1976-77 -0.0335  
  
1978-79 -0.0443 
 
1980-81 -0.0259  
 
 
Gini coefficients derived from two of the four total state revenue Lorenz curves 
measured after the FEFP‟s enactment indicate that the 1976-77 and 1980-81 curves 
actually lay closer to the line of equality than either of the Lorenz curves for 1970-71 and 
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1972-73.  When compared with the Lorenz curves for the other years, the position of the 
1972-73 total state revenue Lorenz curve in relation to the line of equality indicates that 
the pupils residing in the poorest districts received a smaller share of total state revenue 
in 1974-75, 1976-77, 1978-79, and 1980-81 than they did in 1972-73.  Thus, total state 
revenues were distributed more in favor of high fiscal capacity districts for the years 
subsequent to the FEFP‟s establishment than they had been in 1972-73.  These 
conclusions are drawn solely on the basis of unadjusted revenues.  The inclusion of cost 
adjustments as proposed may show the FEFP to be more equitable. 
Total State and Local Revenues.  Gini coefficients for total state and local revenue 
are displayed in Table 16.  Although the Gini coefficients for the distribution of total state 
and local revenues varied less than the coefficients for the other revenue distributions and 
are nearly identical, an examination of Gini coefficients of total state and local revenue 
reveals that total state and local revenues were distributed more in favor of the richer 
districts in 1980-81 than in any of the earlier years of study.  The most equal distribution 
of total state and local revenues came in 1974-75, the year immediately following 
establishment of the FEFP.  It is to be noted however that the corresponding Gini 
coefficients for 1970-71 and 1972-73 suggest a declining trend over time in the degree of 
total state and local revenue distribution inequality prior to the FEFP.  
The design of the FEFP provides for a cost adjustment for districts, the District 
Cost Differential (DCD).  The inclusion of this cost adjustment provides weighted funds 
based on local economies.   
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Table 16:  Gini Coefficients of the Distribution of Total State and Local 
Revenues per Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
 
 Unadjusted      
 Total  State & Local   
  Year Revenue   
 
1970-71 -0.0534  
 
1972-73 -0.0366 
 
1974-75 -0.0324 
 
1976-77 -0.0560 
  
1978-79 -0.0506 
 
1980-81 -0.0605 
 
 
It is to be expected that more state and local revenue would flow to these high cost 
districts.  This is the major flaw in the Shiver study. The Shiver study does not recognize 
the varying cost of doing business in each of the state‟s 67 districts.  To say the FEFP is 
inequitable because it provides more funds to the higher cost districts, ignores the basic 
fact that it cost more money to operate a district in certain local economies.  The current 
study uses multiple cost adjustments.  If adjusted revenues show an inequity exists, then 
the FEFP could be called into question.  To question the formula based on unadjusted 
revenue is misleading. 
Relationships Between Revenue Measures and Selected Independent Variables 
 
 The third phase of this study focuses on changes in the relationship between per 
pupil revenues and the selected independent variables before and after the FEFP‟s 
enactment in 1973.  The Pearson product moment correlation was used by Dr. Shiver to 
assess the extent to which changes in per pupil revenues are associated with changes in 
the independent variables identified in Chapter 1 - District Cost Differential factor and 
   
96 
Assessed Valuation.  Using each of the six years studied previously -- 1970-71, 1972-73, 
1974-75, 1976-77, 1978-79, and 1980-81 -- matrices were constructed which show the 
correlation between each of the independent variables and the three per pupil revenue 
measures – total state revenue per pupil, total local revenue per pupil, and total state and 
local revenue per pupil – used by Dr. Shiver.  An additional fourteen years will be 
analyzed by the current study -- 1982-83, 1984-85, 1986-87, 1988-89, 1990-91, 1992-93, 
1994-95, 1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03, 2004-05, 2006-07, and 2008-09.  
 To aid in the interpretation of changes in the strength of the indicated 
relationships, the coefficient of determination is symbolized by r
2
. 
Selected Independent Variables 
 The selected independent variables are defined as follows: 
 Assessed Valuation per Pupil.  A traditional measure of fiscal capacity in school 
finance equity studies, the property tax base is the nonexempt value of property in each 
district was divided by the district‟s student membership to obtain the assessed value per 
pupil.  This procedure is employed again in the current study. 
 District Cost Differential Factor.  Cost of living factors for the state‟s school 
districts are included in the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP) formula, but were 
not a part of the Minimum Foundation Plan (MFP).  The factor is intended to compensate 
districts for significant differences in the cost of living based on an annual study and 
survey of an identical “market basket” of goods and services priced in each county.  
Because the District Cost Differential factor is an index, the variable was not measured 
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per pupil in the correlation matrices.  This procedure is employed again in the current 
study. 
 Because the product moment coefficient of correlation assumes that the 
relationship between the two variables is a linear one, scatter plots were constructed by 
Dr. Shiver and inspected for each correlation in the original study to determine if 
relationships were possibly curvilinear, the computed Pearson r can underestimate the 
true strength of the relationship.  Therefore, for those scatter plots that appeared to depict 
pronounced curvilinear relationships, a second-order polynomial regression model was 
created in order to obtain a more appropriate indicator of the strength of the relationship 
between the variables.  Scatter plots again are constructed and analyzed.  Should any of 
these appear to be curvilinear; the second-order polynomial regression model will be 
employed.   
Total State Revenue Measures 
 Tables 17 and 18 show the relationship between total state revenue per pupil and 
the aforementioned independent variables of interest at two-year intervals from 1970-71 
through 1980-81. The tables have been expanded to allow for the addition of data at the 
stated two-year interval for the period from 1982-83 through 2008-09.  In addition to the 
reported Pearson product moment correlation coefficients, symbolized by r, 
corresponding coefficient of determination (r
2
) also were presented.  The multiple 
correlation coefficient, R
2
, and its square root, R, are given in parentheses alongside those  
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Table 17:   Product-Moment Correlation Between the District Cost Differential 
and Total State Revenues per Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
     
 Total  State  
  Year Revenue  
 
 r r
2
  
 
1970-71  ---      
 
1972-73  ---      
 
1974-75 -.59 .35    
 
1976-77 -.48 .23    
 
1978-79 -.49 .24     
 
1980-81 -.49 .24      
 
 
Table 18:   Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil and Total State Revenues per Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
   
 Total State  
Year Revenue  
 
 r r
2
     
 
1970-71 -.37 .14  
 
1972-73 -.60 .36    
 
1974-75 -.78 .61     
 
1976-77 -.68 .46     
 
1978-79 -.79 .62     
 
1980-81 -.84 .71   
  
 
product moment correlations and coefficients of determination that substantially 
underestimated the strength of relationships due to their curvilinearity.  (All multiple 
correlations coefficient are positive.) 
A much stronger inverse relationship appeared to have developed between total 
state revenue per pupil and assessed valuation per pupil as shown in Table 18.  By 1980-
81, 71 percent of the variance in one variable was associated with variance in the other 
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variable, an increase of 57 percentage points over the coefficient of determination of the 
same variables in 1970-71.  The difference between the first and last year correlation 
coefficients for total state revenue per pupil and assessed valuation per pupil shows a 
substantially greater degree of negative relationship – a greater equalizing effect under 
the FEFP.  The current study provides data to determine if that inverse relationship 
continued or reversed in subsequent years. 
 The moderate negative relationship between state revenue per pupil and the 
FEFP‟s district cost differential factor depicted in Table 17 remained relatively stable 
across the selected years of study.  That stability may or may not continue in the current 
study.  But either the development of a future trend or the continued stability would be 
noteworthy, as well as changes in the relationship as adjusted revenues are implemented. 
Total Local Revenue Measures 
The matrix presented in Table 19 and 20 show the correlations between total local 
revenue per pupil and the independent variables of interest for the selected years of the 
original study.  The matrix has been expanded to allow for the addition of data for the 
selected years of the current study.   
Overall, Tables 19 and 20 show the FEFP‟s impact on the relationship between 
total local revenue per pupil and the selected independent variables to have been 
negligible during the period of the original study.  Continued study provides data to 
determine if a relationship emerged or if the impact remained negligible.    
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Table 19:  Product-Moment Correlation Between the District Cost Differential 
and Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
  
 Total Local  
  Year Revenue  
 
 r r
2
    
 
1970-71  ---   
     
1972-73  ---  
 
1974-75 .63 .40 
 
1976-77 .67 .45   
 
1978-79 .64 .41   
 
1980-81 .66 .44    
 
 
Table 20:  Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil and Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
  
 Total Local  
  Year Revenue   
 
 r r
2
   
 
1970-71 .87 .76    
     
1972-73 .94 .88 
 
1974-75 .96 .92    
 
1976-77 .97 .94   
 
1978-79 .98 .96  
 
1980-81 .96 .92      
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Total State and Local Revenue Measures 
 Tables 21 and 22 display correlations between total state and local revenue per 
pupil and each of the selected independent variables of interest.  In Table 22, total state 
and local revenue per pupil was correlated with assessed valuation per pupil.  The 
moderate positive relationship between the two variables had remained relatively stable 
over the 11-year period of the original study with virtually identical correlation 
coefficients reported for 1970-71 and 1980-81.   
The static condition of this particular relationship is not characteristic of a school 
finance plan, which has moved or is moving toward fiscal neutrality.  Should the static 
condition continue through the proposed 27-year period, it would be even more striking 
and indicate that the system for financing Florida‟s schools made no movement towards 
fiscal neutrality in the combined 36-years of study.  
 It has been argued that the FEFP‟s cost of living factor in effect primarily 
measures differences in the standard of living among the districts rather than differences 
in the cost of the same standard of living – a viewpoint supported by the fact that 
residents of wealthier districts tend to purchase a greater amount and higher quality of 
goods and services than do those who live in poorer districts (Johns, Alexander, & 
Jordan, 1971).  Because a higher district cost differential factor is supposed to be a result 
of higher cost of living in a particular county, the moderate positive relationship reported 
in Table 21 for 1980-81, which is considerably stronger than the correlation for 1974-75, 
may be of greater interest if a strong relationship exists between the District Cost 
Differential factor and a district‟s fiscal capacity. 
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Table 21:   Product-Moment Correlation Between the District Cost Differential 
and Total State and Local Revenues Per Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
 
 Total State and   
  Year Local Revenue   
 
 r r
2
 (R)  (R
2
)   
 
1970-71  ---      
     
1972-73  ---      
 
1974-75 .18 .03     
 
1976-77 .36 .13      
 
1978-79 .27 .07   
 
1980-81 .52 .27     
 
 
 
Table 22:   Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil and Total State and Local Revenues Per Pupil, 1970-1980 
 
 
 Total State and   
  Year Local Revenue  
 
 r r
2
 (R)  (R
2
)    
 
1970-71 .60 .36 (.66) (.44)   
     
1972-73 .52 .27 
 
1974-75 .42 .18     
 
1976-77 .52 .27   
 
1978-79 .37 .14     
 
1980-81 .62 .38     
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 Table 23 shows the district cost differential factor correlated with assessed 
valuation per pupil for the selected years of study after the FEFP was enacted.  The 
relatively high, positive relationship between the FEFP‟s cost of living factor and the 
wealth measure lends credence to the criticism of the function of the state‟s cost of living 
differential.   
Table 23:   Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil and Florida’s District Cost Differential, 1970-1980 
 
 
 Assessed Value 
     Year per Pupil 
 
  1974-75 .63 
 
  1976-77 .66 
 
  1978-79 .65 
 
  1980-81 .65 
 
 
Returning to Table 21, the 1980-81 coefficient of determination of .27 means that 
the FEFP‟s District Cost Differential explains or is associated with approximately 27 
percent of the variation in total state and local revenue per pupil.  Given this degree of 
association between this particular measure of state aid and the district cost differential 
for 1980-81, Johns‟ earlier caveat remains pivotal: 
If there are real variations among the counties of the state in the cost of 
living for the same standard of living, the legislature should take those 
variations into consideration in the Finance Act because approximately 80 
percent of the current expenses of schools are required to pay the salaries 
and wages of school employees.  However, the legislature defeats the 
purpose of providing for substantially equal educational programs and 
services if it allocated school funds in such a manner as to provide for a 
higher standard of living in some counties than in others (Johns & 
Alexander, 1971). 
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Continued study will determine if the criticisms leveled by Johns and Shiver 
resulted in modifications to the FEFP or if a need to renew those criticisms exists.  The 
analysis of timely data and its publication would provide the needed determinant for this 
judgment. 
Equity Studies in the Literature  
 
The method described in this chapter, and previously in Chapter 1, draws support 
from the literature.  Studies that seek to determine if a state‟s system for distributing 
available funds for education can be found throughout the literature.  Equity studies can 
be found from multiple authors, in multiple journals, and for many different states.  In the 
pages that follow, these studies and their methods are detailed. 
The Equity of Public Education Funding in Georgia 
Ross Rubenstein, Dwight Doering, and Larry Gess conducted an assessment of 
the state of Georgia‟s system for distributing state funding to local districts.  Published in 
the fall of 2000 by the Journal of Education Finance, the study examined the distribution 
of funding in Georgia from 1988-1996.  The study examined the distribution of state and 
local per pupil revenues.  These revenues were adjusted using two independent indexes.  
Revenues were also adjusted for annual differences using the Consumer Price Index 
(Rubenstein, Doering, & Gess, 2000).   
Equity measures employed by the study include the range, restricted range, 
coefficient of variation, and the McLoone index.  Correlations were calculated between 
revenues per pupil and factors the authors referred to as “illegitimate” variables such as 
property wealth. 
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School Finance Reform in Tennessee 
Laura Ann Cohen-Vogel and Daniel Cohen-Vogel conducted an assessment of the 
equity of Tennessee‟s system for distributing funding to local districts.  Published in the 
winter of 2001 by the Journal of Education Finance, the study examined the distribution 
of funding in Tennessee from 1991 to 1998.  The study examined operating expenditures 
in Tennessee‟s local school districts.  Operating expenditures were adjusted using 
Chamber‟s Geographic Cost of Education Index (GCEI).  Operating expenditures were 
also adjusted based on annual differences using inflation measures from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (Cohen-Vogel & Cohen-Vogel, 2001). 
The Tennessee study employed six equity statistics: the range, restricted range, 
federal range ratio, coefficient of variation, Gini coefficient, and the McLoone index. 
Wealthy or Poor: Who Receives and Who Pays in Iowa 
Julie Bundt and Suzanne Leland conducted a review of Iowa system for 
distributing available funding.  Published in the spring of 2001 by the Journal of 
Education Finance, the study looked exclusively at data from 1998.  The study did not 
employ cost adjustments of any kind.  The authors discussed cost adjustments but noted 
that Iowa has a more uniform economy than most other states (Bundt & Leland, 2001). 
Four equity statistics were used in the Iowa study: federal range ratio, McLoone 
index, coefficient of variation, and the Gini coefficient. 
Assessing the Equity of Kentucky’s SEEK Formula 
Lawrence Picus, Allan Odden, and Mark Fermanich conducted a review of 
Kentucky‟s system for financing local districts, the Support Education Excellence in 
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Kentucky or SEEK formula.  Published in the spring of 2004 by the Journal of Education 
Finance, the study examined the financing of Kentucky‟s schools for a ten year period 
beginning with the 1990-91 school year and ending with the 1999-2000 school year.  The 
study looked from a revenue perspective at the resources available to school districts in 
Kentucky.  Revenue was adjusted using Chamber‟s GCEI (Picus, Odden, & Fermanich, 
2004).  
Seven equity statistics were employed by the Kentucky study: the range, restricted 
range, federal range ratio, coefficient of variation, Gini coefficient, McLoone index, and 
Verstegen index.  Fiscal neutrality was also judged using correlations between per pupil 
revenues and the wealth of each district.  District wealth was established using the 
property tax base. 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity Analysis of Indiana 
Marilyn Hirth and Edward Eiler conducted an assessment of the state of Indiana‟s 
system for distributing state funding to local districts.  Published in the spring of 2005 by 
the Journal of Education Finance, the study examined the distribution of funding in 
Indiana from 1993 through 2001.  The study examined the distribution of state and local 
per pupil revenues under Indiana‟s reward-for-effort school funding formula.  These 
revenues were adjusted for both the cost of living variations and inflation (Hirth & Eiler, 
2005). 
The range, restricted range, federal range ratio, Gini coefficient, McLoone index, 
and coefficient of variation were employed as equity statistics in the Indiana study. 
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The Equality of Public School District Funding 
Michele Moser and Ross Rubenstein authored a national study to determine the 
equity of public school financing in the United States.  Published in January of 2002 by 
the journal Public Administration Review, the study examined state and local revenues 
per pupil across each of the fifty states in fiscal years 1992 and 1995.  State and local 
revenues per pupil were adjusted using Chamber‟s Geographic Cost of Education Index 
(Moser & Rubenstein, 2002). 
The federal range ratio, coefficient of variations, McLoone index, and Gini 
coefficient were equity measures used in the national study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS 
The purpose of this study was to examine the distribution of available funding for 
Florida‟s public school districts.  Data covering a twenty-seven year period from the 
1982-83 school year through the 2008-09 school year was examined.  Data was examined 
for even number years during this period yielding 14 data sets. 
Data for the 1982-83, 1984-85, 1986-87, 1988-89, 1990-91, 1992-93, 1994-95, 
1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, 2002-03, 2004-05, 2006-07, and 2008-09 years were 
extracted from the First Calculation from the year of interest made available from the 
Commissioner of Education.  The First Calculation was selected as the data source for the 
study so that analysis takes place using the same figures the legislature uses in its annual 
deliberations. 
Chapter three outlined the research design and methods to be employed in this 
study.  This chapter will begin with a brief review of those methods and continue into a 
presentation of the results.  The results will be presented in two sections.  Measures of 
distributional equity will be discussed in the first results section.  The relationship 
between the selected revenue measures and the independent variables will be the subject 
of the second.  The chapter will conclude with a presentation of a single year‟s analysis 
using weighed students based on the program cost factors. 
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Research Design and Methods 
 This phase of the study investigates the effect of the FEFP on the degree of 
distributional equity achieved by the state‟s school finance plan.  The State of Florida‟s 
Florida Education Finance Program is analyzed at three different levels of revenue 
aggregation: total state revenue per pupil, total local revenue per pupil, and total state and 
local revenue per pupil.  At each of these levels, the variables of interest are subjected to 
three separate, distinct cost adjustments.  The end result is a total of twelve revenue 
figures to which our measures of variability are applied. 
Variables for Analysis 
Total State Revenue per Pupil.  This variable is the sum of all state revenue 
provided to districts and includes the FEFP appropriations, categorical program funding, 
special state revenue sources, special state appropriations, and state lottery funds divided 
by the unweighted FTE student count of the district.  The required local effort is 
prescribed by the state, but raised from local sources (property taxes) and is included in 
total state revenue per pupil. 
District Cost Differential (DCD) Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil.  This 
variable is the sum of all state revenue provided to districts and includes the FEFP 
appropriations, categorical program funding, special revenue sources, special 
appropriations, and lottery funds divided by the unweighted FTE student count of the 
district divided by the district‟s DCD. 
Comparable Wage Index (CWI) Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil.  This 
variable is the sum of all state revenue provided to districts and includes the FEFP 
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appropriations, categorical program funding, special revenue sources, special 
appropriations, and lottery funds divided by the unweighted FTE student count of the 
district divided by the district‟s CWI. 
Geographic Cost of Education Index (GCEI) Adjusted Total State Revenue per 
Pupil.  This variable is the sum of all state revenue provided to districts and includes the 
FEFP appropriations, categorical program funding, special revenue sources, special 
appropriations, and lottery funds divided by the unweighted FTE student count of the 
district divided by the district‟s GCEI. 
Total Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable is the revenue derived from the 
required local effort combined with other local revenues provided to the district divided 
by the unweighted FTE student count. 
DCD Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable is the revenue 
derived from the required local effort combined with other local revenues provided to the 
district divided by the unweighted FTE student count divided by the district‟s DCD. 
CWI Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable is the revenue 
derived from the required local effort combined with other local revenues provided to the 
district divided by the unweighted FTE student count divided by the district‟s CWI. 
GCEI Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable is the revenue 
derived from the required local effort combined with other local revenues provided to the 
district divided by the unweighted FTE student count divided by the district‟s GCEI. 
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Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable combines the total state 
revenue and the total local revenue provided to the district divided by the unweighted 
FTE student count. 
DCD Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable combines 
the total state revenue and the total local revenue provided to the district divided by the 
unweighted FTE student count divided by the district‟s DCD. 
CWI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable combines 
the total state revenue and the total local revenue provided to the district divided by the 
unweighted FTE student count divided by the CWI. 
GCEI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  This variable combines 
the total state revenue and the total local revenue provided to the district divided by the 
unweighted FTE student count divided by the Geographic Cost of Education Index 
(GCEI). 
Measures of Dispersion of Variability and Variation 
Ten measures of dispersions or variability are utilized in the current study. 
Percentiles.  School districts are ranked according to the variable of interest with 
values listed for the 100
th
 (highest), 95
th
, 75
th
, 50
th
 (median), 25
th
, 5
th
, and 1
st
 (lowest) 
percentiles. 
Range.  The range is the difference between the values of a variable in the highest 
and lowest districts in a distribution. 
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Restricted Range.  The restricted range is a measure less sensitive to extreme 
values than the range.  In this study, it is the difference between the values of the selected 
revenue measure at the 95
th
 and the 5
th
 percentiles. 
Federal Range Ratio.  The federal range ratio is the restricted range divided by 
the per-pupil revenue measure at the 5
th
 percentile. 
Mean.  The mean is the sum of the school districts values of a variable divided by 
the number of districts. 
Standard Deviation.  The standard deviation is the square root of the mean of the 
squared differences between the value of the variable in each district and the mean. 
Coefficient of Variation.  The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation 
divided by the mean. 
Gini Coefficient.  After school districts are ranked in ascending order by the 
variable of interest, they will be plotted on a graph with the percentage of the total pupil 
population measured along the horizontal axis and the percentage of revenue received on 
the vertical axis.  A 45-degree diagonal dissects the graph and represents the locus points 
where the two factors are equal, or a state of total equality.  Inequalities are represented 
by the curve (Lorenz curve) divergent from the diagonal.  The Gini coefficient is a 
statistical summary of distributional equality and is equal to the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the 45-degree diagonal divided by the area of the triangle below the diagonal.  
The closer the Gini coefficient approaches zero, the closer the distribution is to total 
equality. 
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McLoone Index.  The McLoone index is the sum of per-pupil revenue measure for 
students at or below the median divided by the sum of per-pupil revenue measure if all 
the students below the median received the median amount. 
Verstegen Index.  The Verstegen index is the sum of per-pupil revenue measure 
for students at or above the median divided by the sum of per-pupil revenue measure if 
all the students above the median received the median amount. 
Correlations 
Separate analysis using Pearson product-moment correlations will focus on the 
relationship between each of the selected per pupil revenue measures and the independent 
variables.  
Independent Variables 
 The selected independent variables are measured in terms of amount or unit per 
pupil and are as follows: 
District Cost Differential Factor.  This factor is incorporated into the FEFP 
formula to adjust the districts‟ FEFP allocations for the varying cost of providing similar 
education programs.  The District Cost Differential is not based on student variables, but 
rather economic data relevant to the cost of doing business in a geographic region and is 
not measured per pupil. 
Assessed Valuation.  The property tax base is the assessed, nonexempt value of 
property against which taxes are levied.  Assessed property values are a net figure for a 
district.  In order for the assessed valuation to be relevant for a school finance study, the 
figure was converted to a per pupil figure.  Each district‟s net assessed valuation is 
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divided by the unweighted FTE of that district. The result is an assessed valuation per 
pupil. 
Measures of Distributional Equity 
Total State Revenue Measures 
Tables 24 and 25 show the framework for evaluating the distribution of total state 
revenue.  Tables 24 and 25 are populated with data from the current study.  Fourteen 
years worth of data is displayed.  Table 24 displays the percentile ranks of total state 
revenues at the 100
th
, 95
th
, 75
th
, 50
th
, 25
th
, 5
th
 and 1
st
 percentiles.  Table 25 displays the 
range, restricted range, mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation.  
Unadjusted total state revenue and District Cost Differential (DCD) adjusted total state 
revenue is shown for all fourteen years.  Beginning in 1988-89, total state revenue is 
shown adjusted by the Geographic Cost of Education Index (GCEI).  The Comparable 
Wage Index is first shown as an adjustment to total state revenue in 1998-99. 
Percentile Ranks 
 The percentile ranks in Table 24 show increases in the majority of the years by 
measure over the previous year.  In 1992-93, 2002-03, and 2008-09, at least three out of 
four revenue measures show decreases. 
 At the highest levels, 100
th
 and  95
th
 percentiles, total state revenues grew in each 
year from 1982-83 through 1990-91.  This was true of all revenue measures during the 
period.  In 1992-93, DCD Adjusted Total State Revenue and GCEI Adjusted Total State 
Revenue decreased at both the 100
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles.  Unadjusted Revenues  
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Table 24:  Percentile Distribution of Total State Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
  
  Year  Revenue Type 100
th
 95
th
 75
th
 50
th
 25
th
 5
th 
1
st
   
 
1982-83 Unadjusted 1704.55 1598.35 1474.88 1350.54 1137.90 724.28 541.98 
 DCD Adjusted 1788.06 1654.68 1517.53 1403.92 1147.88 707.24 547.86 
 
1984-85 Unadjusted 2053.23 1851.01 1757.57 1586.18 1362.21 695.91 432.51 
 DCD Adjusted 2127.47 1954.52 1810.38 1652.17 1398.83 709.61 406.02 
 
1986-87 Unadjusted 2361.13 2182.40 2017.57 1828.10 1510.81 743.63 573.28 
 DCD Adjusted 2438.93 2310.39 2118.52 1839.13 1524.13 760.88 540.64 
 
1988-89 Unadjusted 3284.14 3201.91 3002.87 2530.52 2109.93 1412.37 1134.86 
 DCD Adjusted 3522.62 3368.52 3137.04 2621.59 2187.81 1377.21 1112.79 
 GCEI Adjusted 3950.73 3763.77 3440.65 2683.40 2218.36 1431.62 1154.52 
 
1990-91 Unadjusted 3783.81 3631.65 3378.01 2836.77 2360.18 1394.42 802.33 
 DCD Adjusted 4083.38 3948.64 3575.30 3023.11 2387.04 1365.22 768.14 
 GCEI Adjusted 4552.79 4248.74 3821.40 3096.60 2404.49 1362.69 781.35 
 
1992-93 Unadjusted 3696.74 3498.54 3191.09 2676.22 2211.39 1151.11 729.56 
 DCD Adjusted 3495.08 3354.87 3047.79 2526.99 1988.07 1034.42 655.03 
 GCEI Adjusted 4368.38 4171.58 3619.84 2909.39 2203.92 1152.86 710.94 
 
1994-95 Unadjusted 3869.69 3789.55 3395.83 2884.41 2348.17 1343.48 799.79 
 DCD Adjusted 3777.88 3724.57 3333.48 2723.87 2192.97 1217.71 713.47 
 GCEI Adjusted 4751.99 4612.20 3974.59 3271.23 2488.32 1421.33 810.26 
 
1996-97 Unadjusted 4064.46 3942.65 3545.47 3129.28 2660.84 1485.74 946.48 
 DCD Adjusted 4393.06 4227.29 3843.06 3284.97 2691.28 1478.90 915.75 
 GCEI Adjusted 4929.94 4736.85 4125.59 3416.41 2743.56 1560.42 959.87 
 
1998-99 Unadjusted 4269.37 4109.12 3720.09 3264.21 2801.16 1124.86 861.18 
 DCD Adjusted 4573.02 4411.27 4043.24 3369.98 2832.50 1135.86 825.56 
 GCEI Adjusted 5178.48 5019.51 4419.71 3570.66 2880.79 1235.49 862.52 
 CWI Adjusted 7063.82 6170.83 5060.95 4109.26 3250.55 1434.76 994.45 
 
2000-01 Unadjusted 4429.78 4361.89 3946.68 3490.54 2991.12 1255.36 877.03 
 DCD Adjusted 4746.06 4654.99 4272.42 3587.83 3020.82 1252.23 843.04 
 GCEI Adjusted 5436.70 5335.93 4706.82 3813.98 3092.79 1289.19 878.38 
 CWI Adjusted 6175.63 5522.86 4581.46 3849.00 3148.79 1324.23 919.08 
 
2002-03 Unadjusted 4627.00 4412.25 4014.56 3484.15 2785.54 952.32 885.04 
 DCD Adjusted 4939.16 4771.37 4272.65 3467.36 2870.82 961.11 874.86 
 GCEI Adjusted 5799.75 5420.97 4632.39 3685.14 3069.35 1053.85 935.49 
 CWI Adjusted 6119.59 5609.70 4480.84 3426.60 2839.93 1058.69 868.66 
 
2004-05 Unadjusted 5628.86 4959.02 4437.61 3744.54 3225.70 1306.58 1249.59 
 DCD Adjusted 5915.78 5288.51 4691.90 3850.80 3207.48 1291.33 1257.08 
 GCEI Adjusted 7055.54 6061.64 5139.61 4137.21 3321.60 1385.80 1315.85 
 CWI Adjusted 6396.44 5807.64 4740.80 3656.46 2888.45 1266.41 1136.09 
 
2006-07 Unadjusted 6291.73 6067.31 5178.07 4519.29 3113.06 1702.21 1608.08 
 DCD Adjusted 6647.36 6442.56 5414.03 4590.02 3185.01 1733.79 1681.46 
 GCEI Adjusted 7821.57 7325.98 6072.37 4891.16 3366.86 1807.73 1753.50 
 CWI Adjusted 7394.77 7001.34 5680.12 4175.37 2904.79 1596.87 1521.90 
 
2008-09 Unadjusted 6223.95 6008.00 4936.66 4210.79 2761.49 1931.65 1852.56 
 DCD Adjusted 6785.82 6338.95 5096.59 4216.46 2756.85 1954.84 1926.70 
 GCEI Adjusted 7783.26 7326.96 5655.96 4494.14 2936.37 2025.27 1918.51 
 CWI Adjusted 7361.34 7041.46 5436.51 3901.15 2514.48 1767.11 1700.52 
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Table 25:   Measures of the Variation in the Distribution of Total State Revenues 
per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
   Restricted  Standard Coefficient of 
   Year  Revenue Type Range Range Mean  Deviation Variation 
 
1982-83 Unadjusted 1203.27 874.07 1276.25 280.96 .22 
 DCD Adjusted 1292.57 947.44 1308.74 303.20 .23 
 
1984-85 Unadjusted 1804.60 1155.10 1475.72 372.34 .25 
 DCD Adjusted 1880.16 1244.92 1527.44 401.35 .26 
 
1986-87 Unadjusted 1918.76 1438.77 1697.33 444.02 .26 
 DCD Adjusted 2000.55 1549.51 1749.65 474.96 .27 
 
1988-89 Unadjusted 2242.04 1789.54 2470.76 570.65 .23 
 DCD Adjusted 2495.31 1991.31 2556.88 634.42 .25 
 GCEI Adjusted 2902.86 2332.15 2718.73 752.31 .28 
 
1990-91 Unadjusted 2982.18 2237.23 2746.10 736.46 .27 
 DCD Adjusted 3355.49 2583.43 2883.67 835.66 .29 
 GCEI Adjusted 3781.98 2886.05 3013.33 946.19 .31 
 
1992-93 Unadjusted 2987.21 2347.44 2562.60 754.79 .29 
 DCD Adjusted 2859.18 2320.45 2396.71 743.55 .31 
 GCEI Adjusted 3672.91 3018.72 2815.26 954.89 .34 
 
1994-95 Unadjusted 3072.85 2447.07 2778.63 774.19 .28 
 DCD Adjusted 3064.47 2506.86 2650.19 790.53 .30 
 GCEI Adjusted 3943.02 3190.87 3139.43 1021.33 .33 
 
1996-97 Unadjusted 3137.94 2456.90 2975.30 761.81 .26 
 DCD Adjusted 3480.69 2748.39 3119.54 860.25 .28 
 GCEI Adjusted 3992.31 3176.42 3353.27 1008.68 .30 
 
1998-99 Unadjusted 3418.18 2984.26 3088.70 872.52 .28 
 DCD Adjusted 3767.21 3275.41 3228.55 962.79 .30 
 GCEI Adjusted 4317.08 3784.03 3480.13 1125.53 .32 
 CWI Adjusted 6099.95 4736.07 4076.90 1391.04 .34 
 
2000-01 Unadjusted 3565.62 3106.53 3283.86 915.97 .28 
 DCD Adjusted 3929.22 3402.76 3439.77 1012.74 .29 
 GCEI Adjusted 4562.18 4046.76 3697.71 1180.74 .32 
 CWI Adjusted 5276.59 4198.63 3759.11 1202.17 .32 
 
2002-03 Unadjusted 3798.97 3459.93 3239.22 1020.52 .32 
 DCD Adjusted 4080.65 3810.26 3391.72 1114.27 .33 
 GCEI Adjusted 4874.38 4367.12 3650.77 1298.05 .36 
 CWI Adjusted 5260.27 4551.00 3554.86 1355.34 .38 
 
2004-05 Unadjusted 4405.67 3652.45 3587.76 1145.70 .32 
 DCD Adjusted 4682.63 3997.18 3731.77 1233.99 .33 
 GCEI Adjusted 5742.72 4675.84 4042.82 1458.35 .36 
 CWI Adjusted 5270.70 4541.23 3686.59 1421.60 .39 
 
2006-07 Unadjusted 4749.46 4365.09 4135.29 1435.76 .35 
 DCD Adjusted 5010.65 4708.77 4265.92 1523.10 .36 
 GCEI Adjusted 6087.07 5518.25 4681.25 1822.81 .39 
 CWI Adjusted 5878.50 5404.47 4257.73 1764.25 .41 
 
2008-09 Unadjusted 4405.03 4076.36 3965.18 1365.17 .35 
 DCD Adjusted 4866.14 4384.11 4112.56 1485.67 .36 
 GCEI Adjusted 5956.16 5301.68 4471.94 1756.13 .39 
 CWI Adjusted 5695.33 5274.36 4081.12 1712.30 .42 
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decreased in 1992-93 at the 95
th
 percentile only.  The period from 1994-95 through 2006-
07 showed constant growth with the exception of CWI Adjusted Total State Revenue in 
2000-01 at the 95
th
 percentile and 2002-03 at the 100
th
 percentile. Total State Revenue at 
the 100
th
 percentile decreased in 2008-09 in unadjusted, GCEI adjusted, and CWI 
adjusted.  At the 95
th
 percentile, only unadjusted revenue decreased in 2008-09. 
 At the intermediate levels; 75
th
, 50
th
, and 25
th
 percentiles, revenues grew 
consistently from 1982-83 through 1990-91.  This was true of all revenue measures 
during the period.  In 1992-93, Unadjusted Total State Revenue decreased at the 75
th
, 50
th
 
and 25
th
 percentiles.  DCD Adjusted Total State Revenue decreased at only the 75
th
 
percentile.  GCEI Adjusted Total State Revenue decreased at the 50
th
 and 25
th
 percentiles.  
The period from 1994-95 to 1998-99 again showed consistent growth in all measures. 
CWI Adjusted Total State Revenue decreased at the 75
th
, 50
th
, and 25
th
 percentile in 
2000-01.  The other three revenue measures recorded another year of growth.  In 2002-
03, reduction in revenues took place at the 50
th
 and 25
th
 percentiles for unadjusted 
revenues, 75
th
 and 50
th
 percentiles for GCEI adjusted revenues, and at 75
th
, 50
th
 and 25
th
 
percentiles for CWI adjusted revenues.  There was growth across the board in 2004-05.  
A decrease in Unadjusted Total State Revenue took place at the 25
th
 percentile in 2006-
07.  In 2008-09, unadjusted revenues decreased at the 75
th
, 50
th
, and 25
th
 percentiles.  
GCEI adjusted revenues decreased at the 75
th
 and 50
th
 percentiles during 2008-09.  CWI 
adjusted revenues decreased at the 75
th
 50
th
, and 25
th
 percentiles for the year. 
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 At the lowest levels, 1
st
 and 5
th
 percentiles, Total State Revenues fluctuated more 
than the other levels.  In 1984-85, when revenues increased consistently for the 
intermediate and high levels, revenues decreased for Unadjusted Total State Revenue at 
the 5
th
 and 1
st
 percentile.  At the 1
st
 percentile, DCD Adjusted Total State Revenue also 
decreased in 1984-85.  Total state revenues increased across the board in 1986-87 and 
1988-89, almost doubling in 1988-89.  Revenues decreased for 1990-91 at the 1
st
 and 5
th
 
percentiles for Unadjusted Total State Revenue.  DCD Adjusted Total State Revenue 
deceased at the 5
th
 percentile and increased at the 1
st
.  GCEI Adjusted Total State 
Revenue increased at the 5
th
 percentile and decreased at the 1
st
 for the same year.  As 
with the intermediate and high percentiles, 1992-93 showed decreases in the majority of 
the revenue measures.  Growth was consistent in 1994-95 and 1996-97 when all revenues 
increased.  The period from 1998-99 through 2002-03 showed great variation of revenues 
at the 5
th
 and 1
st
 percentiles.  From 2004-05 to 2008-09, the revenues grew consistently. 
Range and Restricted Range 
 The range and restricted range of total state revenues is displayed in a column 
format in Table 25.  Graphical illustrations of the range and restricted range of state 
revenues are shown Figures 8 through 13. 
 Figure 8 shows a multiple line graph of the range and restricted range of 
Unadjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil.  The figure clearly shows the range and 
restricted range increasing on an annual basis.  The range and restricted range peak in 
2006-07 before showing a modest decline in 2008-09. 
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Figure 8: Range and Restricted Range of Unadjusted Total State Revenue per 
Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 9 shows a multiple line graph of the range and restricted range of DCD 
Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil.  Unlike the range and restricted range unadjusted 
revenues per pupil depicted in Figure 8, the range and restricted range of DCD Adjusted 
Total State Revenue per Pupil does not increase consistently.  Both the range and 
restricted range decrease in 1992-93 before resuming a steady climb and peaking in 
2006-07.  Like the unadjusted range and restricted range, the DCD adjusted range and 
restricted range decreases in 2008-09.  
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Figure 9: Range and Restricted Range of DCD Adjusted Total State Revenue 
per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 10 shows a multiple line graph of the range and restricted range of CWI 
Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil.  Unlike Figures 8 and 9 that show fourteen data 
points, Figure 10 has only six.  The range of CWI adjusted revenues decreases from 
1998-99 to 2000-01.  It is flat from 2000-01 to 2004-05, increases in 2006-07, and 
decreases in 2008-09.  The restricted range of CWI Adjusted Total State Revenue per 
Pupil decreases in 2000-01 and 2008-09.  It increases in 2002-03 and 2006-07.  From 
2002-03 to 2004-05 CWI Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil is flat. 
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Figure 10: Range and Restricted Range of CWI Adjusted Total State Revenue 
per Pupil, 1998-2008 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 11 shows a multiple line graph of the range and restricted range of GCEI 
Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil.  The restricted range in this graph shows a 
steady climb similar to the graph of unadjusted revenue.  Like the unadjusted revenue 
line, the line representing the restricted range of GCEI Adjusted Total State Revenue per 
Pupil increases each year with the exception of the final year of the study, 2008-09.  The 
range of GCEI Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil increases in the same manner with 
the exception of a slight decrease in 1992-93. 
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Figure 11: Range and Restricted Range of GCEI Adjusted Total State Revenue 
per Pupil, 1988-2008 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 12 is a compilation of the ranges of each revenue type.  This multiple line 
graph shows the range for unadjusted, DCD Adjusted, GCEI Adjusted, and CWI 
Adjusted Total State Revenues.  With the exception of a slight outlier in 1998-99, this 
graph shows that the ranges of total state revenues per pupil moved in concert together 
showing similar trends. 
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Figure 12: Range of Total State Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 13 is also a compilation, this time of the restricted range.  The same 
comments hold true for the restricted range as the range.  The restricted ranges show 
similar trends with the exception of and outlier in 1998-99.  The restricted range of Total 
State Revenues per Pupil show a much more dramatic spike in 2006-07 than the ranges 
do.  
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Figure 13: Restricted Range of Total State Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient of Variation 
 The coefficient of variation of total state revenues is displayed in a column format 
in Table 25.  Graphical illustrations of the coefficient of variation of state revenues are 
shown in Figure 14. 
 The coefficient of variation fluctuates throughout the sample period.  Unadjusted 
Total State Revenue per Pupil has a minimum coefficient of variation of 0.22 and a 
maximum of 0.35.  DCD Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil has a minimum 
coefficient of variation of 0.23 and a maximum of 0.36.  GCEI Adjusted Total State 
Revenue per Pupil has a minimum coefficient of variation of 0.28 and a maximum of 
0.39.  CWI Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil has a minimum coefficient of 0.34 
and 0.42.  For each total state revenue type, the minimum occurs in its first year of 
existence and the  
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Figure 14: Coefficient of Variation of Total State Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
maximum the last year of the study.  As one examines the multiple line graph in Figure 
14, it is interesting to note that the lines never cross. 
The distribution of Unadjusted Total State Revenues per Pupil became less 
equitable as the study progressed.  Unadjusted Total State Revenues per Pupil were 
distributed most equitably in 1984-85 and least equitably in 2006-07. 
Federal Range Ratio 
 The federal range ratio of total state revenues is displayed in a column format in 
Table 26.  Graphical illustrations of the federal range ratio of state revenues are shown in 
Figure 15. 
 The federal range ratio for all total state revenue types begin at slightly over one.  
They build in unison to a peak in 2002-03.  At their peak, the federal range ratio is most  
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Table 26:   Additional Measures of the Variation in the Distribution of Total 
State Revenue per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
  Federal Range McLoone Verstegen 
   Year  Revenue Type Ratio Index Index 
 
1982-83 Unadjusted 1.21 .79 1.10 
 DCD Adjusted 1.34 .77 1.10 
 
1984-85 Unadjusted 1.66 .76 1.10 
 DCD Adjusted 1.75 .75 1.10 
 
1986-87 Unadjusted 1.93 .75 1.11 
 DCD Adjusted 2.04 .76 1.15 
 
1988-89 Unadjusted 1.27 .80 1.15 
 DCD Adjusted 1.45 .79 1.17 
 GCEI Adjusted 1.63 .79 1.17 
 
1990-91 Unadjusted 1.60 .77 1.16 
 DCD Adjusted 1.89 .74 1.17 
 GCEI Adjusted 2.12 .73 1.21 
 
1992-93 Unadjusted 2.04 .75 1.17 
 DCD Adjusted 2.24 .72 1.17 
 GCEI Adjusted 2.62 .71 1.21 
 
1994-95 Unadjusted 1.82 .76 1.17 
 DCD Adjusted 2.06 .75 1.20 
 GCEI Adjusted 2.24 .72 1.21 
 
1996-97 Unadjusted 1.65 .77 1.13 
 DCD Adjusted 1.86 .75 1.15 
 GCEI Adjusted 2.04 .75 1.21 
 
1998-99 Unadjusted 2.65 .75 1.14 
 DCD Adjusted 2.88 .74 1.17 
 GCEI Adjusted 3.06 .73 1.22 
 CWI Adjusted 3.30 .73 1.26 
 
2000-01 Unadjusted 2.47 .75 1.13 
 DCD Adjusted 2.72 .75 1.17 
 GCEI Adjusted 3.14 .73 1.21 
 CWI Adjusted 3.17 .74 1.22 
 
2002-03 Unadjusted 3.63 .71 1.15 
 DCD Adjusted 3.96 .74 1.22 
 GCEI Adjusted 4.14 .72 1.26 
 CWI Adjusted 4.30 .72 1.35 
 
2004-05 Unadjusted 2.80 .73 1.19 
 DCD Adjusted 3.10 .73 1.21 
 GCEI Adjusted 3.37 .70 1.25 
 CWI Adjusted 3.59 .70 1.31 
 
2006-07 Unadjusted 2.56 .66 1.17 
 DCD Adjusted 2.72 .66 1.20 
 GCEI Adjusted 3.05 .65 1.26 
 CWI Adjusted 3.38 .67 1.37 
 
2008-09 Unadjusted 2.11 .67 1.21 
 DCD Adjusted 2.24 .68 1.27 
 GCEI Adjusted 2.62 .67 1.33 
 CWI Adjusted 2.98 .68 1.42 
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Figure 15: Federal Range Ratio of Total State Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
inequitable.  The declines subsequent to 2002-03 show them moving to a more equitable 
position. 
Unadjusted Total State Revenues per Pupil were distributed least equitably in 
2002-03 when the measure of distributional equity is the federal range ratio.  They were 
most equitable in the first year of the study in 1982-83. 
McLoone Index 
The McLoone index of total state revenues is displayed in a column format in 
Table 26.  Graphical illustrations of the McLoone index of state revenues are shown in 
Figure 16. 
The McLoone indexes peak in 1988-89 at 0.80 for Unadjusted Total State 
Revenue per Pupil and 0.79 for both DCD and GCEI Adjusted Total State Revenue per 
Pupil.  A higher McLoone value indicates a higher level of equity.  The McLoone values  
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Figure 16: McLoone Index of Total State Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
Are at their lowest, most inequitable, in 2006-07 at 0.65 for GCEI Adjusted Total State 
Revenue per Pupil, 0.66 for both Unadjusted and DCD Adjusted Total State Revenue per 
Pupil, and 0.67 for CWI Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil. 
School districts whose Unadjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil fell below the 
state mean were treated most equitably by the Florida Education Finance Program in 
1988-89.  These same districts were treated least equitably in 2006-07.   
Verstegen Index 
The Verstegen index of total state revenues is displayed in a column format in 
Table 26.  Graphical illustrations of the Verstegen index range of state revenues are 
shown in Figure 17. 
 The Verstegen index is at its lowest value for each revenue type in 1982-83 and 
1984-85, the first two years of the study.  A lower Verstegen index represents a greater  
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 Figure 17: Verstegen Index of Total State Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
level of equity.  As the Verstegen index grows throughout the study period, equity 
decreases. 
School districts whose Unadjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil was above the 
state mean were treated most equitably by the Florida Education Finance Program in 
1982-83.  These same districts were treated least equitably in 2008-09.  
Total Local Revenue Measures 
Tables 27 and 28 show the framework for evaluating the distribution of total local 
revenues.  Tables 27 and 28 are populated with data from the current study.  Fourteen 
years worth of data is displayed.  Table 27 displays the percentile ranks of total local 
revenues at the 100
th
, 95
th
, 75
th
, 50
th
, 25
th
, 5
th
 and 1
st
 percentiles.  Table 28 displays the 
range, restricted range, mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation.  
Unadjusted Total Local Revenue and District Cost Differential (DCD) Adjusted Total  
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Table 27:   Percentile Distribution of Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
   Year  Revenue Type 100
th
 95
th
 75
th
 50
th
 25
th
 5
th 
1
st
 
 
1982-83 Unadjusted 1203.03 1065.78 562.45 349.52 219.25 132.74 111.02 
 DCD Adjusted 1189.12 1007.82 580.69 360.19 226.18 137.75 116.02 
 
1984-85 Unadjusted 1809.80 1373.62 715.26 459.69 276.19 150.70 134.30 
 DCD Adjusted 1800.26 1379.03 729.14 473.58 285.83 159.84 140.52 
 
1986-87 Unadjusted 2198.94 1757.28 948.06 650.11 365.65 195.11 166.81 
 DCD Adjusted 2179.11 1784.80 965.56 661.15 383.69 205.73 174.31 
 
1988-89 Unadjusted 2811.55 2283.22 1316.34 833.86 454.84 280.91 209.23 
 DCD Adjusted 2631.78 2224.06 1320.96 869.44 476.67 287.37 217.90 
 GCEI Adjusted 2908.85 2323.30 1356.49 880.50 525.27 321.91 246.89 
 
1990-91 Unadjusted 3780.38 2780.16 1554.61 1055.00 534.63 329.88 257.88 
 DCD Adjusted 3432.65 2694.96 1569.37 1104.36 569.57 355.16 278.90 
 GCEI Adjusted 3635.06 2745.98 1557.43 1101.53 619.56 387.46 296.60 
 
1992-93 Unadjusted 3769.39 2883.47 1655.82 1090.02 626.15 375.95 295.32 
 DCD Adjusted 3059.32 2588.19 1485.11 1005.19 599.06 352.52 279.21 
 GCEI Adjusted 3624.49 2990.47 1728.14 1184.50 724.91 427.15 339.49 
 
1994-95 Unadjusted 3965.77 3143.77 1703.89 1172.77 675.90 423.62 344.86 
 DCD Adjusted 3277.41 2848.87 1599.96 1098.00 649.06 416.02 336.85 
 GCEI Adjusted 3950.98 3325.29 1894.83 1261.58 797.27 493.64 422.70 
 
1996-97 Unadjusted 4087.73 3290.43 1835.73 1201.06 761.05 476.52 375.45 
 DCD Adjusted 3745.74 3241.46 1883.86 1245.09 808.12 503.80 403.51 
 GCEI Adjusted 4072.48 3483.41 1938.42 1321.62 908.26 556.13 460.25 
 
1998-99 Unadjusted 4516.42 3686.64 2017.09 1345.93 934.10 608.48 417.14 
 DCD Adjusted 4200.93 3760.45 2050.15 1397.79 970.05 641.30 445.59 
 GCEI Adjusted 4499.57 4078.71 2174.47 1499.95 1067.30 718.67 511.36 
 CWI Adjusted 5024.94 4875.37 2443.13 1695.06 1246.85 746.29 539.69 
 
2000-01 Unadjusted 4824.27 4018.70 2161.28 1522.88 989.63 664.75 470.34 
 DCD Adjusted 4468.67 4071.99 2152.49 1554.91 1042.09 708.87 504.50 
 GCEI Adjusted 4817.36 4308.16 2242.43 1607.52 1125.64 801.41 566.21 
 CWI Adjusted 4908.20 4325.00 2281.50 1610.51 1146.72 738.27 522.51 
 
2002-03 Unadjusted 4982.58 4513.42 2344.38 1684.44 1035.26 672.27 513.30 
 DCD Adjusted 4806.80 4594.60 2375.30 1727.28 1103.53 720.67 549.77 
 GCEI Adjusted 5660.01 4871.70 2472.69 1767.45 1194.13 839.52 609.07 
 CWI Adjusted 5645.59 4449.84 2263.31 1666.86 1288.35 818.64 544.54 
 
2004-05 Unadjusted 5378.93 4773.35 2549.39 1817.54 1182.17 682.47 570.60 
 DCD Adjusted 5250.82 4809.49 2573.37 1889.19 1218.06 720.30 601.65 
 GCEI Adjusted 6173.24 5201.80 2800.93 2009.59 1307.85 817.71 700.09 
 CWI Adjusted 5746.07 4618.27 2496.13 1691.76 1273.11 731.95 563.65 
 
2006-07 Unadjusted 6448.29 5430.15 3543.27 2207.04 1601.34 796.85 603.56 
 DCD Adjusted 6642.67 5680.05 3621.19 2236.59 1647.28 819.36 650.64 
 GCEI Adjusted 7641.71 6260.07 3884.53 2384.72 1817.37 962.08 739.93 
 CWI Adjusted 7112.94 5563.57 3219.85 2108.49 1601.21 848.49 632.41 
 
2008-09  Unadjusted 6408.27 5399.07 4189.70 2831.99 1908.50 1024.14 769.29 
 DCD Adjusted 6647.99 5613.99 4208.01 2802.90 1993.80 1082.22 828.49 
 GCEI Adjusted 7389.74 6141.95 4382.63 3046.45 2220.37 1236.76 940.90 
 CWI Adjusted 6878.40 5601.25 3688.03 2778.79 2055.68 1130.46 871.14 
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Table 28:   Measures of the Variation in the Distribution of Total Local Revenues 
per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
   Restricted  Standard Coefficient of 
   Year  Revenue Type Range Range Mean Deviation Variation 
 
1982-83 Unadjusted 1094.69 933.04 434.66 291.81 .67 
 DCD Adjusted 1075.47 870.08 439.35 285.86 .65 
 
1984-85 Unadjusted 1676.24 1222.92 576.39 396.30 .69 
 DCD Adjusted 1660.70 1219.20 586.64 388.08 .68 
 
1986-87 Unadjusted 2037.56 1562.16 771.42 511.58 .66 
 DCD Adjusted 2012.42 1579.07 783.24 501.66 .64 
 
1988-89 Unadjusted 2604.75 2012.31 995.98 646.26 .65 
 DCD Adjusted 2417.37 1936.69 1011.50 628.56 .62 
 GCEI Adjusted 2666.76 2001.39 1056.89 651.85 .62 
 
1990-91 Unadjusted 3535.63 2450.27 1206.26 810.48 .67 
 DCD Adjusted 3172.17 2339.80 1233.80 782.45 .63 
 GCEI Adjusted 3345.84 2358.53 1263.81 784.89 .62 
 
1992-93 Unadjusted 3499.76 2507.53 1276.92 829.58 .65 
 DCD Adjusted 2804.40 2235.67 1169.18 772.83 .62 
 GCEI Adjusted 3305.87 2563.31 2563.31 806.09 .60 
 
1994-95 Unadjusted 3642.16 2720.15 1377.84 867.32 .63 
 DCD Adjusted 2962.83 2432.85 1282.40 763.29 .60 
 GCEI Adjusted 3556.01 2831.64 1488.02 866.02 .58 
 
1996-97 Unadjusted 3753.54 2813.91 1428.84 862.35 .60 
 DCD Adjusted 3389.57 2737.66 1464.76 834.70 .57 
 GCEI Adjusted 3664.59 2927.29 1547.92 866.15 .56 
 
1998-99 Unadjusted 4148.43 3080.16 1608.78 972.24 .60 
 DCD Adjusted 3810.44 3119.15 1648.98 949.82 .58 
 GCEI Adjusted 4050.43 3360.03 1747.30 995.13 .57 
 CWI Adjusted 4495.23 4129.07 2051.59 1190.70 .58 
 
2000-01 Unadjusted 4386.72 3353.95 1703.49 1016.05 .60 
 DCD Adjusted 3998.89 3363.12 1751.58 998.41 .57 
 GCEI Adjusted 4283.33 3506.75 1852.91 1046.20 .56 
 CWI Adjusted 4401.69 3586.73 1902.67 1097.50 .58 
 
2002-03 Unadjusted 4514.29 3841.15 1908.13 1128.61 .59 
 DCD Adjusted 4301.24 3873.93 1965.12 1120.40 .57 
 GCEI Adjusted 5088.45 4032.18 2078.91 1180.06 .57 
 CWI Adjusted 5148.16 3631.20 2016.18 1159.69 .58 
 
2004-05 Unadjusted 4891.32 4090.88 2117.12 1263.91 .60 
 DCD Adjusted 4732.59 4089.19 2173.18 1263.18 .58 
 GCEI Adjusted 5578.10 4384.09 2308.57 1334.02 .58 
 CWI Adjusted 5193.35 3886.31 2092.59 1219.68 .58 
 
2006-07 Unadjusted 5928.37 4633.20 2663.58 1567.03 .59 
 DCD Adjusted 6105.56 4860.69 2723.46 1586.11 .58 
 GCEI Adjusted 7007.14 5298.00 2900.88 1650.00 .57 
 CWI Adjusted 6523.59 4714.68 2631.14 1519.78 .58 
 
2008-09 Unadjusted 5645.73 4378.92 3061.04 1479.06 .48 
 DCD Adjusted 5848.12 4531.76 3144.15 1491.80 .47 
 GCEI Adjusted 6453.21 4905.19 3342.27 1539.80 .46 
 CWI Adjusted 6017.58 4470.79 3030.88 1421.22 .47 
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Local Revenue is shown for all fourteen years.  Beginning in 1988-89, total local revenue 
is shown adjusted by the Geographic Cost of Education Index (GCEI).  The Comparable 
Wage Index (CWI) is first shown as an adjustment to total local revenue in 1998-99. 
Percentile Ranks 
 The percentile ranks in Table 27 show increases in the majority of the years by 
measure over the previous year.  The only year where there was a consistent reduction in 
revenue was in 2008-09 and that was only at the highest percentiles. 
 At the highest levels, 100
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles, total local revenues grew in each 
year from 1982-83 through 1990-91.  This was true of all revenue measures during the 
period.  In 1992-93, Unadjusted and GCEI Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil 
decreased at the 100
th
 percentile, DCD Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil decreases 
at both the 100
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles.  The period from 1994-95 through 2006-07 again 
showed constant growth with the exception of 2000-01 when CWI Adjusted Total Local 
Revenue per Pupil decreased at both the 100
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. In 2008-09, revenues 
decreased in every area except DCD Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil at the 100
th
 
percentile where it was flat. 
 At the intermediate levels; 75
th
, 50
th
, and 25
th
 percentiles, revenues grew 
consistently throughout the fourteen years of the study.  During the time of the study, 
there was not a single year where more than one revenue type showed decreases.  In 
1992-93, DCD Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil decreased at the 75
th
 and 50
th
 
percentile.  DCD Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil decreased again in 2008-09, 
but only at the 75
th
 percentile.  CWI Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil decreased at 
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the 75
th
, 50
th
, and 25
th
 percentiles during 2000-01, the 75
th
 percentile in 2002-03, and the 
75
th
 and 25
th
 percentiles in 2004-05. 
At the lowest levels, 5
th
 and 1
st
 percentiles, total local revenues were the most 
consistent.  Revenues at the 1
st
 percentile only decreased in 2000-01 when measured by 
the CWI adjustment.  DCD Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil decreased only once 
at the 5
th
 percentile, in 1992-93.  CWI Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil decreased 
twice during the period at the 5
th
 percentile, 2000-01 and 2004-05.  The only decrease to 
GCEI Adjusted Total State and Local at the 5
th
 percentile occurred in 2004-05. 
Range and Restricted Range 
 The range and restricted range of total local revenues is displayed in a column 
format in Table 28.  Graphical illustrations of the range and restricted range of state 
revenues are shown in Figures 18 through 23. 
 Figure 18 shows a multiple line graph of the range and restricted range of 
Unadjusted Local Revenue per Pupil.  The range and restricted range move consistently 
with each other peaking in 1990-91.  After the peak in 1990-91, there is a slight decrease 
before climbing steadily to a second peak in 2006-07.  The range and restricted range 
decrease for a second time in 2008-09. 
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Figure 18: Range and Restricted Range of Unadjusted Total Local Revenue per 
Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 19 shows a multiple line graph of the range and restricted range of DCD 
Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil.  The range and restricted range of DCD 
Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil act in an identical manner as the Unadjusted 
Total Local Revenue per Pupil.  The range and restricted range move consistently with 
each other peaking in 1990-91.  After the peak in 1990-91, there is a slight decrease 
before climbing steadily to a second peak in 2006-07.  The range and restricted range 
decrease for a second time in 2008-09. 
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Figure 19: Range and Restricted Range of DCD Adjusted Total Local Revenue 
per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 20 shows a multiple line graph of the range and restricted range of CWI 
Adjusted Local Revenue per Pupil.  Unlike figures 18 and 19 that show fourteen data 
points, Figure 20 has only six.  The range and restricted range of CWI Adjusted Local 
Revenue per Pupil do not mirror each other in the same manner that the Unadjusted and 
DCD Adjusted Total Local Revenues per Pupil do.  In 1998-99, the range and restricted 
range are only $366.16 per pupil apart.  In 2000-01, both the range and restricted range 
decrease, but the difference between them increases to $814.96 per pupil.  In 2002-04, the 
range and restricted range begin to increase, but the difference between them again 
expands.  The difference between the range and restricted range in 2002-04 is $1516.96.  
This separation remains relatively consistent through the end of the study period in 2008-
09.  The range and restricted range of local revenues increase until their peak in 2006-07. 
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Figure 20: Range and Restricted Range of CWI Adjusted Total Local Revenue 
per Pupil, 1998-2008 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 21 shows a multiple line graph of the range and restricted range of GCEI 
Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil.  The range and restricted range of GCEI 
Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil returns to the pattern displayed by the 
Unadjusted and DCD Adjusted Total Local Revenues per Pupil.  The range and restricted 
range move consistently with each other peaking in 1990-91.  After the peak in 1990-91, 
there is a slight decrease before climbing steadily to a second peak in 2006-07.  The 
range and restricted range decrease for a second time in 2008-09. 
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Figure 21: Range and Restricted Range of GCEI Adjusted Total Local Revenue 
per Pupil, 1988-2008 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22 is a compilation of the ranges of each revenue type.  This multiple line 
graph shows the range for unadjusted, DCD Adjusted, GCEI Adjusted, and CWI 
Adjusted Total Local Revenue.  This graph clearly shows the pattern that has been 
discussed previously.  For each revenue type there is a peak in 1990-91 and a second 
peak in 2006-07.   
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Figure 22: Range of Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23 is also a compilation, this time of the restricted range.  The same 
comments hold true for the restricted range as the range.  The restricted ranges show 
similar trends with the exception of an outlier in 1998-99.  This outlier was also evident 
when examining the restricted ranges of total revenues in Figure 13. 
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Figure 23: Restricted Range of Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient of Variation 
 The coefficient of variation of total local revenues is displayed in a column format 
in Table 28.  A graphical illustration of the coefficient of variation of total local revenues 
is shown in Table 24. 
 The coefficient of variation for total local revenues shows a general downward 
trend throughout the study period.  There is a remarkable drop-off in the final year, 2008-
09.  As the coefficient of variation decreases, the distribution of revenues is considered to 
be more equitable.  In its best year, 2008-09, the coefficients of variation range from 0.46 
to 0.48.   
The distribution of Unadjusted Total Local Revenues per Pupil became more 
equitable as the study progressed.  Unadjusted Total Local Revenues per Pupil were 
distributed most equitably in 2008-09 and least equitably in 1984-85. 
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Figure 24: Coefficient of Variation of Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
Federal Range Ratio 
 The federal range ratio of total local revenues is displayed in a column format in 
Table 29.  A graphical illustration of the federal range ratio of local revenues is shown in 
Figure 25. 
 Like the coefficient of variation, decreases in the federal range ratio is interpreted 
to demonstrate movement to a more equitable position.  For each revenue type, the 
federal range ratio is at its lowest point in the last years of the study.  The federal range 
ration of Unadjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil begins at 7.03 in 1982-83 before 
peaking at 8.12 in 1984-85.  The values decrease each year through1998-99 before rising 
to a second peak in 2004-05.   The values fall dramatically for the final year of the study 
to 4.27.  That pattern of values for the unadjusted revenues is repeated for the DCD 
Adjusted, CWI Adjusted, and GCEI Adjusted revenues per pupil. 
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Table 29:   Additional Measures of the Variation in the Distribution of Total 
Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
  Federal Range McLoone Verstegen 
   Year  Revenue Type Ratio Index Index 
 
1982-83 Unadjusted 7.03 .64 1.84 
 DCD Adjusted 6.32 .64 1.80 
 
1984-85 Unadjusted 8.12 .64 1.86 
 DCD Adjusted 7.63 .65 1.82 
 
1986-87 Unadjusted 8.01 .61 1.76 
 DCD Adjusted 7.68 .62 1.75 
 
1988-89 Unadjusted 7.43 .61 1.77 
 DCD Adjusted 6.74 .61 1.71 
 GCEI Adjusted 6.22 .65 1.75 
 
1990-91 Unadjusted 7.43 .58 1.70 
 DCD Adjusted 6.59 .59 1.64 
 GCEI Adjusted 6.09 .62 1.67 
 
1992-93 Unadjusted 6.67 .61 1.73 
 DCD Adjusted 6.34 .62 1.70 
 GCEI Adjusted 6.00 .63 1.63 
 
1994-95 Unadjusted 6.42 .63 1.72 
 DCD Adjusted 5.85 .65 1.68 
 GCEI Adjusted 5.74 .67 1.68 
 
1996-97 Unadjusted 5.91 .67 1.70 
 DCD Adjusted 5.43 .69 1.66 
 GCEI Adjusted 5.26 .70 1.64 
 
1998-99 Unadjusted 5.06 .68 1.71 
 DCD Adjusted 4.86 .69 1.66 
 GCEI Adjusted 4.68 .70 1.63 
 CWI Adjusted 5.53 .72 1.62 
 
2000-01 Unadjusted 5.08 .65 1.59 
 DCD Adjusted 4.74 .67 1.58 
 GCEI Adjusted 4.38 .70 1.60 
 CWI Adjusted 4.86 .71 1.65 
 
2002-03 Unadjusted 5.71 .65 1.61 
 DCD Adjusted 5.38 .67 1.60 
 GCEI Adjusted 4.80 .71 1.64 
 CWI Adjusted 4.44 .73 1.68 
 
2004-05 Unadjusted 5.99 .66 1.66 
 DCD Adjusted 5.68 .67 1.63 
 GCEI Adjusted 5.36 .68 1.61 
 CWI Adjusted 5.31 .73 1.74 
 
2006-07 Unadjusted 5.81 .66 1.75 
 DCD Adjusted 5.93 .67 1.75 
 GCEI Adjusted 5.51 .69 1.73 
 CWI Adjusted 5.55 .71 1.78 
 
2008-09 Unadjusted 4.27 .66 1.50 
 DCD Adjusted 4.19 .69 1.55 
 GCEI Adjusted 3.97 .70 1.50 
 CWI Adjusted 3.95 .70 1.48 
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Figure 25: Federal Range Ratio of Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
Unadjusted Total Local Revenues per Pupil were distributed most equitably in 
2008-09 when the measure of distributional equity is the federal range ratio.  They were 
distributed least equitably in 1984-85. 
McLoone Index 
 The McLoone index of total local revenues is displayed in a column format in 
Table 29.  A graphical illustration of the McLoone index of local revenues is shown in 
Figure 26. 
 As shown in Figure 26, the McLoone indexes decrease for the first five sample 
years.  A decrease in the McLoone index shows a reduction in equity.  The McLoone 
indexes begin five year climb in 1992-93.  From 1998-99 through the end of the study 
period in 2008-09 the McLoone index values fluctuated in a tight range between 0.65 and 
0.70 with the exception of the CWI adjusted values.  
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Figure 26: McLoone Index of Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
School districts whose Unadjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil fell below the 
state mean were treated most equitably by the Florida Education Finance Program in 
1998-99  These same districts were treated least equitably in 1990-91.   
Verstegen Index 
 The Verstegen Index of total local revenues is displayed in a column format in 
Table 29.  A graphical illustration of the Verstegen Indexes of local revenues is shown in 
Figure 27. 
 After peaking in 2006-07, the Verstegen Index is at its lowest value for the entire 
study period for each revenue type in 2008-09.  As the Verstegen decreases, equity 
increases.  The Verstegen Index shows that local revenues were most equitably 
distributed in the final year. 
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Figure 27: Verstegen Index of Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
School districts whose Unadjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil was above the 
state mean were treated most equitably by the Florida Education Finance Program in 
2008-09.  These same districts were treated least equitably in 1982-83.   
Total State and Local Revenue Measures 
Tables 30 and 31 show the framework for evaluating the distribution of total state 
and local revenue.  Tables 30 and 31 are populated with data from the current study.  
Fourteen years worth of data is displayed.  Table 30 displays the percentile ranks of total 
state revenues at the 100
th
, 95
th
, 75
th
, 50
th
, 25
th
, 5
th
 and 1
st
 percentiles.  Table 31 displays 
the range, restricted range, mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation.  
Unadjusted total state and local revenue and District Cost Differential (DCD) Adjusted 
Total State and Local Revenue is shown for all fourteen years.  Beginning in 1988-89, 
total state and local revenue is shown adjusted by the Geographic Cost of Education  
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Table 30:   Percentile Distribution of Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil, 
1982-2008 
 
 
  Year  Revenue Type 100
th
 95
th
 75
th
 50
th
 25
th
 5
th 
1
st
  
 
1982-83 Unadjusted 1907.88 1853.29 1734.82 1695.85 1664.79 1633.15 1619.56 
 DCD Adjusted 1944.05 1852.52 1765.66 1735.51 1714.38 1690.19 1677.45 
 
1984-85 Unadjusted 2244.22 2184.47 2093.19 2051.16 1997.40 1945.40 1928.62 
 DCD Adjusted 2267.03 2220.47 2144.57 2104.32 2076.03 2043.46 2023.83 
 
1986-87 Unadjusted 2809.45 2666.13 2524.13 2466.00 2401.80 2312.83 2262.09 
 DCD Adjusted 2712.16 2633.38 2581.15 2529.36 2497.05 2423.16 2389.04 
 
1988-89 Unadjusted 4055.59 3727.80 3546.61 3443.77 3343.29 3245.13 3199.52 
 DCD Adjusted 3940.64 3856.11 3704.17 3545.03 3448.04 3314.16 3304.51 
 GCEI Adjusted 4525.02 4258.22 4026.36 3752.17 3535.82 3373.43 3209.70 
 
1990-91 Unadjusted 4582.00 4246.89 4036.59 3918.90 3855.15 3694.40 3658.98 
 DCD Adjusted 4582.80 4426.03 4271.69 4102.19 3968.67 3768.25 3711.59 
 GCEI Adjusted 5135.89 4837.70 4568.38 4221.18 4025.79 3787.47 3597.64 
 
1992-93 Unadjusted 4603.12 4113.73 3940.63 3803.00 3726.67 3611.50 3559.64 
 DCD Adjusted 3912.77 3841.51 3685.99 3535.95 3447.72 3325.22 3271.82 
 GCEI Adjusted 4832.09 4705.64 4376.02 4117.17 3898.65 3639.94 3537.85 
 
1994-95 Unadjusted 4842.77 4461.26 4277.62 4118.03 4008.82 3891.34 3820.52 
 DCD Adjusted 4339.30 4278.01 4020.86 3942.21 3819.32 3622.06 3586.21 
 GCEI Adjusted 5465.15 5309.87 4841.41 4589.15 4376.21 4003.69 3908.56 
 
1996-97 Unadjusted 5088.98 4668.02 4504.40 4365.72 4274.39 4186.85 4186.85 
 DCD Adjusted 5084.25 4852.12 4668.58 4590.35 4489.32 4308.53 4243.90 
 GCEI Adjusted 5705.59 5483.19 5136.55 4856.36 4639.72 4363.09 4156.59 
 
1998-99 Unadjusted 5382.74 4948.82 4804.50 4658.31 4574.98 4463.35 4461.01 
 DCD Adjusted 5260.35 5119.24 4990.54 4899.18 4747.65 4609.36 4569.84 
 GCEI Adjusted 5956.81 5875.34 5516.47 5245.83 4944.44 4611.14 4404.77 
 CWI Adjusted 8125.52 7582.95 6663.27 5988.81 5562.67 5066.11 4982.31 
 
2000-01 Unadjusted 5707.93 5244.90 5041.36 4956.05 4871.43 4772.49 4744.18 
 DCD Adjusted 5485.90 5430.99 5326.22 5193.62 5064.44 4972.16 4836.43 
 GCEI Adjusted 6338.29 6196.49 5841.90 5468.05 5311.15 4930.66 4648.24 
 CWI Adjusted 7097.45 6871.71 5928.79 5731.53 5277.00 4903.72 4834.68 
 
2002-03 Unadjusted 5926.81 5543.21 5253.54 5099.50 4938.92 4924.40 4868.90 
 DCD Adjusted 5804.96 5656.06 5493.09 5305.72 5224.69 5119.19 5024.96 
 GCEI Adjusted 6729.93 6429.63 6109.94 5654.59 5463.46 5072.02 4742.30 
 CWI Adjusted 7426.65 7013.73 6137.61 5368.69 4936.92 4566.81 4501.70 
 
2004-05 Unadjusted 6696.67 6268.48 5784.55 5648.61 5533.57 5416.49 5351.34 
 DCD Adjusted 6560.40 6262.81 6045.92 5867.42 5749.88 5624.74 5582.79 
 GCEI Adjusted 7824.36 7129.32 6739.07 6227.55 6028.11 5624.90 5168.09 
 CWI Adjusted 7528.00 7235.02 6354.92 5602.96 5121.19 4742.45 4697.42 
 
2006-07 Unadjusted 8189.28 7466.20 6870.75 6716.44 6603.66 6487.26 6397.65 
 DCD Adjusted 8279.38 7557.21 7161.08 6878.40 6763.66 6630.44 6587.08 
 GCEI Adjusted 9524.58 8639.16 8068.06 7413.25 7165.22 6671.38 6148.33 
 CWI Adjusted 9004.87 8799.67 7507.78 6660.08 6047.85 5700.88 5629.45 
 
2008-09 Unadjusted 8381.22 7613.96 7092.61 6934.10 6824.89 6703.07 6548.36 
 DCD Adjusted 8645.70 7901.24 7430.34 7147.60 6994.37 6874.06 6813.09 
 GCEI Adjusted 9610.35 8919.64 8317.48 7692.19 7389.40 6883.94 6467.58 
 CWI Adjusted 9459.99 9027.24 7830.49 7884.38 6257.86 5903.39 5815.95 
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Table 31:   Measures of the Variation in the Distribution of Total State and Local 
Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
   Restricted  Standard Coefficient of 
   Year  Revenue Type Range Range Mean Deviation Variation 
 
1982-83 Unadjusted 293.33 220.14 1710.91 66.51 .04 
 DCD Adjusted 276.82 162.33 1748.10 54.99 .03 
 
1984-85 Unadjusted 324.18 239.34 2052.11 75.61 .04 
 DCD Adjusted 250.82 177.00 2114.07 53.92 .03 
 
1986-87 Unadjusted 561.21 353.30 2468.75 108.34 .04 
 DCD Adjusted 336.28 210.22 2532.90 67.43 .03 
 
1988-89 Unadjusted 901.72 482.68 3466.74 168.66 .05 
 DCD Adjusted 640.55 541.95 3568.38 163.97 .05 
 GCEI Adjusted 1315.38 884.78 3775.62 310.40 .08 
 
1990-91 Unadjusted 929.12 552.49 3952.36 170.09 .04 
 DCD Adjusted 872.79 657.78 4116.86 200.41 .05 
 GCEI Adjusted 1546.93 1050.23 4277.14 350.77 .08 
 
1992-93 Unadjusted 1082.99 502.23 3839.52 179.26 .05 
 DCD Adjusted 644.20 516.29 3565.89 164.78 .05 
 GCEI Adjusted 1318.51 1065.70 4154.96 347.53 .08 
 
1994-95 Unadjusted 1048.80 569.92 4156.46 196.23 .05 
 DCD Adjusted 775.60 655.95 3932.59 180.95 .05 
 GCEI Adjusted 1617.66 1306.18 4627.44 388.54 .08 
  
1996-97 Unadjusted 902.13 481.16 4404.14 175.41 .04 
 DCD Adjusted 853.58 543.60 4584.30 167.19 .04 
 GCEI Adjusted 1605.25 1120.10 4901.19 364.77 .07 
 
1998-99 Unadjusted 921.74 485.46 4697.48 176.08 .04 
 DCD Adjusted 719.56 509.87 4877.53 156.70 .03 
 GCEI Adjusted 1563.08 1264.20 5227.42 378.35 .07 
 CWI Adjusted 3162.78 2516.84 6128.48 766.02 .12 
 
2000-01 Unadjusted 970.06 472.41 4987.35 172.23 .03 
 DCD Adjusted 681.43 458.83 5191.35 156.17 .03 
 GCEI Adjusted 1832.06 1265.83 5550.62 402.34 .07 
 CWI Adjusted 2274.21 1967.99 5661.78 542.89 .10 
 
2002-03 Unadjusted 1077.15 618.82 5147.34 203.66 .04 
 DCD Adjusted 822.16 536.87 5356.84 179.00 .03 
 GCEI Adjusted 2135.43 1357.60 5729.67 443.59 .03 
 CWI Adjusted 2929.98 2446.93 5571.04 760.70 .14 
 
2004-05 Unadjusted 1362.27 851.99 5704.88 257.61 .05 
 DCD Adjusted 1016.50 638.07 5904.95 221.68 .04 
 GCEI Adjusted 2806.75 1504.43 6351.39 526.30 .08 
 CWI Adjusted 2838.10 2492.58 5779.17 776.31 .13 
 
2006-07 Unadjusted 1872.00 978.94 6798.87 324.53 .05 
 DCD Adjusted 1692.35 926.77 6989.37 337.79 .05 
 GCEI Adjusted 3673.67 1967.78 7572.13 670.94 .09 
 CWI Adjusted 3424.41 3098.79 6888.87 943.50 .14 
 
2008-09 Unadjusted 1898.87 910.89 7017.22 310.24 .04 
 DCD Adjusted 1833.61 1027.18 7256.72 369.91 .05 
 GCEI Adjusted 3407.64 2035.70 7814.22 664.79 .09 
 CWI Adjusted 3712.95 3123.85 7112.00 982.09 .14 
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Index (GCEI).  The Comparable Wage Index (CWI) is first shown as an adjustment to 
total state and local revenue in 1998-99. 
Percentile Ranks 
 The percentile ranks in Table 30 show increases in the great majority of the years 
by measure over the previous years.  In 1992-93, there was a consistent decrease in all 
revenue measures.  In 2000-01 and again in 2002-03, revenues showed a decrease in most 
percentiles when adjusted using the CWI. 
 At the highest levels, 100
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles, total state and local revenues 
grew in each year from 1982-83 through 1990-91.  In 1992-93, revenue for each revenue 
type decreased at both percentile levels.  The only exception was Unadjusted Total State 
and Local Revenue at the 100
th
 percentile, which was flat.  From 1994-95 through the end 
of the study in 2008-09, all revenues grew consistently except for CWI Adjusted Total 
State and Local Revenue which decreased in at both the 100
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles in 
2000-01. 
 At the intermediate levels; 75
th
, 50
th
, and 25
th
 percentiles; total state and local 
revenue grew in each year from 1982-83 through 1990-91 without exception.  In 1992-
93, revenue for each revenue type decreased at all three percentile levels.  From 1994-95 
through the end of the study in 2008-09, all revenues grew consistently except for CWI 
Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue which decreased at all three percentile levels in 
2000-01 and at the 50
th
 and 25
th
 percentiles in 2002-03. 
 At the lowest levels, 5
th
 and 1
st
 percentiles, total state and local revenue grew in 
each year from 1982-83 through 1990-91 without exception.  In 1992-93, revenue for 
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each revenue type decreased at both percentile levels.  From 1994-95 through the end of 
the study in 2008-09, all revenues grew consistently except for CWI Adjusted Total State 
and Local Revenue which decreased at the 5
th
 and 1
st
 percentile levels in 2000-01 and 
2002-03. 
Range and Restricted Range 
 The range and restricted range of total state and local revenues is displayed in a 
column format in Table 31.  Graphical illustrations of the range and restricted range of 
total state and local revenues are shown in Figures 28 through 33.   
 Figure 28 shows a multiple line graph of the range and restricted range of 
Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per pupil.  The range and restricted range in 
Figure 28 are of a similar shape.  They increase and decrease at approximately the same 
times.  What is remarkable is that although the shape of each line is reflective of the 
other, they become increasing separated over the length of the study.  In 1982-83 the 
difference between the range and restricted range is $73.19 by the end of the study in 
2008-09 the difference is $987.98. 
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Figure 28: Range and Restricted Range of Unadjusted Total State and Local 
Revenue per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 29 shows a multiple line graph of the range and restricted range of DCD 
Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil. The range and restricted range in 
Figure 29 are also of a similar shape increasing and decreasing at approximately the same 
times.  As with the unadjusted revenues, they become increasing separated over the 
length of the study. 
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Figure 29: Range and Restricted Range of DCD Adjusted Total State and Local 
Revenue per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 30 shows a multiple line graph of the range and restricted range of the 
CWI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  Unlike Figures 28 and 29 that 
show fourteen data points, Figure 30 has only six.  The range and restricted range of CWI 
Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil do mirror each other, but they do not 
separate the way the other revenue measures did.  The range and restricted range are at 
their lowest levels in 2000-01 before climbing to their highest levels in 2008-09, the final 
year of the study. 
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Figure 30: Range and Restricted Range of CWI Adjusted Total State and Local 
Revenue per Pupil, 1998-2008 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 31 shows a multiple line graph of the range and restricted range of GCEI 
Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  The range and restricted range in 
Figure 31 return to the pattern discussed for Figures 28 and 29.  The lines mirror each 
other and gain increasing separation during the length of the study. 
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Figure 31: Range and Restricted Range of GCEI Adjusted Total State and Local 
Revenue per Pupil, 1988-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 32 is a compilation of the ranges of each revenue type.  The lines 
representing the unadjusted and DCD adjusted ranges can best be described as 
intertwined.  This demonstrates that the measures are very closely related.  The GCEI 
Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil is similar but consistently lies above 
the unadjusted and DCD adjusted lines.  The CWI Adjusted Total State and Local 
Revenue per Pupil once again demonstrates and outlier in 1998.  The figures in 
subsequent years begin to mirror those of the other measures.  
 Figure 33 is a compilation of the restricted ranges of each revenue type.  The 
restricted ranges behave in a similar manner to the ranges discuss in Figure 32. 
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Figure 32: Range of Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: Restricted Range of Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-
2008 
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Coefficient of Variation 
 The coefficient of variation of total state and local revenues is displayed in a 
column format in Table 31.  A graphical illustration of the coefficient of variation of total 
state and local revenues is shown as Figure 34. 
 As Figure 34 demonstrates, the coefficients of variation for total state and local 
revenues fluctuate over time, but in a very tight range.  The coefficient of variation is 
interpreted to show equity as it decreased.  A set of data is defined as equitable if it has a 
coefficient of variation below 0.10.  In our study, all of the data points for Unadjusted, 
DCD Adjusted, and GCEI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenues fall below 0.10.  The 
values for CWI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per pupil vary in the first two 
years before settling into a stable pattern for the final four years at a value slightly below 
0.14.  The distribution of Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil is never 
Figure 34: Coefficient of Variation of Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil, 
1982-2008 
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 greater than 0.05 at any point during this study demonstrating an equitable distribution of 
available resources.   
Federal Range Ratio 
 The federal range ratio of total state and local revenue is displayed in a column 
format in Table 32.  A graphical illustration of the federal range ratio of total state and 
local revenue per pupil is shown as Figure 35. 
 Figure 35 shows the federal range ratio for total state and local revenues to 
fluctuate over time in a very tight range.  The federal range ratio has a minimum value of 
zero.  As values move away from zero, they show disparity in the set of data.  The closer 
a value is to zero, the more equitable the distribution.  For this study, unadjusted revenues 
and DCD adjusted fluctuate in a very tight range between 0.09 and 0.18.  These 
exceptionally low values are indicative of an equitable distribution of Unadjusted and 
DCD Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  The values for GCEI Adjusted 
Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil fluctuate tightly around 0.30.  The values for 
CWI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil vary in the first two years before 
settling into a stable pattern for the final four years at a value slightly above 0.50.  The 
federal range ratio for Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil is never 
greater than 0.16 demonstrating an equitable distribution of available resources. 
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Table 32:   Additional Measures of the Variation in the Distribution of Total 
State and Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
  Federal Range McLoone Verstegen  
   Year  Revenue Type Ratio Index Index  
 
1982-83 Unadjusted .13 .98 1.04 
 DCD Adjusted .10 .99 1.03 
 
1984-85 Unadjusted .12 .97 1.03 
 DCD Adjusted .09 .99 1.02 
 
1986-87 Unadjusted .15 .97 1.03 
 DCD Adjusted .09 .98 1.02 
 
1988-89 Unadjusted .15 .97 1.04 
 DCD Adjusted .16 .97 1.04 
 GCEI Adjusted .26 .94 1.07 
 
1990-91 Unadjusted .15 .98 1.04 
 DCD Adjusted .17 .96 1.04 
 GCEI Adjusted .28 .94 1.08 
 
1992-93 Unadjusted .14 .98 1.04 
 DCD Adjusted .16 .97 1.05 
 GCEI Adjusted .29 .94 1.08 
 
1994-95 Unadjusted .15 .97 1.05 
 DCD Adjusted .18 .96 1.03 
 GCEI Adjusted .33 .94 1.08 
 
1996-97 Unadjusted .11 .98 1.04 
 DCD Adjusted .13 .97 1.03 
 GCEI Adjusted .26 .95 1.07 
 
1998-99 Unadjusted .11 .98 1.04 
 DCD Adjusted .11 .97 1.02 
 GCEI Adjusted .27 .94 1.05 
 CWI Adjusted .50 .92 1.13 
 
2000-01 Unadjusted .10 .98 1.03 
 DCD Adjusted .09 .97 1.02 
 GCEI Adjusted .26 .96 1.07 
 CWI Adjusted .40 .91 1.06 
 
2002-03 Unadjusted .13 .98 1.04 
 DCD Adjusted .10 .98 1.04 
 GCEI Adjusted .27 .95 1.07 
 CWI Adjusted .54 .92 1.15 
 
2004-05 Unadjusted .16 .98 1.04 
 DCD Adjusted .11 .98 1.03 
 GCEI Adjusted .27 .96 1.08 
 CWI Adjusted .53 .92 1.15 
 
2006-07 Unadjusted .15 .98 1.04 
 DCD Adjusted .14 .98 1.05 
 GCEI Adjusted .29 .95 1.09 
 CWI Adjusted .54 .91 1.15 
 
2008-09 Unadjusted .14 .98 1.04 
 DCD Adjusted .15 .98 1.05 
 GCEI Adjusted .30 .95 1.08 
 CWI Adjusted .53 .91 1.15 
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Figure 35: Federal Range Ratio of Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil, 
1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
McLoone Index 
 The McLoone index of total state and local revenue per pupil is displayed in a 
column format in Table 32.  A graphical illustration of the McLoone index of total state 
and local revenue is shown as Figure 36. 
 Figure 36 shows the McLoone index of Unadjusted and DCD Adjusted Total 
State and Local Revenue per Pupil to fluctuate over the first ten years of the study before 
leveling off at a value of 0.98 for the last four years.  The Unadjusted Total State and 
Local Revenue shows a McLoone index value of 0.98 for ten of the fourteen years of 
study.  The McLoone index has a maximum value of 1.0.  The value of the McLoone 
index approaches its most equitable position as it approaches 1.0.  A value of 0.98 shows 
an equitable distribution of revenues.  The GCEI Adjusted Total State and Local 
Revenues per Pupil fluctuates between 0.94 and 0.96 for the entire fourteen years of  
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Figure 36: McLoone Index of Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-
2008 
 
 
 
 
the study.  The CWI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil fluctuate 
between 0.92 and 0.93 for the length of the study.  The McLoone index for districts with 
Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil below the mean is between 0.97 and 
0.98 throughout the entire length of this study.   
Verstegen Index 
 The Verstegen index of Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil is displayed in a 
column format in Table 32.  A graphical illustration of the Verstegen index of Total State 
and Local Revenues per Pupil is shown as Figure 37. 
 Figure 37 shows the Verstegen index of Unadjusted and DCD Adjusted Total 
State and Local Revenue per Pupil to fluctuate between 1.02 and 1.05 for the length of 
the fourteen year study.  The Verstegen index has a minimum value of 1.0.  The value of 
the Verstegen index approaches is most equitable position as it approaches 1.0.  Values of  
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Figure 37: Verstegen Index of Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-
2008 
 
 
 
 
1.02 to 1.05 show an equitable distribution of revenues.  The GCEI Adjusted Total State 
and Local Revenues per Pupil fluctuate between 1.05 and 1.09 for the entire fourteen 
years of the study.  The CWI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil begins in 
1998-99 at 1.13 then drops to 1.06 in 2000-01.  For the final four years of the study, the 
value of the Verstegen Index of CWI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil 
is 1.15.  The Verstegen index for districts with Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue 
per Pupil above the mean is never greater than 1.05 at any point during this study. 
Assessing Distributional Patterns of Per Pupil Revenues 
Using Gini Coefficients 
 
Tables 33, 34, and 35 show the framework for evaluation the distribution of 
revenues using Gini coefficients.  Gini coefficients range from one to zero, with a 
coefficient of zero representing total equality.  Each table is populated with data from the 
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current study.  Fourteen years worth of data is displayed.  Unadjusted and District Cost 
Differential (DCD) adjusted revenue is shown for all fourteen years.  Beginning in 1988-
89, revenue is shown adjusted by the Geographic Cost of Education Index (GCEI).  The 
Comparable Wage Index (CWI) is first shown as an adjustment to total state and local 
revenue in 1998-99. 
Total State Revenue 
 The Gini Coefficients of the distribution of Total State Revenue per Pupil is 
displayed in a column format in Table 33.  A graphical illustration of the distribution of 
total state revenue per pupil is shown in Figure 38. 
Table 33:  Gini Coefficients of the Distribution of Total State Revenues per 
Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 Unadjusted   DCD Adjusted GCEI Adjusted CWI Adjusted 
 Total  Local Total Local Total Local Total Local 
  Year Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
 
1982-83 .122 .127 --- --- 
 
1984-85 .139 .144 --- --- 
 
1986-87 .144 .150 --- --- 
 
1988-89 .118 .127 .138 --- 
 
1990-91 .139 .150 .160 --- 
 
1992-93 .155 .164 .175 --- 
 
1994-95 .146 .156 .167 --- 
 
1996-97 .133 .143 .152 --- 
  
1998-99 .151 .160 .168 .171 
 
2000-01 .147 .155 .163 .161 
 
2002-03 .170 .176 .184 .189 
 
2004-05 .171 .176 .186 .192 
 
2006-07 .192 .195 .208 .211 
 
2008-09 .181 .184 .197 .201 
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 Figure 38 shows that the distribution of Total State Revenues per Pupil has 
gradually become less equitable.  It is remarkable that all of the Gini coefficients follow 
the same pattern throughout the term of the study.  They rise in 1984-85 and 1986-97 
followed by a decrease in 1988-89.  They rise for another two years in 1990-91 and 1992-
93 followed by a two year decrease in 1994-95 and 1996-97.  A rise in 1998-99 is 
immediately followed by a decrease in 2000-01.  From 2002-03 they rise steadily to their 
overall peak in 2006-07.  The final year of study, 2008-09, shows a decrease over the 
preceding year.  
The Gini coefficient of Unadjusted Total State Revenues per Pupil increases 
throughout the term of this study.  They were at their lowest levels in 1988-89 and 
highest in 2006-07.  Increasing Gini coefficient values indicate decreasing distributional 
equity. 
Figure 38: Gini Coefficients of Total State Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
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Total Local Revenue 
The Gini Coefficients of the distribution of total local revenue per pupil is 
displayed in a column format in Table 34.  A graphical illustration of the distribution of 
total local revenue per pupil is shown in Figure 39. 
Table 34:  Gini Coefficients of the Distribution of Total Local Revenues per 
Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 Unadjusted   DCD Adjusted GCEI Adjusted CWI Adjusted 
 Total  State Total State Total State Total State 
  Year Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
 
1982-83 .233 .230 --- --- 
 
1984-85 .236 .234 --- --- 
 
1986-87 .255 .251 --- --- 
 
1988-89 .257 .252 .239 --- 
 
1990-91 .256 .247 .238 --- 
 
1992-93 .244 .237 .226 --- 
 
1994-95 .237 .229 .219 --- 
 
1996-97 .223 .213 .198 --- 
 
1998-99 .210 .201 .186 .185 
 
2000-01 .203 .193 .179 .184 
 
2002-03 .202 .194 .179 .173 
 
2004-05 .204 .196 .184 .180 
 
2006-07 .237 .231 .216 .207 
 
2008-09 .216 .208 .193 .185 
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 Figure 39 shows that the Gini coefficients for Total Local Revenue per Pupil rise 
for the first two years of the study.  The distribution of local revenues becomes more 
equitable each year from 1988-89 as the Gini coefficients decline annually for the next 
eight years.  The final three years of study are marked by sharp increases and decreases in 
the Gini coefficients. 
The Gini coefficient of Unadjusted Total Local Revenues per Pupil decreases 
throughout the term of this study.  They were at their lowest levels in 2002-03 and 
highest in 1988-89.  Decreasing Gini coefficient values indicate increasing distributional 
equity. 
Figure 39: Gini Coefficients of Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
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Total State and Local Revenue 
The Gini coefficients of the distribution of Total State and Local revenue per 
Pupil is displayed in a column format in Table 35.  A graphical illustration of the 
distribution of total state and local revenue per pupil is shown in Figure 40. 
Table 35:  Gini Coefficients of the Distribution of Total State and Local 
Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 Unadjusted   DCD Adjusted GCEI Adjusted CWI Adjusted 
 Total  State & Local Total State & Local Total State & Local Total State & Local 
  Year Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
 
1982-83 .010 .007 --- --- 
 
1984-85 .012 .008 --- --- 
 
1986-87 .017 .011 --- --- 
 
1988-89 .016 .017 .031 --- 
 
1990-91 .014 .020 .032 --- 
 
1992-93 .015 .018 .032 --- 
 
1994-95 .017 .018 .032 --- 
 
1996-97 .013 .015 .029 --- 
 
1998-99 .011 .014 .030 .052 
 
2000-01 .010 .013 .028 .037 
 
2002-03 .011 .013 .028 .056 
 
2004-05 .012 .012 .030 .054 
 
2006-07 .011 .012 .031 .054 
 
2008-09 .010 .013 .030 .054 
 
 
   
165 
 Unlike Figures 38 and 39, Figure 40 shows consistency among the Gini 
coefficients for three of the four revenue measures.  Unadjusted Total State and Local 
Revenue per Pupil shows a consistently low gini coefficient, varying only slightly during 
the study between 0.010 and 0.017. The GCEI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue 
per Pupil vary in an even smaller range of 0.030 to 0.032.  DCD Adjusted Total State and 
Local Revenue per Pupil vary in a slightly larger range of 0.007 to 0.020.  The CWI 
Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil has the largest range of values due to a 
large drop in the second year of its existence. 
The Gini coefficients for the distribution of Unadjusted Total State and Local 
Revenue per Pupil never exceeds 0.020 at any point during this study.  The minimum 
value of the Gini coefficient is zero.  The lower the Gini coefficient, the more equitable 
the distribution of available resources. 
Figure 40: Gini Coefficients of Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-
2008 
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Comparison of Revenues Types 
 Figure 41 examines the Gini coefficients of each of the unadjusted measures, 
Unadjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil, Unadjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil, 
and Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  Figure 38 showed state 
revenues becoming less equitable over time.  Figure 39 showed local revenues becoming 
more equitable over time.  Figure 40 showed the relative consistency of the distributional 
equity of total state and local revenue.  Figure 41 provides a different look at the revenues 
by combining these revenue types in one multiple line graph. 
 
Figure 41: Gini Coefficients of Unadjusted Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
   
167 
 Figure 42 takes the same look at the Gini coefficients of each of the DCD 
adjusted measures as Figure 41 did with unadjusted revenues.  DCD Adjusted Total State 
Revenue per pupil, DCD Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil, and DCD Adjusted 
Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil is the subject of Figure 42. 
Figure 42: Gini Coefficients of DCD Adjusted Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
Relationship Between Revenue Measures and Selected Independent Variables 
District Cost Differential and the Revenue Measures 
Tables 36, 37, and 38 show the framework for evaluation the relationship between 
a district‟s District Cost Differential (DCD) and the selected revenue measures.  Each 
table is populated with data from the current study.  Fourteen years worth of data is 
displayed.  Unadjusted and District Cost Differential (DCD) Adjusted Revenue is shown 
for all fourteen years.  Beginning in 1988-89, revenue is shown adjusted by the 
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Geographic Cost of Education Index (GCEI).  The Comparable Wage Index (CWI) is 
first shown as an adjustment to total state and local revenue in 1998-99. 
Total State Revenue 
 The relationship between the DCD and total state revenues is presented in a 
column format in Table 36.  In addition to the correlation itself (r) the percentage of 
values explained by the correlation is presented as (r
2
).  A graphical illustration of these 
relationships is shown as Figure 43. 
Table 36:   Product-Moment Correlation Between the District Cost Differential 
and Total State Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
  
 Unadjusted   DCD Adjusted GCEI Adjusted CWI Adjusted    
 Total  State Total State Total State Total State  
  Year Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue  
 
  r r
2
    r r
2
    r r
2
    r r
2
      
 
1982-83  -.60 .36    -.66 .43     ---     --- 
 
1984-85  -.59 .35    -.65 .42     ---     --- 
 
1986-87  -.56 .32    -.62 .38     ---     --- 
 
1988-89  -.73 .54    -.78 .61    -.75 .61     --- 
 
1990-91  -.76 .58    -.81 .65    -.79 -.63     --- 
 
1992-93  -.66 .43    -.71 .50    -.68 .46     --- 
 
1994-95  -.70 .49    -.75 .56    -.73 .54     --- 
 
1996-97  -.69 .47    -.75 .56    -.74 .55     --- 
 
1998-99  -.64 .41    -.70 .49    -.70 .49    -.74 .55 
 
2000-01  -.59 .35    -.66 .43    -.66 .44    -.68 .47 
 
2002-03  -.53 .28    -.59 .34    -.59 .35    -.64 .41 
 
2004-05  -.44 .19    -.50 .25    -.51 .26    -.57 .33 
 
2006-07  -.33 .11    -.39 .15    -.41 .17    -.50 .25 
 
2008-09  -.41 .17    -.49 .24    -.49 .24    -.54 .30 
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 Figure 43 shows the correlation between the DCD and total state revenues to be 
consistently negative.  This shows an inverse relationship between the two variables.  The 
relationship shows its strongest magnitude in 1990-91 at -0.76, -0.81, and -0.79 for the 
Unadjusted, DCD Adjusted, and GCEI Adjusted State Revenue measures respectively.  
The magnitude is its weakest in 2006-07 at  -0.33, -0.39, -0.41, and -0.50 for the 
Unadjusted, DCD Adjusted, GCEI Adjusted, and CWI Adjusted state revenue measures 
respectively.  It is remarkable that each of the four revenue measures react in unison from 
year to year.  If one correlation rises, they all rise:  if one decreases, they all decrease.  
There is a strong inverse relationship between state revenue and the DCD.  This 
relationship weakens over the course of this study but remains strong. 
Figure 43: Product-Moment Correlation Between District Cost Differentials and 
Total State Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
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Total Local Revenue 
 The relationship between the DCD and total local revenues is presented in a 
column format in Table 37.  In addition to the correlation itself (r) the percentage of 
values explained by the correlation is presented as (r
2
).  A graphical illustration of these 
relationships is shown as Figure 44. 
Table 37:  Product-Moment Correlation Between the District Cost Differentials 
and Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
  DCD Adjusted GCEI Adjusted CWI Adjusted  
 Total Local Total Local Total Local Total Local  
  Year Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue  
 
  r r
2
    r r
2
    r r
2
    r r
2
  
 
1982-83  .71 .51    .69 .47     ---     --- 
 
1984-85  .70 .49    .66 .44     ---     --- 
 
1986-87  .66 .44    .63 .39     ---     --- 
 
1988-89  .75 .57    .72 .52    .73 .53     --- 
 
1990-91  .75 .57    .72 .52    .72 .52     --- 
 
1992-93  .68 .46    .64 .41    .65 .42     --- 
 
1994-95  .73 .53    .68 .47    .69 .48     --- 
 
1996-97  .72 .52    .68 .47    .68 .46     --- 
 
1998-99  .68 .47    .65 .42    .63 .40    .56 .32 
 
2000-01  .64 .41    .59 .35    .57 .33    .55 .30 
 
2002-03  .58 .34    .53 .28    .51 .26    .44 .19 
 
2004-05  .51 .26    .46 .21    .44 .19    .36 .13 
 
2006-07  .36 .13    .30 .09    .27 .07    .18 .03 
 
2008-09  .43 .18    .35 .13    .33 .11    .23 .05 
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 Figure 44 shows the correlation between the DCD and total local revenues to be 
consistently positive.  For the first eight years of the study (1982-83 through 1996-97), 
the correlations vary around 0.70.  In the five years that follow (1998-99 through 2006-
07) the relationship between the DCD and total local revenues weakens as the correlation 
decreases each year.  In 2008-09, the final year of the study, the correlation shows a 
slight increase for all revenue measures.  There is a strong positive relationship between 
local revenue and the DCD.  This relationship weakens over the course of this study but 
remains strong. 
Figure 44: Product-Moment Correlation Between District Cost Differentials and 
Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
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Total State and Local Revenue 
 The relationship between the DCD and total state and local revenues is presented 
in a column format in Table 38.  In addition to the correlation itself (r) the percentage of 
values explained by the correlation is presented as (r
2
).  A graphical illustration of these 
relationships is shown as Figure 45. 
Table 38:   Product-Moment Correlation Between the District Cost Differentials 
and Total State and Local Revenues Per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
  
  DCD Adjusted GCEI Adjusted CWI Adjusted   
 Total State and Total State and Total State and Total State and  
  Year Local Revenue Local Revenue Local Revenue Local Revenue  
 
  r r
2
    r r
2
    r r
2
    r r
2
    
 
1982-83  .59 .35    -.05 .00     ---     --- 
 
1984-85  .72 .53    -.05 .00     ---     --- 
 
1986-87  .82 .68    .33 .11     ---     --- 
 
1988-89  .39 .16    -.24 .06    -.29 .09     --- 
 
1990-91  .30 .09    -.54 .29    -.52 .27     --- 
 
1992-93  .39 .15    -.37 .14    -.35 .12     --- 
 
1994-95  .45 .20    -.39 .15    -.38 .14     --- 
 
1996-97  .56 .32    -.44 .19    -.43 .19     --- 
 
1998-99  .60 .36    -.37 .14    -.43 .18    -.47 .22 
 
2000-01  .62 .39    -.46 .21    -.45 .21    -.41 .17 
 
2002-03  .59 .35    -.31 .10    -.38 .10    -.47 .22 
 
2004-05  .56 .32    -.15 .02    -.31 .10    -.49 .24 
 
2006-07  .28 .08    -.32 .10    -.43 .19    -.66 .43 
 
2008-09  .21 .05    -.52 .27    -.54 .29    -.61 .37 
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 Figure 45 shows the correlation between the DCD and Unadjusted Total State and 
Local Revenue to be consistently positive.  The relationship between the DCD and all 
three adjusted total state and local revenues is consistently negative.  The lesson here is 
that total state and local revenues have a relationship to the DCD.  When we control for 
the cost of doing business in respective districts using either the DCD, GCEI, or CWI the 
magnitude of this relationship decreases considerably.  There is a mild positive 
relationship between state revenue and the DCD.  This relationship weakens over the 
course of this study and reaches its lowest value in 2008-09. 
Figure 45: Product-Moment Correlation Between District Cost Differentials and 
Total State and Local Revenues, 1982-2008 
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Comparison of Revenue Types 
 Figures 46 and 47 present the correlation of the DCD to revenues from a different 
perspective.  Figure 46 shows the relationship between the DCD and Unadjusted Total 
State Revenue per Pupil, Unadjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil, and Unadjusted 
Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  Figure 47 shows the relationship between the 
DCD and DCD Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil, DCD Adjusted Total Local 
Revenue per Pupil, and DCD Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil. 
Figure 46: Product-Moment Correlation Between District Cost Differential and 
Unadjusted Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
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Figure 47: Product-Moment Correlation Between District Cost Differentials and 
DCD Adjusted Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
Assessed Property Value per Pupil and the Revenue Measures 
Tables 39, 40, and 41 show the framework for evaluating the relationship between 
a district‟s assessed property value per student and the selected revenue measures.  Each 
table is populated with data from the current study.  Fourteen years worth of data is 
displayed.  Unadjusted and District Cost Differential (DCD) Adjusted Revenue is shown 
for all fourteen years.  Beginning in 1988-89, revenue is show adjusted by the 
Geographic Cost of Education Index (GCEI).  The Comparable Wage Index (CWI) is 
first shown as an adjustment to total state and local revenue in 1998-99. 
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Total State Revenue 
 The relationship between assessed property value per student and total state 
revenues is presented in a column format in Table 39.  In addition to the correlation itself 
(r) the percentage of values explained by the correlation is presented as (r
2
).  A graphical 
illustration of these relationships is shown as Figure 48. 
Table 39:   Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil and Total State Revenue per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
  
  DCD Adjusted GCEI Adjusted CWI Adjusted 
 Total State Total State  Total State Total State 
Year Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
 
  r r
2
    r r
2
    r r
2
    r r
2
 
 
1982-83  -.98 .95    -.98 .97     ---     --- 
 
1984-85  -.98 .97    -.99 .98     ---     --- 
 
1986-87  -.98 .97    -.99 .98     ---     --- 
 
1988-89  -.97 .94    -.96 .94    -.93 .87     --- 
 
1990-91  -.97 .94    -.96 .92    -.94 .88     --- 
 
1992-93  -.96 .92    -.95 .91    -.93 .86     --- 
 
1994-95  -.96 .92    -.96 .92    -.93 .86     --- 
 
1996-97  -.96 .92    -.96 .92    -.93 .86     --- 
 
1998-99  -.97 .94    -.97 .93    -.94 .89    -.89 .79 
 
2000-01  -.97 .93    -.96 .93    -.93 .87    -.91 .83 
 
2002-03  -.94 .89    -.94 .88    -.91 .83    -.86 .75 
 
2004-05  -.88 .77    -.87 .76    -.84 .70    -.80 .63 
 
2006-07  -.75 .56    -.74 .55    -.70 .49    -.67 .45 
 
2008-09  -.73 .54    -.72 .52    -.69 .48    -.66 .44 
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 Figure 48 shows the correlation between assessed property per student and total 
state revenues per student to be consistently negative.  This shows an inverse relationship 
between the two variables.  For the first eleven years of the study (1982-83 through 2002-
03) the correlation varied between -0.90 and -1.00.  The final three years showed a 
weakening of the relationship as the values began to climb.  The final correlations were   
-0.73, -0.72, -0.69, and -0.66 for Unadjusted, DCD Adjusted, GCEI Adjusted, and CWI 
Adjusted State Revenues per Pupil respectively.  Remarkably, each value over the course 
of the study maintained the same relative position to the other revenue measures.  There 
is a strong inverse relationship between state revenue and the Assessed Property Value 
per Pupil.  This relationship weakens over the course of this study but remains 
moderately high. 
Figure 48: Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil and Total State Revenues, 1982-2008 
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Total Local Revenue 
 The relationship between assessed property value per student and total local 
revenues is presented in a column format in Table 40.  In addition to the correlation itself 
(r) the percentage of values explained by the correlation is presented as (r
2
).  A graphical 
illustration of these relationships is shown as Figure 49. 
Table 40:  Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil and Total Local Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
  
  DCD Adjusted GCEI Adjusted CWI Adjusted  
 Total Local Total Local Total Local Total Local  
  Year Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue  
 
  r r
2
    r r
2
    r r
2
    r r
2
    
  
1982-83  1.00 1.00    1.00 1.00     ---     --- 
 
1984-85  1.00 1.00    1.00 1.00     ---     --- 
 
1986-87  1.00 1.00    1.00 .99     ---     --- 
 
1988-89  1.00 1.00    1.00 1.00    1.00 .99     --- 
 
1990-91  .99 .99    .99 .98    .99 .98     --- 
 
1992-93  .99 .98    .98 .97    .98 .96     --- 
 
1994-95  .99 .98    .98 .96    .98 .97     --- 
 
1996-97  .99 .97    .98 .95    .98 .96     --- 
 
1998-99  .99 .98    .98 .96    .98 .95    .96 .92 
 
2000-01  .99 .97    .98 .95    .97 .95    .97 .93 
 
2002-03  .97 .94    .96 .92    .95 .91    .93 .86 
 
2004-05  .92 .86    .91 .84    .93 .86    .91 .83 
 
2006-07  .83 .69    .84 .70    .86 .74    .85 .73 
 
2008-09  .82 .67    .83 .69    .84 .70     .82 .67 
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 Figure 49 shows the correlation between assessed property per student and total 
state revenues per student to be consistently positive.  This shows a direct relationship 
between the two variables.  As with the state revenue in Figure 48, for the first eleven 
years of the study (1982-83 through 2002-03) the correlation varied between 0.90 and 
1.00.  The final three years showed a weakening of the relationship as the values began to 
fall.  The final correlations were outside the previous range at 0.82, 0.83, 0.84, and 0.82 
for Unadjusted, DCD Adjusted, GCEI Adjusted, and CWI Adjusted Local Revenues per 
Pupil respectively.  As with the state revenues, each of the local values over the course of 
the study maintained the same relative position to the other revenue measures.  There is a 
strong positive relationship between local revenue and the Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil.  This relationship weakens over the course of this study but remains moderately 
high. 
Figure 49: Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil and Total Local Revenues, 1982-2008 
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Total State and Local Revenue 
 The relationship between assessed property value per student and total state and 
local revenues is presented in a column format in Table 41.  In addition to the correlation 
itself (r) the percentage of values explained by the correlation is presented as (r
2
).  A 
graphical illustration of these relationships is shown as Figure 50. 
Table 41:   Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil and Total State and Local Revenues Per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 Unadjusted DCD Adjusted GCEI Adjusted CWI Adjusted 
 Total State and Total State and Total State and Total State and 
  Year Local Revenue Local Revenue Local Revenue Local Revenue 
 
  r r
2
    r r
2
    r r
2
    r r
2
  
 
1982-83  .27 .07    -.23 .05     ---     --- 
 
1984-85  .39 .15    -.19 .04     ---     --- 
 
1986-87  .69 .48    .45 .20     ---     --- 
 
1988-89  .56 .31    .09 .01    -.16 .03     --- 
 
1990-91  .54 .30    -.15 .02    -.31 .10     --- 
 
1992-93  .55 .30    .01 .00    -.28 .08     --- 
 
1994-95  .59 .35    -.04 .00    -.25 .06     --- 
 
1996-97  .68 .46    -.05 .00    -.24 .08     --- 
 
1998-99  .66 .44    .01 .00    -.23 .05    -.13 .02 
 
2000-01  .68 .46    -.01 .00    -.21 .05    -.06 .00 
 
2002-03  .64 .42    .14 .02    -.13 .02    -.13 .02 
 
2004-05  .64 .41    .34 .12    .03 .00    -.03 .00 
 
2006-07  .69 .48    .60 .36    .21 .04    .12 .01 
 
2008-09  .69 .47    .46 .21    .11 .01    .04 .00 
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 Figure 50 shows the correlation between assessed property value per student and 
Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue to be consistently positive.  An examination 
of the correlation between assessed property value per student and DCD Adjusted Total 
State and Local Revenue shows it to lie between 0.20 and -0.20 nine out of the fourteen 
years of the study.  All of the CWI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil 
are within this range.  The GCEI Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil are 
consistently around -0.20 for the first eight years of the study before becoming slightly 
positive for the last three years.  The relationship intensified over the first three years of 
this study and then leveled off slightly above 0.60.  This shows a moderate relationship 
between a district‟s revenue and assessed property. 
Figure 50: Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil and Total State and Local Revenues, 1982-2008 
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Comparison of Revenue Types 
 Figures 51 and 52 present the correlation of assessed property value per student to 
revenues from a different perspective.  Figure 51 shows the relationship between assessed 
property value per student and Unadjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil, Unadjusted 
Total Local Revenue per Pupil, and Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  
Figure 52 shows the relationship between assessed property value per student and DCD 
Adjusted Total State Revenue per Pupil, DCD Adjusted Total Local Revenue per Pupil, 
and DCD Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil. 
Figure 51: Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil and Unadjusted Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
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Figure 52: Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil and DCD Adjusted Revenues per Pupil, 1982-2008 
 
 
 
 
Assessed Property Value per Pupil and the District Cost Differential 
Table 42 shows the framework for evaluating the relationship between a district‟s 
assessed property value per student and its District Cost Differential (DCD).  Each table 
is populated with data from the current study.  Fourteen years worth of data is displayed.   
The relationship between assessed property value per student and a district‟s DCD 
is presented in a column format in Table 42.  A graphical illustration of this relationship 
is shown as Figure 53. 
Figure 53 shows the correlation between assessed property per student and a 
district‟s DCD to be between 0.65 and 0.80 for the first ten years of the fourteen year 
study.  This relationship weakens over the next three years of the study as the correlation 
falls to 0.13, its lowest value, in 2006-07.  The final year of the study shows a very slight  
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Table 42:   Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Pupil  and the District Cost Differentials, 1982-2008 
 
 
 Assessed Value 
     Year per Pupil 
 
  1982-83 .71 
 
  1984-85 .69 
 
  1986-87 .67 
 
  1988-89 .75 
 
  1990-91 .77 
 
  1992-93 .70 
 
  1994-95 .74 
 
  1996-97 .74 
 
  1998-99 .70 
 
  2000-01 .66 
 
  2002-03 .59 
 
  2004-05 .50 
 
  2006-07 .13 
 
  2008-09 .19 
 
 
 
Figure 53: Product-Moment Correlation Between Assessed Property Value per 
Student and the District Cost Differentials, 1982-2008 
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strengthening of the relationship to a value of 0.19.  There is a moderate relationship 
between these two variables.  The relationship deteriorates over the course of this study.   
Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil Using Weighted Student FTE 
 A fundamental component of the Florida Education Finance Program is the 
Program Cost Factors.  The Program Cost Factors are used to provide weighted funding 
based on the educational program in which the student is enrolled.  Although this study 
focuses on per student revenues at the school district level, the make up of each school 
district is different.  The individual composition of a school district‟s student population 
would be reflected in its Weighted FTE.  As a funding component, Weighted FTE has the 
potential to be an equalizing or disequalizing mechanism. 
 Table 43 includes an analysis of the 1998-99 Florida Education Finance Program 
using Weighted FTE as the divisor when determining per student revenue per district.  
The funding variable on interest is total state and local funding per student.  Data is 
presented for Unadjusted State and Local Revenue per Pupil based on unweighted student 
counts, Unadjusted State and Local Revenue per Pupil based on weighted student counts, 
DCD Adjusted State and Local Revenue per Pupil based on unweighted student counts, 
and DCD Adjusted State and Local Revenue per Pupil based on weighted student counts. 
 An examination of the data in Table 43 shows that all percentile measures are 
lower when calculated using the weighted student counts.  This is basic math.  In all 
districts and all years, the weighted FTE will be higher than the unweighted FTE.  The 
range of Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil decreases 32.3% when 
calculated using the weighted FTE.  The range of DCD Adjusted Total State and Local  
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Table 43:  Use of Weighted and Unweighted Students in Total State and Local 
Revenue per Pupil Equity Measures in 1998-99 
 
 
 1998-99 1998-99 1998-99 1998-99 
 Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Measure Unadjusted Unadjusted DCD Adjusted DCD Adjusted 
 
100
th
 percentile 5382.74 4288.51 5260.35 4168.67 
95
th
 percentile 4948.82 3938.00 5119.24 4136.95 
75
th
 percentile 4808.50 3801.21 4990.54 3982.02 
50
th
 percentile 4658.31 3722.98 4899.18 3899.25 
25
th
 percentile 4578.98 3664.50 4747.65 3802.42 
5
th
 percentile 4463.35 3664.50 4609.36 3737.75 
1
st
 percentile 4461.01 3664.50 4569.84 3707.43 
 
Range 921.74 624.01 719.56 466.92 
 
Restricted Range 485.46 273.51 509.87 399.20 
 
Mean 4697.48 3758.20 4877.53 3903.12 
 
Standard Deviation 176.08 113.23 156.70 124.06 
 
Coefficient of Variation .04 .03 .03 .03 
 
Federal Range Ratio .11 .07 .11 .11 
 
McLoone Index .98 .99 .97 .98 
 
Verstegen Index 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.03 
 
Gini Coefficient .011 .007 .014 .011 
 
 
Revenue per Pupil decreases a similar amount at 35.1%.  The restricted range of 
Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil decreases 43.7% when calculated  
using the weighted FTE.  The restricted range of DCD Adjusted Total State and Local 
Revenue per Pupil decreases at about half the rate of the unadjusted revenues when 
calculated using weighted FTE at 21.7%. 
 The coefficient of variation and federal range ratio showed a more equitable 
distribution of Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil when calculated 
using the weighted FTE.  The coefficient of variation reduced from 0.04 to 0.03.  The 
federal range ration reduced from 0.11 to 0.07.  There was no difference in the coefficient 
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of variation or federal range ratio when using weighted FTE in the calculation of DCD 
Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil. 
 The McLoone index and the Verstegen index showed a more equitable 
distribution of revenue three out of four times with the unadjusted and DCD adjusted 
levels when weighted FTE was used as the pupil measure.  The McLoone index increased 
from 0.98 to 0.99 with Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil and 0.97 to 
0.98 with DCD Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil. The Verstegen index 
decreased from 1.04 to 1.03 with Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil 
and increased from 1.02 to 1.03 with DCD Adjusted Total State and Local Revenue per 
Pupil. 
 The Gini coefficient showed a more equitable distribution of total state and local 
revenues at both the unadjusted and DCD adjusted levels when using weighted FTE as 
the pupil measure.  The Gini coefficient decreased from 0.011 to 0.07 with Unadjusted 
Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil and 0.014 to 0.011 with DCD Adjusted Total 
State and Local Revenue per Pupil. 
A comparison of weighted and unweighted student counts when calculating per 
pupil revenue equity measures shows that values generated using weighted student counts 
are consistently more equitable.  This offers the possibility that some of the disparity in 
districts per pupil revenue may be attributed to the makeup of their student body. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Overview 
 This study was designed to answer one central research question: 
 Does the Florida Education Finance Program equitably distribute available 
funding to public school districts in the state? 
 To answer this question, a three phase study was proposed and conducted. 
Phase I 
 A historical review of the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP) from 1982 
through 2009 was conducted as phase one of this study.  The historical review outlined 
the FEFP in 1982-83 and detailed changes to the FEFP during the 27 year period that 
followed.  The FEFP in 2008-09 was then outlined to allow for comparison.  Finally, a 
review of the relevant legal challenges to the funding of public schools in the state of 
Florida was conducted and discussed.   
Phase II 
 Ten measures of dispersion or variability were employed in phase two to 
determine the level of distributional equity of the Florida Education Finance Program.  
Percentiles, range, restricted range, federal range ratio, mean, standard deviation, 
coefficient of variation, Gini coefficient, McLoone index, and Verstegen index were 
calculated for even numbered years from 1982-83 through 2008-09 on twelve measures 
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of per pupil revenue.  The twelve measures of per pupil revenue include unadjusted state, 
local, and total revenues per pupil at the district level.  Each of the per pupil revenues 
were adjusted by three economic adjustments:  the District Cost Differential (DCD), the 
Geographic Cost of Education Index (GCEI), and the Comparable Wage Index (CWI).   
Phase III 
 A separate analysis using Pearson product-moment correlations was conducted as 
phase three.  Correlations between each of the twelve per pupil revenue measures in 
phase two and the District Cost Differential and Assessed Valuation were calculated to 
determine the fiscal neutrality of the Florida Education Finance Program. 
Interpretation of Findings 
Phase I 
The historical review of the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP) revealed 
that the fundamental components of the formula remained unchanged throughout the time 
frame of this study.  The FEFP uses two central variables to adjust a district‟s per pupil 
revenue.  The first, the Program Cost Factors, adjusts per pupil revenue based on the 
programs the students are enrolled in.  The second, the district cost differential, adjusts 
per pupil revenue based on the cost of doing business in local economies.  These 
variables were present in each year of the study. 
Although the variables, Program Cost Factors and the District Cost Differential, 
were present in all years of the study, they were not unchanged.  Each variable was 
subject to changes in the way they were calculated, and the number of them employed.  
In addition to these central variables, a process of supplements and guarantees were used 
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in the FEFP.  These add-ons were used to start special programs or to stimulate certain 
behavior of the part of the school districts.  
Phase II 
 Phase two of the study was proposed and conducted using twelve measures of a 
district‟s per pupil revenue and ten statistical measures of variability and dispersion.  
Each of the revenue and statistical measures were calculated as proposed, but their 
contribution to the analysis, interpretation, and final conclusions were not equal.   
Revenue Measures 
The Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP) formula calculates a total 
allocation for each district.  A district‟s ability to provide for themselves, the Required 
Local Effort, is then subtracted to determine the level of state aid.  This simple 
mathematical equation presents three components: local revenue, state revenue, and total 
state and local revenue.  This study proposed to use each of those measures.  That 
thinking was flawed.  State revenue and local revenue have an inverse relationship.  
Examination of the measures of dispersion or variability presented conflicting results.  
But, that is the exact point.  State revenue is intended to supplement local revenue.  The 
FEFP calculates a district‟s total revenue without considering the source.  Only after 
considering a district‟s total revenue does it turn to its ability to generate revenue on its 
own.  An analysis of the distributional equity of the Florida Education Finance Program 
should take place using total state and revenue. 
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Adjustment of Revenues 
The per pupil revenue measures were subjected to three cost adjustments.  The 
intent of these adjustments were to determine if the cost adjustment included in the 
Florida Education Finance Program, the District Cost Differential, was responsible for 
any of the variation in distributional equity.  The use of these cost adjustments did not 
contribute to the knowledge base of this study.  Each of the three adjustments was built 
on the same assumption, that there were varying costs of doing business in various 
economies across the state.  An analysis of the distributional equity of the Florida 
Education Finance Program should take place using unadjusted revenues. 
Measures of Dispersions or Variability 
 This study employed ten measures of dispersion or variability.  Five of these 
measures are resistant to inflation, five are not.  This is an important point to consider.  
Over the course of a twenty-seven year study, the per pupil revenues of all districts rose.  
A measure of dispersion or variability needed to be resistant to inflation to provide useful 
information over the course of the study. 
 The percentiles, range, restricted range, mean, and standard deviation were not 
resistant to this inflationary pressure and therefore could not be used in a final analysis.  
These measures were not without contribution.  In many cases, they were necessary for 
the calculation of other measures that were useful.  The measures that were resistant to 
inflationary pressure, and therefore useful in the final analysis, were the federal range 
ratio, coefficient of variation, Gini coefficient, McLoone index, and Verstegen index. 
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Findings 
 Although this study proposed to use twelve measures of per pupil revenue, in the 
end only one measure should be utilized to measure the distributional equity of the 
Florida Education Finance Program.  The most useful measure of a district‟s per pupil 
revenue is Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  This study also 
proposed to use ten measures of dispersions or variability.  Five of those measures proved 
to be resistant to inflation:  the federal range ratio, coefficient of variation, Gini 
coefficient, McLoone index, and Verstegen index. 
 Analysis of Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil using the federal 
range ratio was presented in Table 32 and Figure 35 in Chapter 4.  They show that the 
federal range ratio for Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil was between 
0.10 and 0.16 for the length of this study.    The federal range ratio has a minimum value 
of zero.  The closer the value of the federal range ratio to zero, the more equitable the 
distribution. 
The coefficient of variation of Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per 
Pupil for the study is detailed in Table 31 and Figure 34 of Chapter 4.  They show values 
between 0.03 and 0.05 for the length of the study.  A coefficient of variation of 0.03 
means that 68% of districts had per pupil revenues within 3% of the mean.  It also shows 
that 95% of school districts had per pupil revenues with 6% of the mean.  In their book 
entitled School Finance: A Policy Perspective Odden and Picus (1992) recommend a 
coefficient of variation of 10%, or 0.10, as an equity goal. 
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Analysis of Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil using the 
McLoone index is shown in Table 32 and Figure 36 of Chapter 4.  They show the 
McLoone index to be between 0.97 and 0.98 during the length of our study.  Odden and 
Picus (1992) provide a framework for interpreting the McLoone index and suggest that a 
value of 0.95 or higher is desirable.  The closer the McLoone index is to 1.00 the more 
equitable the distribution.  The values of 0.97 to 0.98 from this study suggest a more 
equitable distribution than Odden and Picus suggest as a policy goal. 
Analysis of Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil using the 
Verstegen index is shown in Table 32 and Figure 37 of Chapter 4.  They show the 
Verstegen index to be between 1.03 and 1.05.  This index can be 1.00 and higher and 
increase as disparities in the top half of the distribution increase. The Verstegen index is 
calculated same as the McLoone index except it deals with the upper half of the 
distribution of revenues.  A policy goal was set at 0.95 for the McLoone index which 
would translate into a 1.05 for the Verstegen index.  The values of the Verstegen index 
values of 1.03 to 1.05 found in this study suggest that the policy goal has been met or 
exceeded.  
The Gini coefficient of Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil for 
the study is detailed in Table 35 and Figure 40 of Chapter 4.  They show values between 
0.010 and 0.017.  The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating perfect equity.  
Values of 0.010 and 0.017 are extremely close to 0 indicating close to perfect equity.   
The use of the federal range ratio, coefficient of variation, McLoone Index, 
Verstegen index, and Gini coefficient are supported by the literature to be well accepted 
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measures of distributional equity. Each of these measures, when employed in our study, 
shows Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenues per Pupil to be distributed equitably.  
Phase III 
 The purpose of phase three was to determine the source of any distributional 
inequality.  The use of the measures of dispersion and variability in phase two did not 
show the existence a distributional inequality in the examination of Unadjusted Total 
State and Local Revenues per Pupil.  The correlations found in phase three are useful 
nonetheless in determining the wealth neutrality of the Florida Education Finance 
Program.  Using the same arguments put forth in phase two, the analysis of the 
relationship of revenues per pupil to our variables will be limited to Unadjusted Total 
State and Local Revenue per Pupil.   
 The relationship between the Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenues per 
Pupil and the District Cost Differential are detailed in Table 38 and Figure 45 of Chapter 
4.  They show a Pearson-moment correlation between 0.21 and 0.82 for the time period 
of this study.  This shows a moderate to strong relationship between Unadjusted Total 
State and Local Revenues per Pupil and the District Cost Differential.  This relationship 
would be of some concern if the other measures showed an inequitable distribution of 
revenues.  What this does tell us is that there is a definite relationship, which varies in 
strength, between the revenues a district receives and the cost of doing business in that 
district.   
 The relationship between the Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenues per 
Pupil and Assessed Property Value per Pupil is detailed in Table 41 and Figure 50 of 
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Chapter 4.  They show a Pearson-moment correlation between 0.27 and 0.69 for the time 
period of this study.   This shows a moderate relationship between Assessed Property 
Value per Pupil and Unadjusted Total State and Local Revenue per Pupil.  It is not 
unexpected that there would be a relationship between a district‟s land value and their 
revenues.   
Implications of Findings 
 This study was constructed with one central research question: 
 Does the Florida Education Finance Program equitably distribute available 
funding to public school districts in the state? 
 The findings show that the Florida Education Finance Program does in fact 
distribute available revenue equitably.  Policy makers and taxpayers in the state of 
Florida should feel confident that funds are distributed equitably across that state.  With 
an equitable formula in place, researchers and policy makers should turn their attention to 
the question of adequacy.   
Recommendations for Future Study 
To produce a workable study, it was necessary to limit the scope of the current 
study.  By limiting the scope of this study, some issues were intentionally left to future 
study.  In the initial introduction, two key questions were presented that currently guide 
the school funding debate: 
1. How much money is needed? 
2. What is fair in the distribution of available funding (Ramirez, 2003)?  
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This study sought to answer the question of equity, but left the question of adequacy to 
future research.  This study focused exclusively on the state of Florida.  Future research 
in other states using a method similar to this would allow for cross-state comparisons.  
 Two additional questions became apparent as this study unfolded that would be 
ripe for future research.  The first is the issue of program cost factors.  Future research 
should examine the number of program cost factors employed in the Florida Education 
Finance Program.  The historical review conducted as phase one of this study, found that 
the number and value of the Program Cost Factors varied greatly.  What is the optimal 
number of Program Cost Factors needed to differentiate the costs of educating students?  
How should the value of these factors be determined?  The second question that became 
apparent as this study unfolded centered on the District Cost Differentials.  In this study, 
three different cost adjustments were employed:  the Geographic Cost of Education Index 
(GCEI), the Comparable Wage Index (CWI), and the District Cost Differential (DCD).  
Each of these indexes produces different values that would affect the distribution of 
revenues to local districts if employed by the Florida Education Finance Program.  No 
position was taken by this study as to which of these indexes best distributes revenues 
based on the economic conditions of each district.  Future and continual study should 
take place to determine the optimal method for adjusting revenues based on local 
economic conditions. 
 The construction of the method of this study included twelve per pupil revenue 
measures and ten measures of dispersions or variability.  Future study should take clues 
from the findings of this study.  The use of state or local revenues in a state like Florida 
   
197 
does not lend additional information to the study.  The elimination of these revenue 
variables would streamline the study.  The use of multiple cost adjustments also was 
found to contribute little to the study.  The elimination of these cost adjustments would 
also streamline the study. 
 The elimination of certain revenue measures and cost adjustments opens the door 
to the possibility of including per student program weights in future studies.  This study 
examined data for a single year using weighted student counts as an adjustment to per 
pupil revenues.  No conclusions can be drawn from that single year‟s data, but the results 
suggested that the type of students in a given district contribute as much to the revenues 
as location. 
Conclusion 
 This study was originally patterned after a study completed in 1982.  The intent of 
this study was to provide additional data, that when coupled with data from the original 
study, would allow for the examination of distributional equity in the state of Florida 
prior to the implementation of the Florida Educational Finance Program.  Due to the 
availability of additional equity measures, and changes to the calculations of existing 
ones, that was not possible.  This study takes no position on the prior study. It is 
important to note that the study completed in 1982 by Dr. Shiver came to a dramatically 
different conclusion.  Dr. Shiver concluded that the Florida Education Finance Program 
did not distribute funds equitably. 
 By the very nature of the contradictory findings, one must question the findings of 
the previous study.  This study ultimately used five different measures of distributional 
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equality to measure the effectiveness of the Florida Education Finance Program.  All five 
of the measures point to distributional equity.  None of the existing measures point to an 
inequitable distribution. 
 Our study sought to answer a single question: 
 Does the Florida Education Finance Program equitably distribute available 
funding to public school districts in the state? 
There is no contradiction in the findings.  The Florida Education Finance Program 
does, in fact, distribute available funds to school districts in the state of Florida equitably.  
   
199 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Baker, B. D. (2005).  The emerging shape of educational adequacy: from theoretical 
assumptions to empirical evidence.  Journal of Education Finance, 30, 259-287. 
 
Baker, B. D. (2008).  Doing more harm than good? A commentary on the politics of cost 
adjustment for wage variation in state school finance formulas.  Journal of 
Education Finance, 33, 406-440. 
 
Bauries, S. R. (2006).  Florida's past and future roles in education finance reform 
litigation.  Journal of Education Finance, 32, 89-104. 
 
Berne, R., Moser, M., & Stiefel, L. (1999).  Social policy: School finance.  Journal of 
Management History, 5, 165-179. 
 
Brimley, V., & Garfield, R. R. (2002).  Financing education in a climate of change (8th 
ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. 
 
Bundt, J., & Leland, S. (2001).  Wealthy or poor:  Who receives and who pays? A closer 
look at measures of equity in Iowa school finance.  Journal of Education Finance, 
26, 397-414. 
 
Chambers, J. (1998).  Geographic variations in public schools’ costs.  Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Development, 
National Center for Education Statistics. 
Chandler, M. W. (2002).  New ideas versus bureaucratic power in school finance.  
Journal of Education Finance, 28, 97-112. 
 
Cohen-Vogel, L. A., & Cohen-Vogel, D. (2001).  School finance reform in Tennessee: 
Inching toward adequacy.  Journal of Education Finance, 26, 297-318. 
 
Crampton, F. E. (2007).  State school finance legislation: A 50-state overview and trend 
analysis.  Journal of Education Finance, 32, 470-487. 
 
Driscoll, L. G., & Salmon, R. G. (2008).  How increased state equalization aid resulted in 
greater disparities: An unexpected consequence for the commonwealth of 
Virginia.  Journal of Education Finance, 33, 238-261. 
   
200 
Fastrup, J. (2002).  Assessing state performance in equalizing access to educational 
resources: The case of Rhode Island (1992-1996).  Journal of Education Finance, 
28, 207-234. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1981, August).  1981-82 
Florida education finance program statistical report  (MIS Series 82-02).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of Management 
Systems and Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1982, May).  1982-83 
Florida education finance program statistical report  (MIS Series 82-27).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of Management 
Systems and Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1983, September).  1983-
84 Florida education finance program statistical report  (MIS Series 84-05).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of Management 
Systems and Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1985, July).  1985-86 
Florida education finance program statistical report  (MIS Series 86-01).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of Management 
Systems and Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1986, August).  1986-87 
Florida education finance program statistical report  (MIS Series 87-01).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of Management 
Systems and Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1987, August).  1987-88 
Florida education finance program statistical report  (MIS Series 88-01).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of Management 
Systems and Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1988, August).  1988-89 
Florida education finance program statistical report  (MIS Series 89-04).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of Business 
Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1989, August).  1989-90 
Florida education finance program statistical report  (MIS Series 90-03).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of Business 
Services. 
 
   
201 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1990, August).  1990-91 
Florida education finance program statistical report  (MIS Series 90-24).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of Business 
Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1991, August).  1991-92 
Florida education finance program statistical report  (MIS Series 92-02).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of Business 
Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1992, August).  1992-93 
Florida education finance program statistical report  (EIAS Series 93-01).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of School Business 
Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1993, May).  1993-94 
Florida education finance program statistical report  Tallahassee, FL: Financial 
Management Section of the Bureau of School Business Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1994, July).  1994-95 
Florida education finance program statistical report  (EIAS Series 95-3).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of School Business 
Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (1995, August).  1995-96 Florida education finance 
program statistical report  (EIAS Series 96-4).  Tallahassee, FL: Financial 
Management Section of the Bureau of School Business Services, Division of 
Public Schools. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (1996, August).  1996-97 Florida education finance 
program statistical report  (EAIS Series 97-06).  Tallahassee, FL:  Financial 
Management Section of the Bureau of School Business Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (1997, August).  1997-98 Florida education finance 
program statistical report  (EAIS Series 98-05).  Tallahassee, FL:  Financial 
Management Section of the Bureau of School Business Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (1998, August).  1998-99 Florida education finance 
program statistical report  (EIAS Series 99-04).  Tallahassee, FL:  Office of 
Funding and Financial Reporting of the Bureau of School Business Services. 
 
   
202 
Florida Department of Education.  (1999, September).  1999-2000 Funding for Florida 
school districts statistical report  (EIAS Series 2000-03).  Tallahassee, FL:  
Office of Funding and Financial Reporting of the Bureau of School Business 
Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (2000, September).  2000-2001 Funding for Florida 
school districts statistical report  (EIAS Series 2001-03).  Tallahassee, FL:  
Office of Funding and Financial Reporting of the Bureau of School Business 
Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (2001, August).  2001-02 Funding for Florida school 
districts statistical report  (EIAS Series 2002-03).  Tallahassee, FL:  Office of 
Funding and Financial Reporting of the Bureau of School Business Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (2003).  Funding for Florida school districts statistical 
report  (EIAS Series 2004-06).  Tallahassee, FL:  Office of Funding and Financial 
Reporting of the Bureau of School Business Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (2004).  2004-05 Funding for Florida school districts 
statistical report  (Series 2005-06).  Tallahassee, FL:  Office of Funding and 
Financial Reporting of the Bureau of School Business Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (2005).  2005-06 Funding for Florida school districts 
statistical report.  Tallahassee, FL:  Office of Funding and Financial Reporting of 
the Bureau of School Business Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (2006).  2006-07 Funding for Florida school districts 
statistical report.  Tallahassee, FL:  Office of Funding and Financial Reporting of 
the Bureau of School Business Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (2007).  2007-08 Funding for Florida school districts 
statistical report.  Tallahassee, FL:  Office of Funding and Financial Reporting of 
the Bureau of School Business Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (2008).  2008-09 Funding for Florida school districts 
statistical report.  Tallahassee, FL:  Office of Funding and Financial Reporting of 
the Bureau of School Business Services. 
 
Glenn, W. (2006, October).  Does school finance adequacy litigation benefit students?  
School Business Affairs. 37-40. 
 
Hadderman, M. (1999, August). Equity and adequacy in educational finance. ERIC 
Digest, 129. (ERIC Document Reproduction Services No. ED 454 566). 
 
   
203 
Harris, D. (2005).  Funding Florida’s schools: Adequacy, costs and the state constitution 
(EPSL-0401-110-EPRU).  Tempe, AZ: Education Policy Studies Laboratory. 
 
Herrington, C., & Weider, V. (2001).  Equity, adequacy and vouchers:  Past and present 
school finance litigation in Florida.  Journal of Education Finance, 27, 517-534. 
Hirth, M., & Eiler, E. (2005).  Horizontal and vertical equity analysis of Indiana‟s 2001 
reward-for-effort formula.  Journal of Education Finance,30, 382-398. 
Imazeki, J., & Reschovsky, A. (2003).  Financing adequate education in rural settings.  
Journal of Education Finance, 29, 137-156. 
Imber, M. (2001, August).  The struggle for equity.  American School Board Journal, 33-
35. 
 
Johns, R. L., & Alexander, K. (Eds.). (1971).  Alternative programs for financing 
education. Gainesville, FL: National Education Finance Project. 
 
Johns, R. L., Alexander, K., & Jordan, K. F. (Eds.). (1975). Planning to finance 
education. Gainesville, FL: National Education Finance Project. 
 
Kramer, L. (2002). Achieving equitable education through the courts: A comparative 
analysis of three states.  Journal of Law & Education, 31(1), 1-51. 
 
Maiden, J. & Evans, N. O. (2009).  Fiscal equity of teacher salaries and compensation in 
Oklahoma.  Journal of Education Finance, 34, 231-246. 
 
Morphet, E. L., Johns, R. L., & Reller, T. L. (1982).  Educational organization and 
administration: Concepts, practices, and issues (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Moser, M., & Rubenstein, R. (2002). The equality of public school district funding in the 
United States: A national status report.  Public Administration Review, 62(1), 63-
72. 
Murry, G. (2006, November).  School funding litigation: Changing the face of public 
education.  School Business Affairs, 32-35. 
 
Nakib, Y., & Herrington, C. D. (1998).  The political economy of K-12 education 
finance: The context of a fast growing large state. Journal of Education Finance, 
23, 351-373. 
 
Odden, A. (2000).  The new school finance: Providing adequacy and improving equity. 
Journal of Education Finance, 25, 467-488. 
   
204 
Odden, A. (2003, October).  Equity and adequacy in school finance today.  Phi Delta 
Kappan, 120-125. 
 
Odden, A. R., & Picus, L. O. (1992).  School finance: A policy perspective.  New York, 
NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
 
Oesch, J. M., & Paquette, J. (1995). School based financial equity in Ontario: 1988-1989. 
Journal of Education Finance, 20, 312-331. 
 
Parrish, T. B., Hikido, C. S., & Fowler, W. L. (1998). Inequalities in public school 
district revenue (NCES 98-210). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 
Office of Educational Research and Improvement. 
Picus, L. (2001, December).  How much is enough?  American School Board Journal, 
28-30. 
Picus, L., Odden, A., & Fermanich, M. (2004).  Assessing the equity of Kentucky‟s 
SEEK formula: A 10-year analysis.  Journal of Education Finance, 96, 315-336. 
Ramirez, A. (2003, January).  The shifting sands of school finance.  Educational 
Leadership, 54-57. 
 
Rebell, M. A. (1999). Fiscal equity litigation and the democratic imperative. Equity & 
Excellence in Education, 32(3), 5-18. 
 
Reschovsky, A. & Imazeki, J. (2001).  Achieving educational adequacy through school 
finance reform.  Journal of Education Finance, 26, 373-396. 
Roellke, C., Green, P., & Zielewski, E. (2004).  School finance litigation:  The promises 
and limitations of the third wave.  Peabody Journal of Education, 79(2), 104-133. 
 
Rolle, A., Houck, E. A., & McColl, A. (2008).  And poor children continue to wait: An 
analysis of horizontal and vertical equity among North Carolina school districts in 
the face of judicially mandated policy restraints 1996-2006.  Journal of Education 
Finance, 34, 75-102. 
 
Rubenstein, R., Doering, D., & Gess, L. (2000).  The equity of public education funding 
in Georgia, 1988-1996.  Journal of Education Finance, 26, 187-208. 
 
Shiver, L. A. (1982).  A historical review of the development of Florida’s school finance 
plan and the fiscal equalization effects of the Florida education finance program.  
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Florida, Gainesville. 
 
   
205 
Taylor, L. (2006).  A Comparable Wage Approach to Geographic Cost Adjustment 
(NCES 2006-321).  U.S. Department of Education. Washington, D.C.: National 
Center for Education Statistics. 
Taylor, L., Alexander, C., Gronberg, D., Jansen, D., & Keller, H. (2002).  Updating the 
Texas cost of education index.  Journal of Education Finance, 28, 261-284. 
Thompson, D. & Crampton, F. (2002).  The impact of school finance litigation: A long 
view.  Journal of Education Finance, 27, 783-816. 
 
Toutkoushian, R. K., & Michael, R. S. (2007).  An alternative approach to measuring 
horizontal and vertical equity in school funding.  Journal of Education Finance, 
32, 395-421. 
 
Toutkoushian, R. K., & Michael, R. S. (2008).  The impacts of school funding formula 
modifications on equity, fiscal neutrality, and adequacy.  Journal of Education 
Finance, 33, 352-380. 
 
Verstegen, D. (2002).  Financing the new adequacy:  Towards new models of state 
education finance systems that support standards based reform.  Journal of 
Education Finance, 27, 749-782. 
 
Verstegen, D. A., & Driscoll, L. G. (2008).  Educational opportunity: The Illinois 
dilemma.  Journal of Education Finance, 33, 331-351. 
 
Verstegen, D. A., & Jordan, T. S. (2009).  A fifty-state survey of school finance policies 
and programs: An overview.  Journal of Education Finance, 34, 213-230. 
 
Vesely, R. S., Crampton, F. E., Obiakor, F. E., & Sapp, M. (2008).  The role of states in 
funding education to achieve social justice.  Journal of Education Finance, 34, 
56-74. 
   
206 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Adams, J. E., Jr., & White W. E., II. (1997).  The equity consequences of school finance 
reform in Kentucky.  Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 19(2), 165-
184. 
 
Addonizio, M. F., Kearney, C. P., & Prince, H. J. (1995).  Michigan‟s high wire act.  
Journal of Education Finance, 20, 235-269. 
 
Addonzio, M. F. (1997).  Equality of choice? School finance reform and the income-
expenditure relationship.  Journal of Education Finance, 23, 22-42. 
 
Addonizio, M. F. (2003).  From fiscal equity to educational adequacy: Lessons from 
Michigan.  Journal of Education Finance, 28, 457-484. 
 
Alexander, K. (1991).  Financing the public schools of the United States: A perspective 
on effort, need, and equity.  Oxford Round Table, 122-144. 
 
Alexander, K., & Salmon, R. G. (1995).  Public school finance.  Boston, MA: Allyn and 
Bacon. 
 
Arnold, M. L. (1998).  3 kinds of equity.  The American School Board Journal, 34-36. 
 
Augenblick, J., Gold, S. D., & McGuire, K. (1990).  Education finance in the 1990’s. 
Denver, CO: Education Commission of the States. (ERIC Document 
Reproduction Services No. ED 330 098) 
 
Augenblick, J., & McGuire, C. K. (1983).  Changes in the equity of school finance 
systems in Oklahoma, Delaware, and Alaska.  Journal of Education Finance, 8, 
436-448. 
 
Ayers, S., Sparkman, W. F., & Wyatt, T. (1989).  Tax reform jeopardizes tax-exempt 
status of school bonds: The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibilities Act of 1982. 
Journal of Education Finance, 14, 513-521. 
 
Baker, B. D., & Imber, M. (1999).  “Rational educational explanation” or politics as 
usual? Evaluating the outcome of educational finance litigation in Kansas. 
Journal of Education Finance, 25, 121-140. 
   
207 
 
Baylis, E. A. (1997).  The Oregon model: Education reform by public mandate.  Journal 
of Law & Education, 26(2), 47-100. 
 
Benson, C. (1975).  Equity in school financing: Full state funding.  Bloomington, IN: Phi 
Delta Kappa Educational Foundation. 
 
Berger, C. (1998).  Equity without adjudication: Kansas school finance reform and the 
1992 School District Finance and Quality Performance Act.  Journal of Law & 
Education, 27(1), 1-46. 
 
Berne, R. (1988).  Equity issues in school finance.  Journal of Education Finance, 14, 
159-180. 
 
Berne, R., & Stiefel, L. (1983).  Changes in school finance equity: A national 
perspective.  Journal of Education Finance, 8, 419-435. 
 
Berne, R., & Stiefel, L. (1984).  The measurement of equity in school finance: 
Conceptual, methodological, and empirical dimensions.  Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
 
Berne, R., & Steifel, L. (1992).  Equity standards for state school finance programs: 
Philosophies and standards relevant to Section 5(d)(2) of the federal impact aid 
program.  Journal of Education Finance, 18, 88-112. 
 
Berne, R., & Stiefel, L. (1994).  Measuring equity at the school level: The financial 
perspective.  Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 16(4), 405-421. 
 
Beversluis, E. H. (1985),  [Review of the book The measurement of equity in school 
finance: Conceptual, methodological, and empirical consideration].  Educational 
Studies, 251-255. 
Biddle, B., & Berliner, D. (2002, May).  Unequal school funding in the United States.  
Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 48-59. 
 
Books, S. (1999).  School funding: Justice v. equity.  Equity & Excellence in Education, 
32(3), 53-58. 
 
Bosworth, M. H. (2001). Courts as catalysts: State supreme courts and public school 
finance equity. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
 
Bradley, A. (1995). Local fund-raising prompts larger questions about equity. Education 
Week, 15(6), 1-12. 
 
   
208 
Brent, B. O. (1999). An analysis of the influence of regional nonresidential expanded tax 
base approaches to school finance on measures of student and taxpayer equity. 
Journal of Education Finance, 24, 353-378. 
 
Brown, S. L. (1991).  Educational finance equity: recent developments in state court.  
NASSP Bulletin, 80-85. 
 
Carroll, S., & Park, R. E. (1983). The search for equity in school finance. Cambridge, 
MA: Ballinger Publishing Company. 
 
Chaikind, S., & Fowler, W. J. (Eds.). (2001).  Education finance in the new millennium: 
AEFA 2001 yearbook.  Larchmont, NY: Eye on Education. 
 
Clune, W. H. (2001).  [Review of the book Equity and adequacy in education finance: 
Issues and perspectives].  Teachers College Record, 103(1), 55-89. 
 
Cohn, E., & Smith, M. S. (1989).  A decade of improvement in wealth neutrality:  A 
study of school finance in South Carolina, 1977-1986.  Journal of Education 
Finance, 14, 380-389. 
 
Coleman, P. (1987).  Equal or equitable?: Fiscal equity and the problem of student 
dispersion,  Journal of Education Finance, 12, 45-68. 
 
Colvin, R. L. (1989). School finance: Equity concerns in an age of reforms.  Educational 
Researcher, 11-15. 
 
Coons, J. E. (1978).  Can education be equal and excellent?  Journal of Education 
Finance, 4, 145-157. 
 
Crampton, F. E. (1991).  The measurement of efficiency and equity in Oregon school 
finance: The beginning stages.  Journal of Education Finance, 16, 348-359. 
 
Crampton, F. E. (2000).  Education finance legislative activity and trends at the state 
level.  Journal of Education Finance, 25, 597-608. 
 
David, R. C., Honeyman, D. S., & Bryers, V. (1990).  Equity in Indiana school finance: 
A decade of local levy property tax restrictions.  Journal of Education Finance, 
16, 83-92. 
 
Dayton, J. (1998).  An examination of judicial treatment of rural schools in public school 
funding equity litigation.  Journal of Education Finance, 24, 179-205. 
 
Dively, J. A., & Hickrod, A. (1992).  Update of selected states‟ school equity funding 
litigation and the “box score”.  Journal of Education Finance, 17, 352-363. 
   
209 
  
Ericson, D. P. (1984).  Liberty and equality in education: A summary review.  
Educational Theory, 43(1), 97-102. 
 
Equality in education: Progress, problems, and possibilities.  (1991). CPRE Policy Brief 
Series. (ERIC Document Reproduction Services No. ED 336 828). 
 
Fleeter, H. B. (1995).  The impact of local tax-based sharing on school finance equity in 
Ohio: Implementation issues and comparative analysis.  Journal of Education 
Finance, 20, 270-301. 
 
Flickstein, H. A. (1995).  Inequalities in educational financing.  Teachers College 
Record, 96(4), 722-728. 
 
Florida Department of Education, Division of Public Schools.  (1984, September).  1984-
85 Florida education finance program statistical report  (MIS Series 85-03).  
Tallahassee, FL: Financial Management Section of the Bureau of Management 
Systems and Services. 
 
Florida Department of Education.  (2002, September).  2002-03 Funding for Florida 
school districts statistical report  (EIAS Series 2003-06).  Tallahassee, FL:  
Office of Funding and Financial Reporting of the Bureau of School Business 
Services. 
 
Fortune, J. C.. & O‟Neil, J. S. (1994). Production function analyses and the study of 
educational funding equity: A methodological critique. Journal of Education 
Finance, 20, 21-46. 
Fox, W., Murray, M, & Price, P. (2002).  Stability and equity in education finance 
formulas.  Journal of Education Finance, 27, 1013-1028. 
 
Gallagher, J. J. (1980).  Can we have equality and educational excellence? A proposal for 
maximum gain for minimum investment.  Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, National Institute of Education. (ERIC 
Document Reproduction Services No. ED 194 481) 
 
Garris, J. M, & Cohn, E. (1996).  Combining efficiency and equity: A new funding 
approach for public education.  Journal of Education Finance, 22, 114-134. 
 
Geske, T. G. (1984). [Review of the book The search for equity in school finance]. 
American Journal of Education, 516-520. 
 
Goertz, M., & Edwards, M. (1999).  In search of excellence for all: The courts and New 
Jersey school finance reform.  Journal of Education Finance, 25, 5-32. 
   
210 
 
Green, P. (1996).  Equity, adequacy and efficiency in New York City school finance 
litigation.  Journal of Education Finance, 22, 88-113. 
 
Greene, K. V. (1979).  The equalizing effects of district power equalization: A review of 
the economics literature.  Journal of Education Finance, 5, 187-214. 
 
Gurwitz, A. S. (1981).  The economics of public school finance.  Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand Corporation. (ERIC Document Reproduction Services No. ED 256 014) 
 
Guthrie, J. W. (1975).  Equity in school financing: District power equalizing.  
Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation. 
 
Guthrie, J. W., Garms, W. I., & Pierce, L. C. (1988).  School finance and educational 
policy (2nd ed.).  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
Harp, L. (1993).  Texas Governor preaches the gospel of finance equity.  Education 
Week, 12(31), 1, 16-17. 
 
Harp, L. (1994).  Vermont House clears plan to encourage equity.  Education Week, 14. 
 
Hayes, K. J., Slottje, D. J., & Taylor, L. L. (1993).  Equality and fiscal equity in school 
finance reform.  Economics of Education Review, 12(2), 171-176. 
 
Heinold, D. (1983).  Impact of federal monies on equity among states in K-12 public 
school finance.  Journal of Education Finance, 8, 461-474. 
 
Heise, M. (1995).  The effect of constitutional litigation on education finance: More 
preliminary analyses and modeling.  Journal of Education Finance, 21, 195-216. 
 
Hendrie, C. (1998).  High court in New Jersey ends funding suit.  Education Week, 
17(37), 1, 15. 
 
Hirth, M. A. (1994).  A multistate analysis of school finance issues and equity trends in 
Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, 1982-1992: The implications for 21st century 
school finance policies.  Journal of Education Finance, 20, 163-190. 
 
Hooker, R. (1986). [Review of the book The measurement on equity in School Finance]. 
Journal of Education Finance, 11, 498-499. 
Huerta, L. (2006).  Next steps for results: Campaign for fiscal equity v. state of New 
York.  Journal of Education Finance, 31(4), 379-394. 
 
   
211 
Jefferson, A. L. (1983).  Assessment of fiscal equity: How well have we done?  Journal 
of Education Finance, 9, 171-184. 
 
Johns, R. L., Alexander, K., & Jordan, F. (1972).  Financing education: Fiscal and legal 
alternatives.  Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company. 
 
Johns, R. L., Alexander, K., & Stollar, D. H. (Eds.). (1971).  Status and impact of 
educational finance programs.  Gainesville, FL: National Education Finance 
Project. 
 
Johns, R. L., Goffman, I. J., Alexander, K., & Stollar, D. H. (Eds.). (1970).  Economic 
factors affecting the financing of education.  Gainesville, FL: National Education 
Finance Project. 
 
Johns, R. L., & Morphet, E. L. (1960).  Financing the public schools.  Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Johns, R. L., Morphet, E. L., & Alexander, K. (1983).  The economics and financing of 
education (4th ed.).  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
Johnson, G., & Pillianayagam, M. G. (1991).  A longitudinal equity study of Ohio‟s 
school finance system 1980-1989.  Journal of Education Finance, 17, 60-82. 
 
Johnston, R. C. (1997).  North Carolina court targets adequacy in equity ruling.  
Education Week, 20-24. 
 
Jordan, K. F., & Lyons, T. S. (1992). Financing public education in an era of change. 
Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappan Educational Foundation. 
 
Jordan, T. S., Garcia, J. P., Jr., Kops, G., & Jordan, K. F. (1998).  School finance reform 
in New Mexico.  Journal of Education Finance, 23, 323-350. 
 
Kearney, C. P., & Chen, L. (1989). Measuring equity in Michigan school finance: A 
further look.  Journal of Education Finance, 14, 319-367. 
 
Keller, B. (2000). School finance case draws to close in New York.  Education Week, 23, 
29. 
 
Koski, W. S., & Levin, H. M. (2000).  Twenty-five years after Rodriguez: What have we 
learned?  Teachers College Record, 102(3), 480-513. 
 
Krupey, J. E., & Hopeman, A. (1983).  Minnesota school finance equity, 1973-1982.  
Journal of Education Finance, 8, 490-501. 
  
   
212 
Ladd, H. F., Chalk, R., & Hansen, J. S. (Eds.). (1999).  Equity and adequacy in education 
finance: Issues and perspectives.  Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Lake, P. (1983).  Expenditure equity in the public school of atlantic Canada.  Journal of 
Education Finance, 8, 449-460. 
Laubert, L. (2005).  Housing markets and school financing.  Journal of Education 
Finance,30, 187-208. 
 
Larson, L. (1990).  State school finance litigation: A background paper.  St. Paul, MN: 
Minnesota House of Representatives, St. Paul Research Department. (ERIC 
Document Reproduction Services No. ED 335 791). 
Lindsay, D. (1995).  Two finance cases spur New York court to consider how to measure 
equity.  Education Week, 13. 
 
Lindsay, D. (1995).  West Virginia court reopens landmark finance case.  Education 
Week, 9. 
MacPhail-Wilcox, B. (1985).  Fiscal equity for public schools in a nonreform state: North 
Carolina, 1975-1983.  Journal of Education Finance, 10, 417-425. 
Mathis, W. (2003).  Financial challenges, adequacy, and equity in rural schools and 
communities.  Journal of Education Finance, 29, 119-136. 
McKinley, S. (2005).  The journey to adequacy: The DeRolph saga (Part 1).  Journal of 
Education Finance,30, 288-312. 
McKinley, S. (2005).  The journey to adequacy: The DeRolph saga (Part 2).  Journal of 
Education Finance,30, 321-381. 
 
McGuire, K. (1994).  The current policy debate in school finance: Why does it matter?  
The Clearinghouse, 68(2), 71-73. 
Melvin, L. D. (1984).  The law of public school finance.  Contemporary Education, 
55(3), 149-155. 
 
Meyers, T. J., Valesky, T. C., & Hirth, M. A. (1995).  K-12 education funding in 
Tennessee: Equity now - adequacy coming.  Journal of Education Finance, 20, 
394-409. 
 
Molnar, A. (1985).  The equality of opportunity trap.  Educational Leadership, 60-61. 
 
Molnar, A. (1995).  School funding: The right issue, The wrong logic.  Educational 
Leadership, 58-59. 
   
213 
 
 
Murphy, J., & Picus, L. O. (1996).  Special program encroachment on school district 
general funds in California: Implications for Serrano equalization.  Journal of 
Education Finance, 21, 366-386. 
 
Odden, A. R. (Ed.). (1992)  Rethinking school finance: An agenda for the 1990’s.  San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
 
Odden, A. R., & Clune, W. H. (1998).  School finance systems: Aging structures in need 
of renovation.  Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 20(3), 157-177. 
 
Owens, T., & Maiden, J. (1999).  A comparison of interschool and interdistrict funding 
equity in Florida.  Journal of Education Finance, 24, 503-518. 
 
Paquette, J. (1987).  Vertical equity in Ontario education finance.  Journal of Education 
Finance, 13, 135-157. 
 
Phelps, J. L, & Addonizio, M. F. (1981).  District power equalizing: Cure-all or 
prescription.  Journal of Education Finance, 7, 64-87. 
 
Pipho, C. (1993).  School finance: Moving from equity to productivity.  Phi Delta 
Kappan, 590-591. 
 
Plecki, M. L. (2000).  Washington‟s school finance reform: Moderate success and the 
need for improvement.  Journal of Education Finance, 25, 565-582. 
 
Prince, H. (1997).  Michigan‟s school finance reform: Initial pupil-equity results.  
Journal of Education Finance, 22, 394-409. 
 
Puerta, R. (1999).  A Pennsylvania perspective on Charles Berger‟s “Equity without 
adjudication.”  Journal of Law & Education, 28(2), 235-24. 
 
Rebell, M. A. (1998).  Fiscal equity litigation and the democratic imperative.  Journal of 
Education Finance, 24, 23-50. 
 
Reinhard, B. (1997).  Wisconsin judge finds state‟s school aid system constitutional.  
Education Week, 24. 
 
Rossmiller, R. A. (1987).  Achieving equity and effectiveness in schooling.  Journal of 
Education Finance, 12, 561-577. 
 
Rydell, L. H. (1983).  Equity for taxpayers and equal opportunity for students in Maine.  
Journal of Education Finance, 9, 39-52. 
   
214 
 
Sample, P. R., & Hartman, W. T. (1990).  An equity simulation of Pennsylvania‟s school 
finance system.  Journal of Education Finance, 16, 49-69. 
 
Scheiuer, J. (1983).  The equity of New York state‟s system of financing schools: An 
update.  Journal of Education Finance, 9, 79-96. 
Schnalberg, L. (1996).  Arizona high court again rules finance plan unconstitutional.  
Education Week, 23. 
 
Schnalberg, L. (1996).  Report finds no easy solutions for disparities in school funding.  
Education Week, 23. 
 
Shelton, G. H. (2000).  Equity for the 21st Century.  Unpublished Manuscript. (ERIC 
Document Reproduction Services No. ED 441 895) 
 
Slavin, R. E. (1999).  How can funding equity ensure enhanced achievement?  Journal of 
Education Finance, 24, 519-582. 
 
Smith, C. A. (1994).  Simulated partial property redistribution in Illinois: An empirical 
and spatial analysis.  Journal of Education Finance, 20, 191-200. 
 
Stark, S., Wood, R. C., & Honeyman, D. S. (1993).  The Florida education lottery: Its use 
as a substitute for existing funds and its effects on the equity of school funding.  
Journal of Education Finance, 18, 231-242. 
 
Taylor, L., Chambers, J., & Robinson, J. (2004).  A new geographic cost of education 
index for Alaska: Old approaches with some new twists.  Journal of Education 
Finance, 30, 51-78. 
 
Thompson, D. C., Camp, W., Horn, J. G., & Stewart, G. K. (1988, September).  Finance, 
facilities, and equity: Emerging concerns for the future.  Paper presented at the 
meeting of the National Rural Education Research Forum and the National Rural 
Education Association Convention, Bismark, SD. (ERIC Document Reproduction 
Services No. ED 307 087) 
 
Thompson, D. C., Honeyman, D. S., & Wood, R. C. (1993).  The Kansas school district 
equalization act: A study of fiscal equity funding categories.  Journal of 
Education Finance, 19, 36-68. 
 
Underwood, J. K. (1989).  Changing equal protection analyses in finance equity 
litigation.  Journal of Education Finance, 14, 413-425. 
 
   
215 
Underwood, J. K. (1994).  School finance litigation: Legal theories, judicial activism, and 
social neglect.  Journal of Education Finance, 20, 143-162. 
 
Verstegen, D. A. (1987).  Equity in state education finance: A response to Rodriguez.  
Journal of Education Finance, 12, 315-330. 
Verstegen, D. A. (1994).  Efficiency and equity in the provision and reform of American 
schooling.  Journal of Education Finance, 20, 107-131. 
 
Vergstegen, D. A. (1996).  Concepts and measures fiscal inequality: A new approach and 
effects for five states.  Journal of Education Finance, 22, 145-160. 
 
Verstegen, D. A. (2000).  Author E. Wise and the promise of equal educational 
opportunity.  Journal of Education Finance, 25, 583-596. 
 
Verstegen, D. A. (2002, October).  The new finance.  American School Board Journal, 
24-26. 
 
Verstegen, D. A., & Salmon, R. G. (1988).  Virginia education finance reform: Have 
excellence and equity been achieved?  Journal of Education Finance, 14, 200-
220. 
Verstegen, D. A., & Salmon, R. G. (1989).  The conceptualization & measurement of 
equity in school finance in Virginia.  Journal of Education Finance, 15, 205-228. 
 
Verstegen, D. A., & Salmon, R. G. (1991).  Assessing fiscal equity in Virginia: Cross-
time comparisons.  Journal of Education Finance, 16, 416-430. 
Vesely, R., & Crampton, F. (2004).  An assessment of vertical equity in four states:  
Addressing risk factors in education funding formulas.  Journal of Education 
Finance, 30, 111-122. 
 
Vinik, D. F. (1996).  The contrasting politics of remedy: The Alabama and Kentucky 
school equity funding suits.  Journal of Education Finance, 22, 60-87. 
 
Ward, J. G. (1987).  In pursuit of equity and adequacy: Reforming school finance in 
Illinois.  Journal of Education Finance, 12, 107-120. 
 
Wekhart, L. A., & Buoncristiano, B. A. (1984).  Educational finance and educational 
excellence: A programmic approach to school finance reform.  Brooklyn, NY: 
New York City Board of Education. (ERIC Document Reproduction Services No. 
ED 244 382) 
 
   
216 
White, K. A. (1997).  Updating „82 ruling, Judge orders West Virginia funding plan.  
Education Week, 20. 
 
Williams, M. F. (1983).  Small change: Maryland‟s progress toward greater school 
finance equity.  Journal of Education Finance, 9, 97-115. 
Wong, K. K. (1999).  Funding public schools: Politics and policies.  Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
 Curtis Todd Bowden received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Business 
Administration with a major in Accounting from the University of South Florida in 
Tampa, Florida in 1993. He subsequently earned a Masters of Education Degree in 
Educational Leadership from the University of South Florida in 1998. 
 Mr. Bowden is a third generation educator, following both his mother and his 
grandmother on his father's side into the profession.  He has worked in a variety of 
instructional and administrative positions with the school districts of Hillsborough and 
Sarasota Counties on Florida's gulf coast.   
 His administrative experiences include assistant principal positions at both a 
comprehensive and a technical high school in Hillsborough County.  He has also served 
as an adult high school principal and an adult technical school principal in Hillsborough 
County. 
 Mr. Bowden currently serves as the director of the Sarasota County Technical 
Institute in Sarasota, Florida. 
 
